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Re: GPGME
From: |
Daiki Ueno |
Subject: |
Re: GPGME |
Date: |
Wed, 29 Jun 2011 05:36:02 +0900 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/23.3 (gnu/linux) |
Ted Zlatanov <address@hidden> writes:
> Are there any alternatives? Maybe you remember our discussion years ago
> about encrypt.el, where I proposed a neutral API with at least some
> symmetric ciphers implemented in ELisp and C in the Emacs core
> (essentially what Lars was requesting).
I remember that the problem of encrypt.el was that the data format is
not interoperable and the algorithm used is not interchangeable though
the API might be neutral. I guess you need a minimal encryption
function which employs the standard GPG message format (RFC4880).
> Could something like that work
> within the EPA/EPG structure, so some special invocation of
> `epg-encrypt-string' could bypass the external callout to GPG?
If your statement in <address@hidden>:
The decoding will happen late, probably in the funcall to obtain the
secret (and it will set some scoped variables to cache the data)
is true, epg-encrypt-string is not necessarily to be optimized in that
way, I think. How about implementing your side first and profiling
before the optimization?
One suggestion to reduce the number of calls to epg-encrypt-string is
that, I would suggest encrypt the key name as well. For example,
key1 val1 encrypted hexdata
where hexdata is decrypted to:
key2 val2 key3 val3
Regards,
--
Daiki Ueno
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, (continued)
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Stefan Monnier, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/06/03
- netrc field encryption in auth-source (was: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el), Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/05
- Re: netrc field encryption in auth-source, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/06/26
- GPGME (was: netrc field encryption in auth-source), Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/27
- Re: GPGME, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/27
- Re: GPGME, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/28
- Re: GPGME,
Daiki Ueno <=
- secure plist store, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/29
- Re: secure plist store, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/06/29
- Re: secure plist store, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/29
- Re: secure plist store, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/29
- Re: secure plist store, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/29
- Re: secure plist store, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/29
- Re: secure plist store, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/29
- Re: secure plist store, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/29
- Re: secure plist store, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/29
- Re: secure plist store, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/29