LYNX-DEV Re: http://www.crl.com/~subir/lynx/security.html

[Subir Grewal]

I should have remembered this, I've changed that section to note that if
the sticky bit is set on /tmp, other users shouldn't be able to overwrite
the contents of the download. 

On 1 Jul 1997 address@hidden wrote:

:The first section looks fine to me.
:
:>Use of /tmp for temporary downloads
:>
:>   Lynx uses /tmp to store files during temporary downloads. The filename
:>   Lynx chooses can be predicted, and another user on the system can
:>   overwrite the file being downloaded, replacing it with a trojan horse
:>   binary. If the user performing the download executes this binary at a
:>   later time, it may be possible to execute commands with his/her UID.
:
:No, other users can make symbolic link of the same name and thus overwrite
:any file the other user owns, and without the control of what will be the
:'other file' overwritten with. (It will be overwritten with the content of
:the document the user D)ownloads.) 
:
:Hynek
:
:PS Please bounce this to lynx-dev, I forgot to include the CC.
:

address@hidden + Lynx 2.7.1 + NeXT/PGP mail + www.crl.com/~subir/
"The Government's assertion is incorrect...
 The Government's reasoning is also flawed."
          -- Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens' opinion of the CDA

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