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www/philosophy surveillance-vs-democracy.es.htm...


From: GNUN
Subject: www/philosophy surveillance-vs-democracy.es.htm...
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2021 05:01:22 -0400 (EDT)

CVSROOT:        /web/www
Module name:    www
Changes by:     GNUN <gnun>     21/07/08 05:01:22

Modified files:
        philosophy     : surveillance-vs-democracy.es.html 
        philosophy/po  : surveillance-vs-democracy.es-en.html 
                         surveillance-vs-democracy.es.po 

Log message:
        Automatic update by GNUnited Nations.

CVSWeb URLs:
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.es.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.64&r2=1.65
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.es-en.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.53&r2=1.54
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.es.po?cvsroot=www&r1=1.118&r2=1.119

Patches:
Index: surveillance-vs-democracy.es.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.es.html,v
retrieving revision 1.64
retrieving revision 1.65
diff -u -b -r1.64 -r1.65
--- surveillance-vs-democracy.es.html   30 Apr 2021 09:12:11 -0000      1.64
+++ surveillance-vs-democracy.es.html   8 Jul 2021 09:01:19 -0000       1.65
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 <!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE" 
value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
 
 <!--#include virtual="/server/header.es.html" -->
-<!-- Parent-Version: 1.90 -->
+<!-- Parent-Version: 1.96 -->
+<!-- This page is derived from /server/standards/boilerplate.html -->
 
 <!-- This file is automatically generated by GNUnited Nations! -->
 <title>¿Cuánta vigilancia puede soportar la democracia? - Proyecto GNU - Free
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@
 <!--#include virtual="/server/banner.es.html" -->
 <h2 class="center">¿Cuánta vigilancia puede soportar la democracia?</h2>
 
-<address class="byline center">por <a href="http://www.stallman.org/";>Richard 
Stallman</a></address>
+<address class="byline center">por <a href="https://www.stallman.org/";>Richard 
Stallman</a></address>
 
 <!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced
      anti-ad-block system -->
@@ -77,17 +78,17 @@
 nuestra vida digital, y eso incluye la prevención de la vigilancia. No
 podemos confiar en el software que no es libre. La <abbr title="National
 Security Agency">NSA</abbr> (Agencia de Seguridad Nacional) <a
-href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm";>usa</a>
+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/https://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm";>usa</a>
 e incluso <a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>crea</a>
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>crea</a>
 vulnerabilidades de seguridad en el software que no es libre para poder
 invadir nuestros ordenadores y enrutadores. El software libre nos permite
 ejercer el control sobre nuestras propias computadoras, pero <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>eso no protegerá nuestra
-privacidad una vez que pongamos los pies en Internet</a>.</p>
+href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>eso no protegerá
+nuestra privacidad una vez que pongamos los pies en Internet</a>.</p>
 
 <p>En los EE.&nbsp;UU. se está elaborando una <a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>legislación
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>legislación
 bipartidista para «restringir los poderes de vigilancia nacional»</a>, pero
 se basa en limitar el uso de algunas partes de nuestros expedientes
 virtuales. Esto no será suficiente para proteger al denunciante si «capturar
@@ -106,25 +107,25 @@
 
 <p>Un funcionario no identificado del gobierno de los EE.&nbsp;UU. en 2011 hizo
 a los periodistas la inquietante declaración de que <a
-href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river";>el
+href="https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river";>el
 Estado no citaría a los reporteros a declarar en los tribunales porque
 «sabemos con quién están hablando»</a>. Para obtener tal información, a
 veces <a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>se
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>se
 requieren por orden judicial los registros de las llamadas telefónicas de
 los periodistas</a>, aunque Snowden nos ha demostrado que, de hecho,
 constantemente se ordena la entrega de todos los registros de las llamadas
 telefónicas de todos los ciudadanos de los Estados  Unidos, a <a
 
href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order";>Verizon</a>
 y a <a
-href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>otras
+href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>otras
 empresas</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Los activistas opositores y disidentes se ven en la necesidad de ocultar
 información a los Estados que están dispuestos a jugarles trucos sucios. La
 Unión Estadounidense por las Libertades Civiles (<abbr title="American Civil
 Liberties Union">ACLU</abbr>) ha demostrado la <a
-href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>práctica
+href="https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>práctica
 sistemática del gobierno de los Estados Unidos de infiltrarse en los grupos
 disidentes pacíficos</a> bajo el pretexto de que podría haber terroristas
 entre ellos. El punto en el que la vigilancia es excesiva se alcanza cuando
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@
 mínimo, ni siquiera suponiendo que el Gobierno respete las reglas. La NSA ha
 engañado al tribunal de la Ley de Vigilancia de Inteligencia Extranjera
 (<abbr title="Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act">FISA</abbr>), que <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>manifestó
+href="https://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>manifestó
 ser incapaz de imputar efectivamente responsabilidades a la NSA</a>. La
 sospecha de un delito será motivo para obtener el acceso, por lo que una vez
 que el denunciante haya sido acusado de «espionaje», la búsqueda del 
«espía»
@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@
 
 <p>Además, el personal de vigilancia del Estado hará un uso indebido de los
 datos por motivos personales. Algunos agentes de la NSA <a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>usaron
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>usaron
 los sistemas de vigilancia de los EE.&nbsp;UU. para rastrear a sus
 amantes</a> &mdash;pasados, presentes o anhelados&mdash;, una práctica
 llamada «<cite>LOVEINT</cite>». La  NSA afirma que ha descubierto y
@@ -171,7 +172,7 @@
 
href="https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared";>nuevos
 sistemas digitales</a>.En 2016, un fiscal fue acusado de falsificar firmas
 de jueces a fin de obtener autorización para <a
-href="http://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933";>pinchar
+href="https://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933";>pinchar
 el teléfono de la persona objeto de su obsesión romántica</a>. La AP
 (Associated Press) ha conocido <a
 href="https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43";>muchos otros
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@
 <a
 
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment";>EE.&nbsp;UU.</a>
 y, más recientemente, <a
-href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021";>en
+href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021";>en
 Turquía</a>. (Las dudas de Turquía acerca de quién había utilizado 
realmente
 el programa Bylock no hizo más que agravar la deliberada injusticia
 fundamental de castigar a la gente arbitrariamente por haberlo utilizado).
@@ -201,7 +202,7 @@
 
 <p>Los gobiernos pueden fácilmente utilizar la capacidad de vigilancia masiva
 para <a
-href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html";>subvertir
+href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html";>subvertir
 directamente la democracia</a>.</p>
 
 <p>La vigilancia total que puede obtener el Estado le capacita para acometer
@@ -226,7 +227,7 @@
 <p>No obstante, tales protecciones legales son precarias: como lo demuestra la
 historia reciente, pueden ser revocadas (como en el caso de la Ley de
 Enmiendas de la FISA), suspendidas o <a
-href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>ignoradas</a>.</p>
+href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>ignoradas</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Mientras tanto, los demagogos recurrirán a las excusas habituales como
 fundamento para la vigilancia total; cualquier ataque terrorista, aun cuando
@@ -272,7 +273,7 @@
 la empresa que gestoina el servidor.</p>
 
 <p>Proteja también la privacidad de sus amigos y conocidos. <a
-href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>No
+href="https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>No
 revele los datos personales de esas personas</a> excepto para indicar cómo
 contactarlos, y no entregue nunca, a ningún sitio web, su lista de
 direcciones electrónicas o los números de teléfono de sus contactos. No
@@ -371,10 +372,11 @@
 acceder sistemáticamente a los datos recolectados por las empresas.</p>
 
 <p>A través del programa PRISM, la NSA <a
-href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2";>ha accedido a las
-bases de datos de muchas grandes corporaciones de Internet</a>. La empresa
-AT&amp;T ha guardado todos los registros telefónicos desde 1987 y <a
-href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>los
+href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies";>ha
+accedido a las bases de datos de muchas grandes corporaciones de
+Internet</a>. La empresa AT&amp;T ha guardado todos los registros
+telefónicos desde 1987 y <a
+href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>los
 pone a disposición de la Brigada Antidroga (<abbr title="Drug Enforcement
 Administration">DEA</abbr>)</a> cuando se los solicita. Estrictamente
 hablando, el gobierno de los EE.&nbsp;UU. no posee esos datos, pero en
@@ -407,19 +409,18 @@
 <p>Podríamos solucionar estos dos problemas adoptando un sistema de pago
 anónimo (anónimo para quienes pagan, no queremos ayudar a quienes cobran a
 evadir impuestos). <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>Bitcoin
+href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>Bitcoin
 no es anónimo</a>, aunque se están haciendo esfuerzos para idear métodos de
 pago anónimo. Sin embargo, la tecnología para crear <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>dinero digital
-se desarrolló por primera vez en los años ochenta</a>; el software de GNU
-para hacer esto se llama <a href="http://taler.net/";>GNU Taler</a>. Ahora
-solo necesitamos acuerdos comerciales adecuados y que el Estado no los
-obstruya.</p>
+href="https://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>dinero
+digital se desarrolló por primera vez en los años ochenta</a>; el software
+de GNU para hacer esto se llama <a href="https://taler.net/";>GNU
+Taler</a>. Ahora solo necesitamos acuerdos comerciales adecuados y que el
+Estado no los obstruya.</p>
 
 <p>Otro método posible para efectuar pagos anónimos es el uso de <a
-href="https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html";>tarjetas
-telefónicas de prepago</a>. Es más incómodo, pero muy sencillo de poner en
-práctica. </p>
+href="/philosophy/phone-anonymous-payment.html">tarjetas telefónicas de
+prepago</a>. Es más incómodo, pero muy sencillo de poner en práctica. </p>
 
 <p>Otra amenaza de la recolección de datos personales es que los sistemas de
 seguridad son vulnerables, de modo que la información puede ser robada y
@@ -503,11 +504,11 @@
 Provider">ISP</abbr> y las compañías telefónicas conservan mucha 
información
 de los contactos de sus usuarios (navegación, llamadas telefónicas,
 etc). Cuando se trata de teléfonos celulares, también <a
-href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>registran
+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210312235125/http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>registran
 la ubicación física del usuario</a>. Conservan estos expedientes por largo
 tiempo: más de 30 años, en el caso de AT&amp;T. Muy pronto registrarán
 también <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>
+href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>
 las actividades físicas</a>. Parece ser que <a
 
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location";>la
 NSA recoge los datos sobre la ubicación de los celulares</a> en masa.</p>
@@ -521,7 +522,7 @@
 <p>Esta solución no es completamente satisfactoria porque no evitaría que el
 gobierno físicamente recoja toda la información inmediatamente a medida que
 se genera, que <a
-href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>es
+href="https://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>es
 lo que hace Estados Unidos con algunas o todas las compañías
 telefónicas</a>. Tendríamos que confiar en que se prohibiera por ley. Sin
 embargo, eso sería mejor que la situación actual, pues la legislación
@@ -567,7 +568,7 @@
 
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131025014556/http://photographyisnotacrime.com/2013/10/23/jeff-gray-arrested-recording-cops-days-becoming-pinac-partner/";>fotógrafos
 </a>). En una ciudad de California donde se obligó a los policías a llevar
 puestas cámaras de video todo el tiempo, <a
-href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>el
+href="https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>el
 uso de la fuerza disminuyó en un 60%</a>. La Unión Estadounidense por las
 Libertades Civiles está a favor de esto.</p>
 
@@ -576,7 +577,7 @@
 corporaciones no son personas, y no tienen derechos humanos</a>. Es legítimo
 solicitar a las empresas que publiquen los detalles de procesos que podrían
 causar daños químicos, biológicos, nucleares, físicos, informáticos (por
-ejemplo, <a href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org";><abbr title="Digital
+ejemplo, <a href="https://DefectiveByDesign.org";><abbr title="Digital
 Restrictions Management">DRM</abbr></a>, gestión digital de restricciones) o
 políticos (por ejemplo, <cite>lobbying</cite>) a la sociedad, en cualquier
 nivel que sea necesario para el bien público. El peligro de estas
@@ -630,7 +631,7 @@
 
 <!-- for id="content", starts in the include above -->
 <!--#include virtual="/server/footer.es.html" -->
-<div id="footer">
+<div id="footer" role="contentinfo">
 <div class="unprintable">
 
 <p>Envíe sus consultas acerca de la FSF y GNU a <a
@@ -651,7 +652,7 @@
 
         &lt;web-translators@gnu.org&gt;</a>.</p>
 
-        <p>For information on coordinating and submitting translations of
+        <p>For information on coordinating and contributing translations of
         our web pages, see <a
         href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations
         README</a>. -->
@@ -681,7 +682,7 @@
      
      There is more detail about copyright years in the GNU Maintainers
      Information document, www.gnu.org/prep/maintain. -->
-<p>Copyright &copy; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 Richard Stallman</p>
+<p>Copyright &copy; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 Richard 
Stallman</p>
 
 <p>Esta página está bajo licencia <a rel="license"
 href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/deed.es_ES";>Creative
@@ -696,7 +697,7 @@
 <p class="unprintable"><!-- timestamp start -->
 Última actualización:
 
-$Date: 2021/04/30 09:12:11 $
+$Date: 2021/07/08 09:01:19 $
 
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>

Index: po/surveillance-vs-democracy.es-en.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.es-en.html,v
retrieving revision 1.53
retrieving revision 1.54
diff -u -b -r1.53 -r1.54
--- po/surveillance-vs-democracy.es-en.html     18 Dec 2020 12:06:25 -0000      
1.53
+++ po/surveillance-vs-democracy.es-en.html     8 Jul 2021 09:01:21 -0000       
1.54
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 <!--#include virtual="/server/header.html" -->
-<!-- Parent-Version: 1.90 -->
+<!-- Parent-Version: 1.96 -->
+<!-- This page is derived from /server/standards/boilerplate.html -->
 <title>How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?
 - GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title>
 <style type="text/css" media="print,screen"><!--
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@
 <h2 class="center">How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?</h2>
 
 <address class="byline center">by
-<a href="http://www.stallman.org/";>Richard Stallman</a></address>
+<a href="https://www.stallman.org/";>Richard Stallman</a></address>
 
 <!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced
      anti-ad-block system -->
@@ -70,14 +71,14 @@
 can't trust nonfree software; the NSA
 <a 
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm";>uses</a>
 and
-even <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>creates</a>
+even <a 
href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>creates</a>
 security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers
 and routers.  Free software gives us control of our own computers,
-but <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>that won't
+but <a href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>that won't
 protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>.</p>
 
 <p><a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>Bipartisan
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>Bipartisan
 legislation to &ldquo;curtail the domestic surveillance
 powers&rdquo;</a> in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on
 limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers.  That won't
@@ -97,22 +98,22 @@
 
 <p>An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in
 2011 that
-the <a 
href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river";>U.S.
 would
+the <a 
href="https://www.rcfp.org/journals/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river/";>U.S.
 would
 not subpoena reporters because &ldquo;We know who you're talking
 to.&rdquo;</a>
-Sometimes <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>journalists'
+Sometimes <a 
href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>journalists'
 phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden
 has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records
 of everyone in the U.S., all the
 time, <a 
href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order";>from
 Verizon</a>
-and <a 
href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>from
+and <a 
href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>from
 other companies too</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from
 states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them.  The ACLU has
 demonstrated the U.S. government's <a
-href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>systematic
+href="https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>systematic
 practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext
 that there might be terrorists among them.  The point at which
 surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@
 accumulated data.  That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not
 even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules.
 (The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it
-was <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>unable
+was <a href="https://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>unable
 to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime
 will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of
 &ldquo;espionage,&rdquo; finding the &ldquo;spy&rdquo; will provide an
@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@
 
 <p>In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data
 for personal reasons.  Some NSA
-agents <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>used
+agents <a 
href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>used
 U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>&mdash;past,
 present, or wished-for&mdash;in a practice called
 &ldquo;LOVEINT.&rdquo; The NSA says it has caught and punished this a
@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@
 with <a 
href="https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared";>new
 digital systems</a>.  In 2016, a prosecutor was accused of forging
 judges' signatures to get authorization
-to <a 
href="http://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933";>
+to <a 
href="https://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933";>
 wiretap someone who was the object of a romantic obsession</a>. The AP
 knows
 of <a href="https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43";>many
@@ -171,7 +172,7 @@
 from <a 
href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/";>Europe</a>,
 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment";>the
 US</a>, and most
-recently <a 
href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021";>Turkey</a>.
+recently <a 
href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021";>Turkey</a>.
 (Turkey's confusion about who had really used the Bylock program only
 exacerbated the basic deliberate injustice of arbitrarily punishing
 people for having used it.)
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@
 working for hostile states</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability
-to <a 
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html";>subvert
+to <a 
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html";>subvert
 democracy directly</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to
@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@
 <p>However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history
 shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act),
 suspended, or <a
-href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>ignored</a>.</p>
+href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>ignored</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for
 total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a
@@ -250,7 +251,7 @@
 pertinent data to the company's server.</p>
 
 <p>Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy,
-too.  <a 
href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>Don't
+too.  <a 
href="https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>Don't
 give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them,
 and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts.
 Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that
@@ -343,10 +344,10 @@
 systematically available to the state.</p>
 
 <p>The NSA, through PRISM,
-has <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2";>gotten
+has <a 
href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies";>gotten
 into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>.  AT&amp;T
 has saved all its phone call records since 1987
-and <a 
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>makes
+and <a 
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>makes
 them available to the DEA</a> to search on request.  Strictly
 speaking, the U.S.  government does not possess that data, but in
 practical terms it may as well possess it.  Some companies are praised
@@ -376,17 +377,17 @@
 <p>We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
 payments&mdash;anonymous for the payer, that is.  (We don't want to
 help the payee dodge
-taxes.)  <a 
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>Bitcoin
+taxes.)  <a 
href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>Bitcoin
 is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay
 anonymously with Bitcoin.  However, technology
-for <a href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>digital
+for <a href="https://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>digital
 cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; the GNU software for doing
-this is called <a href="http://taler.net/";>GNU Taler</a>.  Now we need
+this is called <a href="https://taler.net/";>GNU Taler</a>.  Now we need
 only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct
 them.</p>
 
 <p>Another possible method for anonymous payments would
-use <a 
href="https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html";>prepaid
+use <a href="/philosophy/phone-anonymous-payment.html">prepaid
 phone cards</a>.  It is less convenient, but very easy to
 implement.</p>
 
@@ -463,10 +464,10 @@
 <p>Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive
 data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc).  With
 mobile phones, they
-also <a 
href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>record
+also <a 
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210312235125/http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>record
 the user's physical location</a>.  They keep these dossiers for a long
 time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&amp;T.  Soon they will
-even <a 
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>record
+even <a 
href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>record
 the user's body activities</a>.  It appears that
 the <a 
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location";>NSA
 collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk.</p>
@@ -479,7 +480,7 @@
 <p>This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't
 physically stop the government from collecting all the information
 immediately as it is generated&mdash;which is what
-the <a 
href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>U.S.
 does
+the <a 
href="https://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>U.S.
 does
 with some or all phone companies</a>.  We would have to rely on
 prohibiting that by law.  However, that would be better than the
 current situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not
@@ -520,7 +521,7 @@
 photographers</a>.)
 One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all
 the time
-found <a 
href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>their
+found <a 
href="https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>their
 use of force fell by 60%</a>.  The ACLU is in favor of this.</p>
 
 <p><a
@@ -528,7 +529,7 @@
 are not people, and not entitled to human rights</a>.  It is
 legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes
 that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational
-(e.g., <a href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org";>DRM</a>) or political
+(e.g., <a href="https://DefectiveByDesign.org";>DRM</a>) or political
 (e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for
 public well-being.  The danger of these operations (consider the BP
 oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs
@@ -573,7 +574,7 @@
 
 </div><!-- for id="content", starts in the include above -->
 <!--#include virtual="/server/footer.html" -->
-<div id="footer">
+<div id="footer" role="contentinfo">
 <div class="unprintable">
 
 <p>Please send general FSF &amp; GNU inquiries to
@@ -591,13 +592,13 @@
         to <a href="mailto:web-translators@gnu.org";>
         &lt;web-translators@gnu.org&gt;</a>.</p>
 
-        <p>For information on coordinating and submitting translations of
+        <p>For information on coordinating and contributing translations of
         our web pages, see <a
         href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations
         README</a>. -->
 Please see the <a
 href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations
-README</a> for information on coordinating and submitting translations
+README</a> for information on coordinating and contributing translations
 of this article.</p>
 </div>
 
@@ -618,7 +619,7 @@
      There is more detail about copyright years in the GNU Maintainers
      Information document, www.gnu.org/prep/maintain. -->
 
-<p>Copyright &copy; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 Richard Stallman</p>
+<p>Copyright &copy; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 Richard 
Stallman</p>
 
 <p>This page is licensed under a <a rel="license"
 href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/";>Creative
@@ -628,7 +629,7 @@
 
 <p class="unprintable">Updated:
 <!-- timestamp start -->
-$Date: 2020/12/18 12:06:25 $
+$Date: 2021/07/08 09:01:21 $
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>
 </div>

Index: po/surveillance-vs-democracy.es.po
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.es.po,v
retrieving revision 1.118
retrieving revision 1.119
diff -u -b -r1.118 -r1.119
--- po/surveillance-vs-democracy.es.po  8 Jul 2021 08:48:54 -0000       1.118
+++ po/surveillance-vs-democracy.es.po  8 Jul 2021 09:01:21 -0000       1.119
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
 msgid "How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?"
 msgstr "¿Cuánta vigilancia puede soportar la democracia?"
 
-# | by <a href=\"http{+s+}://www.stallman.org/\">Richard Stallman</a>
 #. type: Content of: <address>
 msgid "by <a href=\"https://www.stallman.org/\";>Richard Stallman</a>"
 msgstr "por <a href=\"https://www.stallman.org/\";>Richard Stallman</a>"
@@ -129,18 +128,6 @@
 "debemos reducir la vigilancia hasta el punto en que los denunciantes sepan "
 "que no corren peligro."
 
-# | Using free/libre software, <a
-# | href=\"/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html\">as I've
-# | advocated since 1983</a>, is the first step in taking control of our
-# | digital lives, and that includes preventing surveillance.  We can't trust
-# | nonfree software; the NSA <a
-# | 
href=\"https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm\";>uses</a>
-# | and even <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security\">creates</a>
-# | security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers and
-# | routers.  Free software gives us control of our own computers, but <a
-# | href=\"http{+s+}://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/\">that won't
-# | protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "Using free/libre software, <a href=\"/philosophy/free-software-even-more-"
@@ -171,13 +158,6 @@
 "\"https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/\";>eso no protegerá nuestra "
 "privacidad una vez que pongamos los pies en Internet</a>."
 
-# | <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill\">Bipartisan
-# | legislation to &ldquo;curtail the domestic surveillance powers&rdquo;</a>
-# | in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on limiting the government's
-# | use of our virtual dossiers.  That won't suffice to protect whistleblowers
-# | if &ldquo;catching the whistleblower&rdquo; is grounds for access
-# | sufficient to identify him or her.  We need to go further.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "<a href=\"https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-";
@@ -213,20 +193,6 @@
 "quién se ha comunicado con un reportero es demasiada vigilancia, una "
 "vigilancia que la democracia no puede soportar."
 
-# | An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in 2011
-# | that the <a
-# | 
[-href=\"http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river\";>U.S.-]
-# | 
{+href=\"https://www.rcfp.org/journals/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river/\";>U.S.+}
-# | would not subpoena reporters because &ldquo;We know who you're talking
-# | to.&rdquo;</a> Sometimes <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press\">journalists'
-# | phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden has
-# | shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records of
-# | everyone in the U.S., all the time, <a
-# | 
href=\"https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order\";>from
-# | Verizon</a> and <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07\">from
-# | other companies too</a>.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in 2011 that "
@@ -258,14 +224,6 @@
 "marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-"
 "verizon-2013-06-07\">otras empresas</a>."
 
-# | Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states that
-# | are willing to play dirty tricks on them.  The ACLU has demonstrated the
-# | U.S. government's <a
-# | href=\"http{+s+}://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf\">systematic
-# | practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext that
-# | there might be terrorists among them.  The point at which surveillance is
-# | too much is the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known
-# | journalist or a known dissident.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states that "
@@ -291,16 +249,6 @@
 msgstr ""
 "Una vez que se haya obtenido la información, será usada incorrectamente"
 
-# | When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too high,
-# | the first response is to propose limits on access to the accumulated data.
-# |  That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not even slightly, even
-# | supposing that the government obeys the rules.  (The NSA has misled the
-# | FISA court, which said it was <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/\">unable
-# | to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime will be
-# | grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of
-# | &ldquo;espionage,&rdquo; finding the &ldquo;spy&rdquo; will provide an
-# | excuse to access the accumulated material.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too high, "
@@ -342,26 +290,6 @@
 "serio para ser acatadas, son más bien un cuento  de hadas en el que podemos "
 "creer si así lo deseamos."
 
-# | In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data for
-# | personal reasons.  Some NSA agents <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems\">used
-# | U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>&mdash;past, present,
-# | or wished-for&mdash;in a practice called &ldquo;LOVEINT.&rdquo; The NSA
-# | says it has caught and punished this a few times; we don't know how many
-# | other times it wasn't caught.  But these events shouldn't surprise us,
-# | because police have long <a
-# | 
href=\"https://web.archive.org/web/20160401102120/http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.V_mKlYbb69I\";>used
-# | their access to driver's license records to track down someone
-# | attractive</a>, a practice known as &ldquo;running a plate for a
-# | date.&rdquo; This practice has expanded with <a
-# | 
href=\"https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared\";>new
-# | digital systems</a>.  In 2016, a prosecutor was accused of forging judges'
-# | signatures to get authorization to <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933\">
-# | wiretap someone who was the object of a romantic obsession</a>. The AP
-# | knows of <a
-# | href=\"https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43\";>many other
-# | instances in the US</a>.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data for "
@@ -405,17 +333,6 @@
 "com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43\">muchos otros casos en EE.&nbsp;UU.</"
 "a>."
 
-# | Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this is
-# | prohibited.  Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the
-# | possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in dreadful ways, as
-# | shown by examples from <a
-# | 
href=\"http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/\";>Europe</a>,
-# | <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment\";>the
-# | US</a>, and most recently <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021\">Turkey</a>.
-# |  (Turkey's confusion about who had really used the Bylock program only
-# | exacerbated the basic deliberate injustice of arbitrarily punishing people
-# | for having used it.)
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this is "
@@ -458,9 +375,6 @@
 "articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first."
 "shtml\">informáticos al servicio de países enemigos</a>."
 
-# | Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability to <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html\">subvert
-# | democracy directly</a>.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability to <a href="
@@ -506,9 +420,6 @@
 "serían adecuados para proteger las libertades democráticas, siempre y 
cuando "
 "se adopten completamente y se apliquen sin excepción para siempre."
 
-# | However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows,
-# | they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or <a
-# | href=\"http{+s+}://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html\">ignored</a>.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows, "
@@ -606,15 +517,6 @@
 "ceder a otros el control sobre sus tareas informáticas, esto le obliga a "
 "enviar todos los datos pertinentes a la empresa que gestoina el servidor."
 
-# | Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy, too.  <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/\">Don't
-# | give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them, and
-# | never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts.  Don't tell
-# | a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that they might not
-# | wish to publish in a newspaper.  Better yet, don't be used by Facebook at
-# | all.  Reject communication systems that require users to give their real
-# | names, even if you are happy to divulge yours, since they pressure other
-# | people to surrender their privacy.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy, too.  <a href=\"https://";
@@ -811,20 +713,6 @@
 "ello se encarga una empresa, porque el Estado puede acceder sistemáticamente 
"
 "a los datos recolectados por las empresas."
 
-# | The NSA, through PRISM, has <a
-# | [-href=\"https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2\";>gotten-]
-# | 
{+href=\"https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies\";>gotten+}
-# | into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>.  AT&amp;T has
-# | saved all its phone call records since 1987 and <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0\">makes
-# | them available to the DEA</a> to search on request.  Strictly speaking,
-# | the U.S.  government does not possess that data, but in practical terms it
-# | may as well possess it.  Some companies are praised for <a
-# | 
href=\"https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-government-data-requests-2015\";>resisting
-# | government data requests to the limited extent they can</a>, but that can
-# | only partly compensate for the harm they do to by collecting that data in
-# | the first place.  In addition, many of those companies misuse the data
-# | directly or provide it to data brokers.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "The NSA, through PRISM, has <a href=\"https://www.commondreams.org/";
@@ -894,17 +782,6 @@
 "Todos somos conscientes de que las «políticas de privacidad» son más 
excusas "
 "para violar la privacidad que compromisos para defenderla."
 
-# | We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
-# | payments&mdash;anonymous for the payer, that is.  (We don't want to help
-# | the payee dodge taxes.)  <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/\">Bitcoin
-# | is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay
-# | anonymously with Bitcoin.  However, technology for <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html\">digital
-# | cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; the GNU software for doing this
-# | is called <a href=\"http{+s+}://taler.net/\">GNU Taler</a>.  Now we need
-# | only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct
-# | them.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous "
@@ -929,10 +806,6 @@
 "taler.net/\">GNU Taler</a>. Ahora solo necesitamos acuerdos comerciales "
 "adecuados y que el Estado no los obstruya."
 
-# | Another possible method for anonymous payments would use <a
-# | 
[-href=\"https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html\";>prepaid-]
-# | {+href=\"/philosophy/phone-anonymous-payment.html\">prepaid+} phone
-# | cards</a>.  It is less convenient, but very easy to implement.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "Another possible method for anonymous payments would use <a href=\"/"
@@ -1094,17 +967,6 @@
 msgid "Remedy for Communications Dossiers"
 msgstr "Remedio para los expedientes de comunicaciones"
 
-# | Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data on
-# | their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc).  With mobile phones,
-# | they also <a
-# | 
[-href=\"http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz\";>record-]
-# | 
{+href=\"https://web.archive.org/web/20210312235125/http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz\";>record+}
-# | the user's physical location</a>.  They keep these dossiers for a long
-# | time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&amp;T.  Soon they will even <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/\">record
-# | the user's body activities</a>.  It appears that the <a
-# | 
href=\"https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location\";>NSA
-# | collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data on "
@@ -1147,16 +1009,6 @@
 "información por mucho tiempo, a menos que exista una orden judicial para "
 "vigilar a una cierta persona."
 
-# | This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't physically
-# | stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as it
-# | is generated&mdash;which is what the <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order\">U.S.
-# | does with some or all phone companies</a>.  We would have to rely on
-# | prohibiting that by law.  However, that would be better than the current
-# | situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not clearly
-# | prohibit the practice.  In addition, if the government did resume this
-# | sort of surveillance, it would not get data about everyone's phone calls
-# | made prior to that time.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't physically stop "
@@ -1230,16 +1082,6 @@
 "impedimos que los sistemas digitales acumulen información masiva <i>a "
 "priori</i>."
 
-# | Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit
-# | their right to privacy and must be monitored.  (In fact, police have their
-# | own jargon term for perjury, &ldquo;<a
-# | 
href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&amp;oldid=552608302\";>testilying</a>,&rdquo;
-# | since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters and <a
-# | 
href=\"https://web.archive.org/web/20131025014556/http://photographyisnotacrime.com/2013/10/23/jeff-gray-arrested-recording-cops-days-becoming-pinac-partner/\";>
-# | photographers</a>.)  One city in California that required police to wear
-# | video cameras all the time found <a
-# | 
href=\"http{+s+}://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition\">their
-# | use of force fell by 60%</a>.  The ACLU is in favor of this.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit their "
@@ -1268,16 +1110,6 @@
 "disminuyó en un 60%</a>. La Unión Estadounidense por las Libertades Civiles 
"
 "está a favor de esto."
 
-# | <a
-# | 
href=\"https://web.archive.org/web/20171019220057/http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266\";>Corporations
-# | are not people, and not entitled to human rights</a>.  It is legitimate to
-# | require businesses to publish the details of processes that might cause
-# | chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational (e.g., <a
-# | href=\"http{+s+}://DefectiveByDesign.org\">DRM</a>) or political (e.g.,
-# | lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public
-# | well-being.  The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill,
-# | the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs that of
-# | terrorism.
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
 msgid ""
 "<a href=\"https://web.archive.org/web/20171019220057/http://action.citizen.";



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