Re: Pool dried up

[Todd Fleisher]

On Mar 22, 2021, at 13:28, Andrew Gallagher <andrewg@andrewg.com> wrote:

I happened to check the pool just now, and there are only three nodes in it:

1 pgpkeys.uk[@]
2 sks.pod01.fleetstreetops.com[@]
3 sks.pod02.fleetstreetops.com[@]

Looking at the cached metadata it appears that when the spider ran, pod02.fleetstreetops nodes was unavailable, as was pgpkeys.co.uk (the domain registration has expired).

I can’t speak for pgpkeys.co.uk, but I have not seen any issues with sks.pod02.fleetstreetops.com (nor hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net, which it powers) today.

pod01.fleetstreetops does not advertise any peers,

This happens intermittently when the non-recon node services the status request, but it is a multi-node pool so rest assured there is external reconciliation configured.

This demonstrates that connectivity is a serious issue with the pool right now. A few key nodes going down can orphan all other nodes, no matter how well-behaved.

While the core idea behind this take is valid, I do not believe the current state of affairs is as dire as it is being portrayed.

It should probably also be noted that pod02.fleetstreetops has been the only node in the HKPS pool now for some time. This certainly can't be good for its load.

Yes, this has been the case since last summer. This is completely reliant on Kristian’s continued signing of CSRs for member nodes.

-T

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