Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH] pci: Use PCI aliases when determining device IOMMU address space

[Auger Eric]

Hi Alex,

[+ Robin]

On 3/27/19 5:37 PM, Alex Williamson wrote:
> On Wed, 27 Mar 2019 14:25:00 +0800
> Peter Xu <address@hidden> wrote:
> 
>> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 04:55:19PM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
>>> Conventional PCI buses pre-date requester IDs.  An IOMMU cannot
>>> distinguish by devfn & bus between devices in a conventional PCI
>>> topology and therefore we cannot assign them separate AddressSpaces.
>>> By taking this requester ID aliasing into account, QEMU better matches
>>> the bare metal behavior and restrictions, and enables shared
>>> AddressSpace configurations that are otherwise not possible with
>>> guest IOMMU support.
>>>
>>> For the latter case, given any example where an IOMMU group on the
>>> host includes multiple devices:
>>>
>>>   $ ls  /sys/kernel/iommu_groups/1/devices/
>>>   0000:00:01.0  0000:01:00.0  0000:01:00.1  
>>
>> [1]
>>
>>>
>>> If we incorporate a vIOMMU into the VM configuration, we're restricted
>>> that we can only assign one of the endpoints to the guest because a
>>> second endpoint will attempt to use a different AddressSpace.  VFIO
>>> only supports IOMMU group level granularity at the container level,
>>> preventing this second endpoint from being assigned:
>>>
>>> qemu-system-x86_64 -machine q35... \
>>>   -device intel-iommu,intremap=on \
>>>   -device pcie-root-port,addr=1e.0,id=pcie.1 \
>>>   -device vfio-pci,host=1:00.0,bus=pcie.1,addr=0.0,multifunction=on \
>>>   -device vfio-pci,host=1:00.1,bus=pcie.1,addr=0.1
>>>
>>> qemu-system-x86_64: -device vfio-pci,host=1:00.1,bus=pcie.1,addr=0.1: vfio \
>>> 0000:01:00.1: group 1 used in multiple address spaces
>>>
>>> However, when QEMU incorporates proper aliasing, we can make use of a
>>> PCIe-to-PCI bridge to mask the requester ID, resulting in a hack that
>>> provides the downstream devices with the same AddressSpace, ex:
>>>
>>> qemu-system-x86_64 -machine q35... \
>>>   -device intel-iommu,intremap=on \
>>>   -device pcie-pci-bridge,addr=1e.0,id=pci.1 \
>>>   -device vfio-pci,host=1:00.0,bus=pci.1,addr=1.0,multifunction=on \
>>>   -device vfio-pci,host=1:00.1,bus=pci.1,addr=1.1
>>>
>>> While the utility of this hack may be limited, this AddressSpace
>>> aliasing is the correct behavior for QEMU to emulate bare metal.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <address@hidden>  
>>
>> The patch looks sane to me even as a bug fix since otherwise the DMA
>> address spaces used under misc kinds of PCI bridges can be wrong, so:
> 
> I'm not sure if "as a bug fix" here is encouraging a 4.0 target, but
> I'd be cautious about this if so.  Eric Auger noted that he's seen an
> SMMU VM hit a guest kernel bug-on, which needs further
> investigation.  It's not clear if it's just an untested or
> unimplemented scenario for SMMU to see a conventional PCI bus or if
> there's something wrong in QEMU.  I also haven't tested AMD IOMMU and
> only VT-d to a very limited degree, thus RFC.

So I have tracked this further and here is what I can see.

On guest side, the 2 assigned devices that I have put downstream to the
pcie-to-pci bridge get an iommu_fwspec handle with 2 ids, the first one
corresponding to the requester id of the very device and the second one
corresponding to the rid matching the same bus number and devfn=0

dev0 =  0000:02:01.0
        0000:02:00.0

dev1 = 0000:02:01.1
       0000:02:00.0

Then iommu_probe_device is called for 0000:02:01.0 and 0000:02:01.1.
Each time it iterates over the associated ids and we call add_device
twice for 0000:02:00.0. The second time, the arm-smmu-v3 driver
recognizes a context is already alive for 0000:02:00.0 and triggers a
BUG_ON().

At the origin of the creation of 2 ids for each device,
iort_iommu_configure is called on each downstream device which calls
pci_for_each_dma_alias(). We enter the
pci_is_pcie(tmp)/PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCI_BRIDGE code path and
iort_pci_iommu_init is called with bus number 2 and devfn=0.

Thanks

Eric
>  
>> Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <address@hidden>
>>
>> Though I have a question that confused me even before: Alex, do you
>> know why all the context entry of the devices in the IOMMU root table
>> will be programmed even if the devices are under a pcie-to-pci bridge?
>> I'm giving an example with above [1] to be clear: in that case IIUC
>> we'll program context entries for all the three devices (00:01.0,
>> 01:00.0, 01:00.1) but they'll point to the same IOMMU table.  DMAs of
>> devices 01:00.0 and 01:00.1 should always been tagged with 01:00.0 on
>> bare metal and then why we bother to program the context entry of
>> 01:00.1?  It seems never used.
>>
>> (It should be used for current QEMU to work with pcie-to-pci bridges
>>  if without this patch, but I feel like I don't know the real answer
>>  behind)
> 
> We actually have two different scenarios that could be represented by
> [1], the group can be formed by lack of isolation or by lack of
> visibility.  In the group above, it's the former, isolation.  The PCIe
> root port does not support ACS, so while the IOMMU has visibility of
> the individual devices, peer-to-peer between devices may also be
> possible.  Native, trusted, in-kernel drivers for these devices could
> still make use of separate IOMMU domains per device, but in order to
> expose the devices to a userspace driver we need to consider them a
> non-isolated set to prevent side-channel attacks between devices.  We
> therefore consider them as a group within the IOMMU API and it's
> required that each context entry maps to the same domain as the IOMMU
> will see transactions for each requester ID.
> 
> If we had the visibility case, such as if [1] represented a PCIe-to-PCI
> bridge subgroup, then the IOMMU really does only see the bridge
> requester ID and there may not be a reason to populate the context
> entries for the downstream aliased devices.  Perhaps the IOMMU might
> still choose to do so, particularly if the bridge is actually a PCI-X
> bridge as PCI-X does incorporate a requester ID, but also has strange
> rules about the bridge being able to claim ownership of the
> transaction.  So it might be paranoia or simplification that causes all
> the context entries to be programmed, or for alias quirks, uncertainty
> if a device exclusively uses a quirked requester ID or might sometimes
> use the proper requester ID.
> 
> In the example I present, we're taking [1], which could be either case
> above, and converting it into the visibility case in order to force the
> IOMMU to handle the devices within a single address space.  Thanks,
> 
> Alex
>