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From: GNUN
Subject: www/philosophy surveillance-vs-democracy.ml.htm...
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 04:28:53 -0500 (EST)

CVSROOT:        /web/www
Module name:    www
Changes by:     GNUN <gnun>     19/12/04 04:28:53

Modified files:
        philosophy     : surveillance-vs-democracy.ml.html 
Added files:
        philosophy/po  : surveillance-vs-democracy.ml-diff.html 

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Index: surveillance-vs-democracy.ml.html
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-<!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE" 
value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
+<!--#set var="PO_FILE"
+ value='<a href="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.ml.po">
+ https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.ml.po</a>'
+ --><!--#set var="ORIGINAL_FILE" 
+ --><!--#set var="DIFF_FILE" 
+ --><!--#set var="OUTDATED_SINCE" value="2019-10-05" --><!--#set 
var="ENGLISH_PAGE" value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
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+<!--#include virtual="/server/outdated.ml.html" -->
 <h2 class="center">ജനാധിപത്യത്തിനു് 
എത്രത്തോളം സർവേയിലൻസിനെ 
ചെറുക്കുവാൻ കഴിയും?</h2>
 <p class="byline center"><a 
സ്റ്റാൾമാൻ</a> എഴുതിയതു്</p>
@@ -724,7 +730,7 @@
 <p class="unprintable"><!-- timestamp start -->
-$Date: 2019/07/21 15:58:24 $
+$Date: 2019/12/04 09:28:52 $
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Index: po/surveillance-vs-democracy.ml-diff.html
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+++ po/surveillance-vs-democracy.ml-diff.html   4 Dec 2019 09:28:52 -0000       
@@ -0,0 +1,646 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
+    "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd";>
+<!-- Generated by GNUN -->
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"; xml:lang="en" lang="en">
+<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
+<style type="text/css">
+span.removed { background-color: #f22; color: #000; }
+span.inserted { background-color: #2f2; color: #000; }
+&lt;!--#include virtual="/server/header.html" --&gt;
+&lt;!-- Parent-Version: 1.86 --&gt;
+&lt;title&gt;How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?
+- GNU Project - Free Software Foundation&lt;/title&gt;
+&lt;style type="text/css" media="print,screen"&gt;&lt;!--
+#intro { margin: 2em auto 1.5em; }
+.pict.wide { width: 23em; }
+.pict p { margin-top: .2em; }
+@media (min-width: 55em) {
+   #intro { max-width: 55em; }
+   .pict.wide { margin-bottom: 0; }
+&lt;!-- GNUN: localize URL /graphics/dog.small.jpg --&gt;
+&lt;!--#include virtual="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.translist" 
+&lt;!--#include virtual="/server/banner.html" --&gt;
+&lt;h2 class="center"&gt;How Much Surveillance Can Democracy 
+&lt;p class="byline center"&gt;by &lt;a 
href="http://www.stallman.org/"&gt;Richard Stallman&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced
+     anti-ad-block system --&gt;
+&lt;blockquote class="center"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;A version of this article 
was first published in
+&lt;cite&gt;Wired&lt;/cite&gt; in October&nbsp;2013.&lt;br /&gt;
+Also consider reading &ldquo;&lt;a
+radical proposal to keep your personal data safe&lt;/a&gt;,&rdquo; published in
+&lt;cite&gt;The Guardian&lt;/cite&gt; in 
+&lt;div class="article"&gt;
+&lt;div id="intro"&gt;
+&lt;div class="pict wide"&gt;
+&lt;a href="/graphics/dog.html"&gt;
+&lt;img src="/graphics/dog.small.jpg" alt="Cartoon of a dog, wondering at the 
three ads that popped up on his computer screen..." /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;&ldquo;How did they find out I'm a dog?&rdquo;&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Thanks to Edward Snowden's disclosures, we know that the current
+level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human
+rights.  The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents,
+sources, and journalists in the US and elsewhere provides
+confirmation.  We need to reduce the level of general surveillance,
+but how far?  Where exactly is the
+&lt;em&gt;maximum tolerable level of surveillance&lt;/em&gt;, which we must 
+is not exceeded?  It is the level beyond which surveillance starts to
+interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that whistleblowers
+(such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;div class="columns" style="clear:both"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on
+to &lt;a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama"&gt;tell
+us what the state is doing&lt;/a&gt;.  <span class="inserted"><ins><em>(We 
were reminded of this in 2019 as
+various whistleblowers gave the public increments
+of &lt;a 
+about Trump's attempt to shake down the president of 
+However, today's surveillance intimidates potential whistleblowers,
+which means it is too much.  To recover our democratic control over
+the state, we must reduce surveillance to the point where
+whistleblowers know they are safe.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Using free/libre
+software, &lt;a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html"&gt;as
+I've advocated <span class="removed"><del><strong>for 30 
years&lt;/a&gt;,</strong></del></span> <span class="inserted"><ins><em>since 
1983&lt;/a&gt;,</em></ins></span> is the first step in taking control
+of our digital lives, and that includes preventing surveillance.  We
+can't trust nonfree software; the NSA
+even &lt;a 
+security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers
+and routers.  Free software gives us control of our own computers,
+but &lt;a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/"&gt;that won't
+protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
+legislation to &ldquo;curtail the domestic surveillance
+powers&rdquo;&lt;/a&gt; in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on
+limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers.  That won't
+suffice to protect whistleblowers if &ldquo;catching the
+whistleblower&rdquo; is grounds for access sufficient to identify him
+or her.  We need to go further.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;h3 class="subheader" style="clear: both"&gt;The Upper Limit on 
Surveillance in a Democracy&lt;/h3&gt;
+&lt;div class="columns"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;If whistleblowers don't dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the
+last shred of effective control over our government and institutions.
+That's why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has
+talked with a reporter is too much surveillance&mdash;too much for
+democracy to endure.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in
+2011 that
+the &lt;a 
+not subpoena reporters because &ldquo;We know who you're talking
+Sometimes &lt;a 
+phone call records are subpoenaed&lt;/a&gt; to find this out, but Snowden
+has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records
+of everyone in the U.S., all the
+time, &lt;a 
+and &lt;a 
+other companies too&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from
+states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them.  The ACLU has
+demonstrated the U.S. government's &lt;a
+practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups&lt;/a&gt; on the pretext
+that there might be terrorists among them.  The point at which
+surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who
+spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;h3 class="subheader"&gt;Information, Once Collected, Will Be 
+&lt;div  class="columns"&gt;
+&lt;p id="willbemisused"&gt;When people recognize
+that the level of general surveillance is too
+high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the
+accumulated data.  That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not
+even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules.
+(The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it
+was &lt;a 
+to effectively hold the NSA accountable&lt;/a&gt;.) Suspicion of a crime
+will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of
+&ldquo;espionage,&rdquo; finding the &ldquo;spy&rdquo; will provide an
+excuse to access the accumulated material.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;In practice, we can't expect state agencies even to make up excuses
+to satisfy the rules for using surveillance data&mdash;because US
+already &lt;a 
+lie to cover up breaking the rules&lt;/a&gt;.  These rules are not seriously
+meant to be obeyed; rather, they are a fairy-tale we can believe if we
+&lt;p&gt;In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data
+for personal reasons.  Some NSA
+agents &lt;a 
+U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers&lt;/a&gt;&mdash;past,
+present, or wished-for&mdash;in a practice called
+&ldquo;LOVEINT.&rdquo; The NSA says it has caught and punished this a
+few times; we don't know how many other times it wasn't caught.  But
+these events shouldn't surprise us, because police have
+long &lt;a 
+their access to driver's license records to track down someone
+attractive&lt;/a&gt;, a practice known as &ldquo;running a plate for a
+date.&rdquo; This practice has expanded
+with &lt;a 
+digital systems&lt;/a&gt;.  In 2016, a prosecutor was accused of forging
+judges' signatures to get authorization
+to &lt;a 
+wiretap someone who was the object of a romantic obsession&lt;/a&gt;. The AP
+of &lt;a href="https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43"&gt;many
+other instances in the US&lt;/a&gt;.
+&lt;p&gt;Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if
+this is prohibited.  Once the data has been accumulated and the state
+has the possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in
+dreadful ways, as shown by examples
+from &lt;a 
+&lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment"&gt;the
+US&lt;/a&gt;, and most
+recently &lt;a 
+(Turkey's confusion about who had really used the Bylock program only
+exacerbated the basic deliberate injustice of arbitrarily punishing
+people for having used it.)
+&lt;p&gt;Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained
+by outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even
+by &lt;a 
+working for hostile states&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability
+to &lt;a 
+democracy directly&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to
+launch a massive fishing expedition against any person.  To make
+journalism and democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data
+that is easily accessible to the state.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;h3 class="subheader"&gt;Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be 
+&lt;div class="columns"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose
+a set of legal principles designed to &lt;a
+href="https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text"&gt;prevent the
+abuses of massive surveillance&lt;/a&gt;.  These principles include,
+crucially, explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a
+consequence, they would be adequate for protecting democratic
+freedoms&mdash;if adopted completely and enforced without exception
+&lt;p&gt;However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history
+shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act),
+suspended, or &lt;a
+&lt;p&gt;Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for
+total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a
+handful of people, can be hyped to provide an opportunity.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if
+they had never existed: years worth of dossiers would suddenly become
+available for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by
+companies, for their private misuse as well.  If, however, we stop the
+collection of dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won't exist, and
+there will be no way to compile them retroactively.  A new illiberal
+regime would have to implement surveillance afresh, and it would only
+collect data starting at that date.  As for suspending or momentarily
+ignoring this law, the idea would hardly make sense.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;h3 class="subheader"&gt;First, Don't Be Foolish&lt;/h3&gt;
+&lt;div class="columns"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has
+to protect your privacy is you.  Avoid identifying yourself to web
+sites, contact them with Tor, and use browsers that block the schemes
+they use to track visitors.  Use the GNU Privacy Guard to encrypt the
+contents of your email.  Pay for things with cash.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Keep your own data; don't store your data in a company's
+&ldquo;convenient&rdquo; server.  It's safe, however, to entrust a
+data backup to a commercial service, provided you put the files in an
+archive and encrypt the whole archive, including the names of the
+files, with free software on your own computer before uploading
+&lt;p&gt;For privacy's sake, you must avoid nonfree software; if you give
+control of your computer's operations to companies, they
+are &lt;a href="/malware/proprietary-surveillance.html"&gt;likely to make it
+spy on you&lt;/a&gt;.
+Avoid &lt;a 
+as a software substitute&lt;/a&gt;; in addition to giving others control of
+how your computing is done, it requires you to hand over all the
+pertinent data to the company's server.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy,
+too.  &lt;a 
+give out their personal information&lt;/a&gt; except how to contact them,
+and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts.
+Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that
+they might not wish to publish in a newspaper.  Better yet, don't be
+used by Facebook at all.  Reject communication systems that require
+users to give their real names, even if you are happy to divulge yours,
+since they pressure other people to surrender their privacy.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous
+self-protection is insufficient to protect your privacy on or from
+systems that don't belong to you.  When we communicate with others or
+move around the city, our privacy depends on the practices of society.
+We can avoid some of the systems that surveil our communications and
+movements, but not all of them.  Clearly, the better solution is to
+make all these systems stop surveilling people other than legitimate
+&lt;h3 class="subheader"&gt;We Must Design Every System for Privacy&lt;/h3&gt;
+&lt;div class="columns"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;If we don't want a total surveillance society, we must consider
+surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance
+impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental
+impact of physical construction.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;For example: &ldquo;smart&rdquo; meters for electricity are touted
+for sending the power company moment-by-moment data about each
+customer's electric usage, including how usage compares with users in
+general.  This is implemented based on general surveillance, but does
+not require any surveillance.  It would be easy for the power company
+to calculate the average usage in a residential neighborhood by
+dividing the total usage by the number of subscribers, and send that
+to the meters.  Each customer's meter could compare her usage, over
+any desired period of time, with the average usage pattern for that
+period.  The same benefit, with no surveillance!&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;We need to design such privacy into all our digital
+systems&nbsp;[&lt;a href="#ambientprivacy"&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;].&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;h3 class="subheader"&gt;Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It 
+&lt;div class="columns"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is
+to &lt;a name="dispersal"&gt;keep the data dispersed and inconvenient to
+access&lt;/a&gt;.  Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat to 
privacy(&lt;a href="#privatespace"&gt;*&lt;/a&gt;).
+The recording was stored on the premises, and kept for a few weeks at
+most.  Because of the inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it
+was never done massively; they were accessed only in the places where
+someone reported a crime.  It would not be feasible to physically
+collect millions of tapes every day and watch them or copy them.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they
+are connected to the Internet so recordings can be collected in a data
+center and saved forever.  In Detroit, the cops pressure businesses to
+give them &lt;a
+access to their surveillance cameras&lt;/a&gt; so that they can look through
+them at any and all times.  This is already dangerous, but it is going
+to get worse.  Advances in face recognition may bring the day when
+suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see
+who they talk with.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security
+themselves, which means &lt;a
+can watch what those cameras see&lt;/a&gt;.  This makes internet-connected
+cameras a major threat to security as well as privacy.  For privacy's
+sake, we should ban the use of Internet-connected cameras aimed where
+and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people.
+Everyone must be free to post photos and video recordings
+occasionally, but the systematic accumulation of such data on the
+Internet must be limited.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name="privatespace"&gt;&lt;b&gt;*&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt; I assume 
here that the security
+camera points at the inside of a store, or at the street.  Any camera
+pointed at someone's private space by someone else violates privacy,
+but that is another issue.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;h3 id="digitalcash" class="subheader"&gt;Remedy for Internet Commerce 
+&lt;div class="columns"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Most data collection comes from people's own digital activities.
+Usually the data is collected first by companies.  But when it comes
+to the threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether
+surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a
+business, because the data that the companies collect is
+systematically available to the state.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;The NSA, through PRISM,
+has &lt;a href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2"&gt;gotten
+into the databases of many large Internet corporations&lt;/a&gt;.  AT&amp;T
+has saved all its phone call records since 1987
+and &lt;a 
+them available to the DEA&lt;/a&gt; to search on request.  Strictly
+speaking, the U.S.  government does not possess that data, but in
+practical terms it may as well possess it.  Some companies are praised
+for &lt;a 
+government data requests to the limited extent they can&lt;/a&gt;, but that
+can only partly compensate for the harm they do to by collecting that
+data in the first place.  In addition, many of those companies misuse
+the data directly or provide it to data brokers.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires
+that we reduce the data collected about people by any organization,
+not just by the state.  We must redesign digital systems so that they
+do not accumulate data about their users.  If they need digital data
+about our transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more
+than a short time beyond what is inherently necessary for their
+dealings with us.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the
+Internet is that sites are financed through advertising based on
+tracking users' activities and propensities.  This converts a mere
+annoyance&mdash;advertising that we can learn to ignore&mdash;into a
+surveillance system that harms us whether we know it or not.
+Purchases over the Internet also track their users.  And we are all
+aware that &ldquo;privacy policies&rdquo; are more excuses to violate
+privacy than commitments to uphold it.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
+payments&mdash;anonymous for the payer, that is.  (We don't want to
+help the payee dodge
+taxes.)  &lt;a 
+is not anonymous&lt;/a&gt;, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay
+anonymously with Bitcoin.  However, technology
+for &lt;a 
+cash was first developed in the 1980s&lt;/a&gt;; the GNU software for doing
+this is called &lt;a href="http://taler.net/"&gt;GNU Taler&lt;/a&gt;.  Now we 
+only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct
+&lt;p&gt;Another possible method for anonymous payments would
+use &lt;a 
+phone cards&lt;/a&gt;.  It is less convenient, but very easy to
+&lt;p&gt;A further threat from sites' collection of personal data is that
+security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it.  This includes
+customers' credit card details.  An anonymous payment system would end
+this danger: a security hole in the site can't hurt you if the site
+knows nothing about you.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;h3 class="subheader"&gt;Remedy for Travel Surveillance&lt;/h3&gt;
+&lt;div class="columns"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using
+digital cash, for instance).  License-plate recognition systems
+recognize all cars' license plates&lt;/a&gt;, and
+the &lt;a 
+can be kept indefinitely&lt;/a&gt;; they should be required by law to notice
+and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars
+sought by court orders.  A less secure alternative would record all
+cars locally but only for a few days, and not make the full data
+available over the Internet; access to the data should be limited to
+searching for a list of court-ordered license-numbers.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;The U.S. &ldquo;no-fly&rdquo; list must be abolished because it is
+without trial&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage
+will be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic
+flights could be treated as if they were on this list.  It is also
+acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the
+country at all, from boarding flights to the country.  This ought to
+be enough for all legitimate purposes.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for
+payment.  These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the
+mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card
+permanently with your name.  Furthermore, they record all travel
+associated with each card.  Together they amount to massive
+surveillance.  This data collection must be reduced.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Navigation services do surveillance: the user's computer tells the
+map service the user's location and where the user wants to go; then
+the server determines the route and sends it back to the user's
+computer, which displays it.  Nowadays, the server probably records
+the user's locations, since there is nothing to prevent it.  This
+surveillance is not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it:
+free/libre software in the user's computer could download map data for
+the pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the
+route, and display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is
+or wants to go.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the
+borrower's identity is known only inside the station where the item
+was borrowed.  Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is
+&ldquo;out,&rdquo; so when the user returns it at any station (in
+general, a different one), that station will know where and when that
+item was borrowed.  It will inform the other station that the item is
+no longer &ldquo;out.&rdquo; It will also calculate the user's bill,
+and send it (after waiting some random number of minutes) to
+headquarters along a ring of stations, so that headquarters would not
+find out which station the bill came from.  Once this is done, the
+return station would forget all about the transaction.  If an item
+remains &ldquo;out&rdquo; for too long, the station where it was
+borrowed can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the
+borrower's identity immediately.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;h3 class="subheader"&gt;Remedy for Communications Dossiers&lt;/h3&gt;
+&lt;div class="columns"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive
+data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc).  With
+mobile phones, they
+also &lt;a 
+the user's physical location&lt;/a&gt;.  They keep these dossiers for a long
+time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&amp;T.  Soon they will
+even &lt;a 
+the user's body activities&lt;/a&gt;.  It appears that
+the &lt;a 
+collects cell phone location data&lt;/a&gt; in bulk.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such
+dossiers.  So it should be illegal to create or keep them.  ISPs and
+phone companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very
+long, in the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't
+physically stop the government from collecting all the information
+immediately as it is generated&mdash;which is what
+the &lt;a 
+with some or all phone companies&lt;/a&gt;.  We would have to rely on
+prohibiting that by law.  However, that would be better than the
+current situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not
+clearly prohibit the practice.  In addition, if the government did
+resume this sort of surveillance, it would not get data about
+everyone's phone calls made prior to that time.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;For privacy about who you exchange email with, a simple partial
+solution is for you and others to use email services in a country that
+would never cooperate with your own government, and which communicate
+with each other using encryption.  However, Ladar Levison (owner of
+the mail service Lavabit that US surveillance sought to corrupt
+completely) has a more sophisticated idea for an encryption system
+through which your email service would know only that you sent mail to
+some user of my email service, and my email service would know only
+that I received mail from some user of your email service, but it
+would be hard to determine that you had sent mail to me.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;h3 class="subheader"&gt;But Some Surveillance Is Necessary&lt;/h3&gt;
+&lt;div class="columns"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate
+specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court
+order.  With the Internet, the power to tap phone conversations would
+naturally extend to the power to tap Internet connections.  This power
+is easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary.
+Fortunately, this won't make it possible to find whistleblowers after
+the fact, if (as I recommend) we prevent digital systems from accumulating
+massive dossiers before the fact.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police,
+forfeit their right to privacy and must be monitored.  (In fact,
+police have their own jargon term for perjury,
+since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters
+and &lt;a 
+One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all
+the time
+found &lt;a 
+use of force fell by 60%&lt;/a&gt;.  The ACLU is in favor of this.&lt;/p&gt;
+are not people, and not entitled to human rights&lt;/a&gt;.  It is
+legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes
+that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational
+(e.g., &lt;a href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org"&gt;DRM&lt;/a&gt;) or political
+(e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for
+public well-being.  The danger of these operations (consider the BP
+oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs
+that of terrorism.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when
+it is carried out as part of a business.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;div class="column-limit"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
+&lt;div class="reduced-width"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the
+level of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications.
+It is far more than we experienced in the 1990s, and &lt;a
+more than people behind the Iron Curtain experienced&lt;/a&gt; in the 1980s,
+and proposed legal limits on state use of the accumulated data would
+not alter that.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Companies are designing even more intrusive surveillance.  Some
+project that pervasive surveillance, hooked to companies such as
+Facebook, could have deep effects on &lt;a
+people think&lt;/a&gt;.  Such possibilities are imponderable; but the threat
+to democracy is not speculation.  It exists and is visible today.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from
+a grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the
+Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase.
+That requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;div class="column-limit"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
+&lt;h3 style="font-size: 1.2em"&gt;End Note&lt;/h3&gt;
+&lt;li id="ambientprivacy"&gt;The condition of &lt;em&gt;not being 
+has been referred to as &lt;a
+&lt;/div&gt;&lt;!-- for id="content", starts in the include above --&gt;
+&lt;!--#include virtual="/server/footer.html" --&gt;
+&lt;div id="footer"&gt;
+&lt;div class="unprintable"&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Please send general FSF &amp; GNU inquiries to
+&lt;a href="mailto:address@hidden"&gt;&lt;address@hidden&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.
+There are also &lt;a href="/contact/"&gt;other ways to contact&lt;/a&gt;
+the FSF.  Broken links and other corrections or suggestions can be sent
+to &lt;a 
+&lt;p&gt;&lt;!-- TRANSLATORS: Ignore the original text in this paragraph,
+        replace it with the translation of these two:
+        We work hard and do our best to provide accurate, good quality
+        translations.  However, we are not exempt from imperfection.
+        Please send your comments and general suggestions in this regard
+        to &lt;a href="mailto:address@hidden"&gt;
+        &lt;address@hidden&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
+        &lt;p&gt;For information on coordinating and submitting translations of
+        our web pages, see &lt;a
+        href="/server/standards/README.translations.html"&gt;Translations
+        README&lt;/a&gt;. --&gt;
+Please see the &lt;a
+README&lt;/a&gt; for information on coordinating and submitting translations
+of this article.&lt;/p&gt;
+&lt;!-- Regarding copyright, in general, standalone pages (as opposed to
+     files generated as part of manuals) on the GNU web server should
+     be under CC BY-ND 4.0.  Please do NOT change or remove this
+     without talking with the webmasters or licensing team first.
+     Please make sure the copyright date is consistent with the
+     document.  For web pages, it is ok to list just the latest year the
+     document was modified, or published.
+     If you wish to list earlier years, that is ok too.
+     Either "2001, 2002, 2003" or "2001-2003" are ok for specifying
+     years, as long as each year in the range is in fact a copyrightable
+     year, i.e., a year in which the document was published (including
+     being publicly visible on the web or in a revision control system).
+     There is more detail about copyright years in the GNU Maintainers
+     Information document, www.gnu.org/prep/maintain. --&gt;
+&lt;p&gt;Copyright &copy; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 Richard 
+&lt;p&gt;This page is licensed under a &lt;a rel="license"
+Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 
+&lt;!--#include virtual="/server/bottom-notes.html" --&gt;
+&lt;p class="unprintable"&gt;Updated:
+&lt;!-- timestamp start --&gt;
+$Date: 2019/12/04 09:28:52 $
+&lt;!-- timestamp end --&gt;
+&lt;/div&gt;&lt;!-- for class="inner", starts in the banner include --&gt;

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