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Re: [Qemu-block] [Qemu-devel] storing machine data in qcow images?


From: Michael S. Tsirkin
Subject: Re: [Qemu-block] [Qemu-devel] storing machine data in qcow images?
Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2018 00:18:15 +0300

On Thu, Jun 07, 2018 at 11:36:20AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 07, 2018 at 11:32:18AM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 07, 2018 at 12:02:29PM +0200, Andrea Bolognani wrote:
> > > Something that I haven't seen mentioned in the thread - and this
> > > looks like as good a point as any to jump in - is that for q35
> > > guests using EFI as well as aarch64 guests the "one click import"
> > > experience requires not only hints about the machine (and firmware!)
> > > type, but also a copy of the EFI variable store:
> > > 
> > >   $ virt-builder fedora-27 --arch aarch64 --notes
> > >   Fedora® 27 Server (aarch64)
> > > 
> > >   [...]
> > > 
> > >   You will need to use the associated UEFI NVRAM variables file:
> > >     http://libguestfs.org/download/builder/fedora-27-aarch64-nvram.xz
> > 
> > This is true, although only sometimes.  If the bootloader[*] has a
> > working fallback path then usually it is able to boot and reset the
> > UEFI varstore back to the correct values.  We have had bugs before
> > where the fallback path was not working, eg:
> > 
> >   https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1353689 (yours!)
> >   https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1558793
> > 
> > Another problem which Laszlo mentioned is the varstore isn't portable
> > between UEFI implementations, or if the UEFI is compiled with
> > different options.  You can even imagine shipping multiple
> > varstores(!) which argues for a tar-like format.
> 
> Could we perhaps imagine shipping the actual UEFI bios, rather
> than only the varstore.

That's pretty unusual, UEFI is designed to abstract away the
hardware. It normally ships with the hardware.

I don't think it's a good idea to stick firmware itself in the image:
updating guest images is already a problem, at least we can easily fix
firmware bugs by dnf update on the host.

> The bios blob runs in guest context,
> so there shouldn't be able security concerns from hosting
> vendors with running user provided bios.

It seems possible that users that do supply their own firmware
will want to save it with the image. I don't think
we should do it for the standard firmware.


> Mostly its a matter
> of confidence that the interface between bios & qemu is stable
> which feels easier than assuming varstore vs different bios is
> portable. IIRC, shipping actual UEFI BIOS is something that was
> desirable for AMD SEV usage.

For SEV storing the un-encrypted binary, having QEMU read it out and write
it into guest memory isn't any better than shipping it with QEMU.

> 
> Regards,
> Daniel
> -- 
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