www-commits
[Top][All Lists]
Advanced
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

www/philosophy surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br....

From: GNUN
Subject: www/philosophy surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br....
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 2021 12:31:36 -0400 (EDT) 
CVSROOT:        /web/www
Module name:    www
Changes by:     GNUN <gnun>     21/07/30 12:31:36

Modified files:
        philosophy     : surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.html 
        philosophy/po  : surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br-en.html 
                         surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.po 

Log message:
        Automatic update by GNUnited Nations.

CVSWeb URLs:
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.28&r2=1.29
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br-en.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.23&r2=1.24
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.po?cvsroot=www&r1=1.71&r2=1.72

Patches:
Index: surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.html,v
retrieving revision 1.28
retrieving revision 1.29
diff -u -b -r1.28 -r1.29
--- surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.html        19 Dec 2020 14:03:03 -0000      
1.28
+++ surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.html        30 Jul 2021 16:31:35 -0000      
1.29
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 <!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE" 
value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
 
 <!--#include virtual="/server/header.pt-br.html" -->
-<!-- Parent-Version: 1.90 -->
+<!-- Parent-Version: 1.96 -->
+<!-- This page is derived from /server/standards/boilerplate.html -->
 
 <!-- This file is automatically generated by GNUnited Nations! -->
 <title>Qual o Nível de Vigilância Que a Democracia Pode Suportar? - Projeto 
GNU -
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@
 <!--#include virtual="/server/banner.pt-br.html" -->
 <h2 class="center">Qual o Nível de Vigilância Que a Democracia Pode 
Suportar?</h2>
 
-<address class="byline center">por <a href="http://www.stallman.org/";>Richard 
Stallman</a></address>
+<address class="byline center">por <a href="https://www.stallman.org/";>Richard 
Stallman</a></address>
 
 <!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced
      anti-ad-block system -->
@@ -76,15 +77,15 @@
 softwares não livres; a NSA <a
 
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm";>usa</a>
 e até mesmo <a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>cria</a>
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>cria</a>
 falhas de segurança em softwares não livres para invadir nossos próprios
 computadores e roteadores. Software livre nos dá controle sobre nossos
 próprios computadores, mas <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>não protege nossa
+href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>não protege nossa
 privacidade quando utilizamos a Internet</a>.</p>
 
 <p><a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>Uma
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>Uma
 legislação suprapartidária para “reduzir os poderes de vigilância 
doméstica
 nos EUA”</a> está sendo elaborada, mas não estabelece o limite de acesso de
 nossos dossiês virtuais pelo governo. Isso não será suficiente para proteger
@@ -103,26 +104,26 @@
 
 <p>Um oficial não identificado do governo dos EUA falou de forma ameaçadora a
 jornalistas em 2011 que os <a
-href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river";>EUA
+href="https://www.rcfp.org/journals/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river/";>EUA
 não iriam intimar repórteres porque “Nós sabemos com quem vocês estão
 falando”</a>. Em alguns casos, <a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>registros
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>registros
 de ligações telefônicas de jornalistas são obtidos</a> para descobrir isso,
 mas Snowden nos mostrou que na verdade eles obtêm todos os registros de
 ligações telefônicas de todos nos EUA, o tempo todo, <a
 
href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order";>da
 empresa Verizon</a> e <a
-href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>de
+href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>de
 outras empresas operadoras de comunicação também</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Ativistas opositores e dissidentes devem manter segredo em relação ao
 Estado, que está disposto a jogar um jogo sujo. A União Estadunidense pelas
 Liberdades Civis (ACLU) demonstrou que o governo dos EUA adota a <a
-href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>prática sistemática
-de infiltração em grupos dissidentes pacíficos</a> sob o pretexto de que
-poderia haver terroristas entre eles. O ponto em que a vigilância é
-excessiva é atingido quando o Estado pode identificar quem se comunicou com
-um jornalista ou com um dissidente conhecido.</p>
+href="https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>prática
+sistemática de infiltração em grupos dissidentes pacíficos</a> sob o
+pretexto de que poderia haver terroristas entre eles. O ponto em que a
+vigilância é excessiva é atingido quando o Estado pode identificar quem se
+comunicou com um jornalista ou com um dissidente conhecido.</p>
 </div>
 
 <h3 class="subheader">A Informação, Uma Vez Coletada, Será Utilizada de 
Modo Abusivo</h3>
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@
 supondo que o governo obedeça as leis. (A NSA induziu a corte da Lei de
 Vigilância de Inteligência Estrangeira - FISA <sup><a id="TransNote1-rev"
 href="#TransNote1">1</a></sup> a erro, a qual declarou <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>não ser
+href="https://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>não ser
 possível responsabilizar a NSA</a>.) A suspeita de um crime seria fundamento
 para o acesso, então uma vez que os denunciantes foram acusados de
 “espionagem”, localizar o “espião” será uma desculpa para acessar o 
material
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@
 
 <p>Além disso, a equipe de vigilância do estado utilizará os dados para fins
 pessoais. Alguns agentes da NSA <a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>usaram
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>usaram
 os sistemas de vigilância dos EUA para perseguir suas amantes</a> —
 anteriores, atuais ou desejadas — em uma prática chamada de
 <i>“LOVEINT”</i><sup><a id="TransNote2-rev"
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@
 href="https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared";>novos
 sistemas digitais</a>. Em 2016, um promotor foi acusado de forjar as
 assinaturas de juízes para obter autorização para <a
-href="http://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933";>grampear
+href="https://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933";>grampear
 uma pessoa que era objeto de uma obsessão romântica</a>. A AP sabe de <a
 href="https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43";>muitas outras
 ocorrências nos EUA</a>.
@@ -175,10 +176,10 @@
 seja proibido. Uma vez que os dados foram acumulados e o estado tem a
 possibilidade de acesso a eles, ele pode usar esses dados de maneira
 terrível, como mostrado por exemplos da <a
-href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/";>Europa</a>,
+href="https://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/";>Europa</a>,
 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment";>dos
 EUA</a> e, mais recentemente, <a
-href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021";>Turquia</a>.
+href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021";>Turquia</a>.
 (A confusão da Turquia sobre quem realmente usou o programa Bylock só
 exacerbou a injustiça básica e deliberada de punir arbitrariamente as
 pessoas por terem usado.)
@@ -190,7 +191,7 @@
 trabalhando para Estados hostis</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Governos podem facilmente usar a capacidade de vigilância em massa para <a
-href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html";>subverter
+href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html";>subverter
 diretamente a democracia</a>.</p>
 
 <p>A vigilância total que o Estado pode obter permite que o mesmo realize uma
@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@
 servidor da empresa.</p>
 
 <p>Proteja a privacidade de seus amigos e conhecidos também. <a
-href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>Não
+href="https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>Não
 forneça informação pessoal deles</a>, exceto como contatá-los, e nunca
 forneça a qualquer site sua lista de contatos de e-mail e de telefones. Não
 informe a uma empresa, como o Facebook, nada sobre seus amigos que eles
@@ -347,10 +348,11 @@
 Estado.</p>
 
 <p>A NSA, por meio do software de vigilância PRISM, <a
-href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2";>conseguiu entrar
-nas bases de dados de muitas grandes corporações da Internet</a>. AT&amp;T
-guardou todos os seus registros de chamada telefônica desde 1987 e <a
-href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>disponibiliza
+href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies";>conseguiu
+entrar nas bases de dados de muitas grandes corporações da
+Internet</a>. AT&amp;T guardou todos os seus registros de chamada telefônica
+desde 1987 e <a
+href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>disponibiliza
 para o DEA</a> para pesquisa sob demanda. Estritamente falando, o governo
 dos EUA não possui aqueles dados, mas em termos práticos ele pode acessá-los
 mesmo assim. Algumas empresas são elogiadas por <a
@@ -380,18 +382,17 @@
 <p>Nós poderíamos corrigir ambos problemas adotando um sistema de pagamentos
 anônimos — anônimos para o pagador (não queremos ajudar o vendedor a se
 esquivar das taxas). <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>Bitcoin
+href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>Bitcoin
 não é anônimo</a>, apesar de haver esforços para desenvolver formas de 
pagar
 anonimamente com o Bitcoin. Porém, a tecnologia para <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>dinheiro
+href="https://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>dinheiro
 digital foi primeiramente nos anos 80s</a>; o software GNU para fazer isso é
-chamado <a href="http://taler.net/";>GNU Taler</a>. Agora, só precisamos
+chamado <a href="https://taler.net/";>GNU Taler</a>. Agora, só precisamos
 organizar um negócio adequado, e que o Estado não o obstrua.</p>
 
 <p>Um outro método possível para pagamentos anônimos seria usar <a
-href="https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html";>cartões
-pré-pagos de telefone</a>. É menos conveniente, mas muito fácil de
-implementar.</p>
+href="/philosophy/phone-anonymous-payment.html">cartões pré-pagos de
+telefone</a>. É menos conveniente, mas muito fácil de implementar.</p>
 
 <p>Uma ameaça ainda maior da coleção de dados pessoais dos sites é que 
crackers
 podem quebrar a segurança e acessar, tomar e fazer mau uso deles. Isso
@@ -469,11 +470,11 @@
 <p>Provedores de serviços de Internet e de telefone mantém dados extensivos 
de
 seus contatos de usuários (navegação, chamadas telefônicas etc.). Com
 telefones móveis, eles também <a
-href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>registram
+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210312235125/http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>registram
 a localização física do usuário</a>. Eles mantêm esses dossiês por um 
longo
 período de tempo: cerca de 30 anos, no caso da AT&amp;T. Em breve, elas vão
 até mesmo <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>registrar
+href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>registrar
 as atividades corporais do usuário</a>. Parece que a <a
 
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location";>NSA
 coleta dados da localização de telefone celular</a> em massa.</p>
@@ -486,7 +487,7 @@
 <p>Essa solução não é inteiramente satisfatória, pois ela não vai impedir
 fisicamente o governo de coletar todas as informações imediatamente, pois
 elas são geradas — que é o que os <a
-href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>EUA
+href="https://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>EUA
 fazem com algumas ou todas empresas de telefonia</a>. Nós teríamos que
 confiar na proibição disto por lei. Porém, isso seria melhor do que a
 situação atual, na qual a lei relevante (A <i>USA PAT RIOT Act</i><sup><a
@@ -528,7 +529,7 @@
 
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131025014556/http://photographyisnotacrime.com/2013/10/23/jeff-gray-arrested-recording-cops-days-becoming-pinac-partner/";>fotógrafos</a>.)
 Uma cidade na Califórnia que exigiu que policiais utilizassem câmeras de
 vídeo na farda todo o tempo, descobriu que <a
-href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>o
+href="https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>o
 uso da força deles caiu em 60%</a>;. A ACLU concorda com isto.</p>
 
 <p><a
@@ -536,10 +537,11 @@
 não são pessoas, e a elas não se aplicam diretos humanos</a>. É legítimo
 requerer que negócios publiquem os detalhes dos processo que podem causar
 desastres químicos, biológicos, nucleares, fiscais, computacionais (ex.: <a
-href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org";>DRM</a>) ou político (ex.: <i>lobby</i>)
-para a sociedade, seja qual for o nível necessário para o bem público. O
-perigo dessas operações (considerando o vazamento de óleo da petroleira BP,
-colapsos de Fukushima e as crises fiscais em 2008) superam o terrorismo.</p>
+href="https://DefectiveByDesign.org";>DRM</a>) ou político (ex.:
+<i>lobby</i>) para a sociedade, seja qual for o nível necessário para o bem
+público. O perigo dessas operações (considerando o vazamento de óleo da
+petroleira BP, colapsos de Fukushima e as crises fiscais em 2008) superam o
+terrorismo.</p>
 
 <p>Porém, jornalismo deve ser protegido da vigilância mesmo quando esta é 
parte
 de um negócio.</p>
@@ -637,7 +639,7 @@
 
 <!-- for id="content", starts in the include above -->
 <!--#include virtual="/server/footer.pt-br.html" -->
-<div id="footer">
+<div id="footer" role="contentinfo">
 <div class="unprintable">
 
 <p>Envie perguntas em geral sobre a FSF e o GNU para <a
@@ -657,7 +659,7 @@
 
         &lt;web-translators@gnu.org&gt;</a>.</p>
 
-        <p>For information on coordinating and submitting translations of
+        <p>For information on coordinating and contributing translations of
         our web pages, see <a
         href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations
         README</a>. -->
@@ -667,8 +669,8 @@
 <a
 href="mailto:web-translators@gnu.org";>&lt;web-translators@gnu.org&gt;</a>.
 </p><p>Consulte o <a href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Guia
-para as traduções</a> para mais informações sobre a coordenação e o 
envio de
-traduções das páginas deste site.</p>
+para as traduções</a> para mais informações sobre a coordenação e a
+contribuição com traduções das páginas deste site.</p>
 </div>
 
 <!-- Regarding copyright, in general, standalone pages (as opposed to
@@ -687,7 +689,7 @@
      
      There is more detail about copyright years in the GNU Maintainers
      Information document, www.gnu.org/prep/maintain. -->
-<p>Copyright &copy; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 Richard Stallman</p>
+<p>Copyright &copy; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 Richard 
Stallman</p>
 
 <p>Esta página está licenciada sob uma licença <a rel="license"
 href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/deed.pt_BR";>Creative
@@ -708,7 +710,7 @@
 <p class="unprintable"><!-- timestamp start -->
 Última atualização:
 
-$Date: 2020/12/19 14:03:03 $
+$Date: 2021/07/30 16:31:35 $
 
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>

Index: po/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br-en.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br-en.html,v
retrieving revision 1.23
retrieving revision 1.24
diff -u -b -r1.23 -r1.24
--- po/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br-en.html  19 Dec 2020 14:03:03 -0000      
1.23
+++ po/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br-en.html  30 Jul 2021 16:31:36 -0000      
1.24
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 <!--#include virtual="/server/header.html" -->
-<!-- Parent-Version: 1.90 -->
+<!-- Parent-Version: 1.96 -->
+<!-- This page is derived from /server/standards/boilerplate.html -->
 <title>How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?
 - GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title>
 <style type="text/css" media="print,screen"><!--
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@
 <h2 class="center">How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?</h2>
 
 <address class="byline center">by
-<a href="http://www.stallman.org/";>Richard Stallman</a></address>
+<a href="https://www.stallman.org/";>Richard Stallman</a></address>
 
 <!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced
      anti-ad-block system -->
@@ -70,14 +71,14 @@
 can't trust nonfree software; the NSA
 <a 
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm";>uses</a>
 and
-even <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>creates</a>
+even <a 
href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>creates</a>
 security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers
 and routers.  Free software gives us control of our own computers,
-but <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>that won't
+but <a href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>that won't
 protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>.</p>
 
 <p><a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>Bipartisan
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>Bipartisan
 legislation to &ldquo;curtail the domestic surveillance
 powers&rdquo;</a> in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on
 limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers.  That won't
@@ -97,22 +98,22 @@
 
 <p>An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in
 2011 that
-the <a 
href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river";>U.S.
 would
+the <a 
href="https://www.rcfp.org/journals/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river/";>U.S.
 would
 not subpoena reporters because &ldquo;We know who you're talking
 to.&rdquo;</a>
-Sometimes <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>journalists'
+Sometimes <a 
href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>journalists'
 phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden
 has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records
 of everyone in the U.S., all the
 time, <a 
href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order";>from
 Verizon</a>
-and <a 
href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>from
+and <a 
href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>from
 other companies too</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from
 states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them.  The ACLU has
 demonstrated the U.S. government's <a
-href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>systematic
+href="https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>systematic
 practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext
 that there might be terrorists among them.  The point at which
 surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@
 accumulated data.  That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not
 even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules.
 (The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it
-was <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>unable
+was <a href="https://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>unable
 to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime
 will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of
 &ldquo;espionage,&rdquo; finding the &ldquo;spy&rdquo; will provide an
@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@
 
 <p>In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data
 for personal reasons.  Some NSA
-agents <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>used
+agents <a 
href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>used
 U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>&mdash;past,
 present, or wished-for&mdash;in a practice called
 &ldquo;LOVEINT.&rdquo; The NSA says it has caught and punished this a
@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@
 with <a 
href="https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared";>new
 digital systems</a>.  In 2016, a prosecutor was accused of forging
 judges' signatures to get authorization
-to <a 
href="http://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933";>
+to <a 
href="https://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933";>
 wiretap someone who was the object of a romantic obsession</a>. The AP
 knows
 of <a href="https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43";>many
@@ -171,7 +172,7 @@
 from <a 
href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/";>Europe</a>,
 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment";>the
 US</a>, and most
-recently <a 
href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021";>Turkey</a>.
+recently <a 
href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021";>Turkey</a>.
 (Turkey's confusion about who had really used the Bylock program only
 exacerbated the basic deliberate injustice of arbitrarily punishing
 people for having used it.)
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@
 working for hostile states</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability
-to <a 
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html";>subvert
+to <a 
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html";>subvert
 democracy directly</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to
@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@
 <p>However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history
 shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act),
 suspended, or <a
-href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>ignored</a>.</p>
+href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>ignored</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for
 total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a
@@ -250,7 +251,7 @@
 pertinent data to the company's server.</p>
 
 <p>Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy,
-too.  <a 
href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>Don't
+too.  <a 
href="https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>Don't
 give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them,
 and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts.
 Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that
@@ -343,10 +344,10 @@
 systematically available to the state.</p>
 
 <p>The NSA, through PRISM,
-has <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2";>gotten
+has <a 
href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies";>gotten
 into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>.  AT&amp;T
 has saved all its phone call records since 1987
-and <a 
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>makes
+and <a 
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>makes
 them available to the DEA</a> to search on request.  Strictly
 speaking, the U.S.  government does not possess that data, but in
 practical terms it may as well possess it.  Some companies are praised
@@ -376,17 +377,17 @@
 <p>We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
 payments&mdash;anonymous for the payer, that is.  (We don't want to
 help the payee dodge
-taxes.)  <a 
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>Bitcoin
+taxes.)  <a 
href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>Bitcoin
 is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay
 anonymously with Bitcoin.  However, technology
-for <a href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>digital
+for <a href="https://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>digital
 cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; the GNU software for doing
-this is called <a href="http://taler.net/";>GNU Taler</a>.  Now we need
+this is called <a href="https://taler.net/";>GNU Taler</a>.  Now we need
 only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct
 them.</p>
 
 <p>Another possible method for anonymous payments would
-use <a 
href="https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html";>prepaid
+use <a href="/philosophy/phone-anonymous-payment.html">prepaid
 phone cards</a>.  It is less convenient, but very easy to
 implement.</p>
 
@@ -463,10 +464,10 @@
 <p>Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive
 data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc).  With
 mobile phones, they
-also <a 
href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>record
+also <a 
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210312235125/http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>record
 the user's physical location</a>.  They keep these dossiers for a long
 time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&amp;T.  Soon they will
-even <a 
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>record
+even <a 
href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>record
 the user's body activities</a>.  It appears that
 the <a 
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location";>NSA
 collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk.</p>
@@ -479,7 +480,7 @@
 <p>This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't
 physically stop the government from collecting all the information
 immediately as it is generated&mdash;which is what
-the <a 
href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>U.S.
 does
+the <a 
href="https://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>U.S.
 does
 with some or all phone companies</a>.  We would have to rely on
 prohibiting that by law.  However, that would be better than the
 current situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not
@@ -520,7 +521,7 @@
 photographers</a>.)
 One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all
 the time
-found <a 
href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>their
+found <a 
href="https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>their
 use of force fell by 60%</a>.  The ACLU is in favor of this.</p>
 
 <p><a
@@ -528,7 +529,7 @@
 are not people, and not entitled to human rights</a>.  It is
 legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes
 that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational
-(e.g., <a href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org";>DRM</a>) or political
+(e.g., <a href="https://DefectiveByDesign.org";>DRM</a>) or political
 (e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for
 public well-being.  The danger of these operations (consider the BP
 oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs
@@ -573,7 +574,7 @@
 
 </div><!-- for id="content", starts in the include above -->
 <!--#include virtual="/server/footer.html" -->
-<div id="footer">
+<div id="footer" role="contentinfo">
 <div class="unprintable">
 
 <p>Please send general FSF &amp; GNU inquiries to
@@ -591,13 +592,13 @@
         to <a href="mailto:web-translators@gnu.org";>
         &lt;web-translators@gnu.org&gt;</a>.</p>
 
-        <p>For information on coordinating and submitting translations of
+        <p>For information on coordinating and contributing translations of
         our web pages, see <a
         href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations
         README</a>. -->
 Please see the <a
 href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations
-README</a> for information on coordinating and submitting translations
+README</a> for information on coordinating and contributing translations
 of this article.</p>
 </div>
 
@@ -618,7 +619,7 @@
      There is more detail about copyright years in the GNU Maintainers
      Information document, www.gnu.org/prep/maintain. -->
 
-<p>Copyright &copy; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 Richard Stallman</p>
+<p>Copyright &copy; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 Richard 
Stallman</p>
 
 <p>This page is licensed under a <a rel="license"
 href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/";>Creative
@@ -628,7 +629,7 @@
 
 <p class="unprintable">Updated:
 <!-- timestamp start -->
-$Date: 2020/12/19 14:03:03 $
+$Date: 2021/07/30 16:31:36 $
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>
 </div>

Index: po/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.po
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.po,v
retrieving revision 1.71
retrieving revision 1.72
diff -u -b -r1.71 -r1.72
--- po/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.po       30 Jul 2021 15:59:02 -0000      
1.71
+++ po/surveillance-vs-democracy.pt-br.po       30 Jul 2021 16:31:36 -0000      
1.72
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
-"X-Outdated-Since: 2021-07-03 07:56+0000\n"
 "Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n > 1)\n"
 "X-Generator: Gtranslator 40.0\n"
reply via email to
[Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread]