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Wed, 18 Apr 2018 17:28:56 -0400 (EDT) |
CVSROOT: /web/www
Module name: www
Changes by: GNUN <gnun> 18/04/18 17:28:56
Modified files:
philosophy : surveillance-vs-democracy.it.html
surveillance-vs-democracy.uk.html
philosophy/po : surveillance-vs-democracy.uk-diff.html
Added files:
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Log message:
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http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.uk.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.25&r2=1.26
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Patches:
Index: surveillance-vs-democracy.it.html
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retrieving revision 1.32
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diff -u -b -r1.32 -r1.33
--- surveillance-vs-democracy.it.html 16 Feb 2018 08:32:00 -0000 1.32
+++ surveillance-vs-democracy.it.html 18 Apr 2018 21:28:53 -0000 1.33
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
-<!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE"
value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
+<!--#set var="PO_FILE"
+ value='<a href="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.it.po">
+ https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.it.po</a>'
+ --><!--#set var="ORIGINAL_FILE"
value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.html"
+ --><!--#set var="DIFF_FILE"
value="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.it-diff.html"
+ --><!--#set var="OUTDATED_SINCE" value="2018-02-17" --><!--#set
var="ENGLISH_PAGE" value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
<!--#include virtual="/server/header.it.html" -->
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@@ -20,6 +25,7 @@
<!-- GNUN: localize URL /graphics/dog.small.jpg -->
<!--#include virtual="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.translist" -->
<!--#include virtual="/server/banner.it.html" -->
+<!--#include virtual="/server/outdated.it.html" -->
<h2 class="center">Quanta sorveglianza può sostenere una democrazia?</h2>
<p class="byline center">di <a href="http://www.stallman.org/";>Richard
Stallman</a></p>
@@ -628,7 +634,7 @@
<p class="unprintable"><!-- timestamp start -->
Ultimo aggiornamento:
-$Date: 2018/02/16 08:32:00 $
+$Date: 2018/04/18 21:28:53 $
<!-- timestamp end -->
</p>
Index: surveillance-vs-democracy.uk.html
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--- surveillance-vs-democracy.uk.html 3 Feb 2018 10:36:19 -0000 1.25
+++ surveillance-vs-democracy.uk.html 18 Apr 2018 21:28:53 -0000 1.26
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
-<!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE"
value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
+<!--#set var="PO_FILE"
+ value='<a href="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.uk.po">
+ https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.uk.po</a>'
+ --><!--#set var="ORIGINAL_FILE"
value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.html"
+ --><!--#set var="DIFF_FILE"
value="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.uk-diff.html"
+ --><!--#set var="OUTDATED_SINCE" value="2018-02-17" --><!--#set
var="ENGLISH_PAGE" value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
<!--#include virtual="/server/header.uk.html" -->
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@@ -20,6 +25,7 @@
<!-- GNUN: localize URL /graphics/dog.small.jpg -->
<!--#include virtual="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.translist" -->
<!--#include virtual="/server/banner.uk.html" -->
+<!--#include virtual="/server/outdated.uk.html" -->
<h2 class="center">СкÑлÑки ÑÑÐµÐ¶ÐµÐ½Ñ Ð¼Ð¾Ð¶Ðµ виÑÑимаÑи
демокÑаÑÑÑ?</h2>
<p class="byline center"><a href="http://www.stallman.org/";>Ð ÑÑаÑд
СÑолмен</a></p>
@@ -624,7 +630,7 @@
<p class="unprintable"><!-- timestamp start -->
Ðновлено:
-$Date: 2018/02/03 10:36:19 $
+$Date: 2018/04/18 21:28:53 $
<!-- timestamp end -->
</p>
Index: po/surveillance-vs-democracy.uk-diff.html
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retrieving revision 1.6
retrieving revision 1.7
diff -u -b -r1.6 -r1.7
--- po/surveillance-vs-democracy.uk-diff.html 9 Nov 2017 19:29:05 -0000
1.6
+++ po/surveillance-vs-democracy.uk-diff.html 18 Apr 2018 21:28:56 -0000
1.7
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@
</style></head>
<body><pre>
<!--#include virtual="/server/header.html" -->
-<!-- Parent-Version: 1.79 -->
+<!-- Parent-Version: 1.84 -->
<title>How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?
- GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title>
<style type="text/css" media="print,screen"><!--
-#intro { margin: 1.5em auto; }
+#intro { margin: <span class="removed"><del><strong>1.5em
auto;</strong></del></span> <span class="inserted"><ins><em>2em auto
1.5em;</em></ins></span> }
.pict.wide { width: 23em; }
.pict p { margin-top: .2em; }
@media (min-width: 55em) {
@@ -32,8 +32,12 @@
<!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced
anti-ad-block system -->
-<blockquote class="center"><p>A version of this article was first
published in Wired
-in October 2013.</p></blockquote>
+<blockquote class="center"><p>A version of this article was first
published in <span class="removed"><del><strong>Wired</strong></del></span>
+<span
class="inserted"><ins><em><cite>Wired</cite></em></ins></span> in
<span class="removed"><del><strong>October
2013.</p></blockquote></strong></del></span> <span
class="inserted"><ins><em>October 2013.<br />
+Also consider reading “<a
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/03/facebook-abusing-data-law-privacy-big-tech-surveillance">A
+radical proposal to keep your personal data safe</a>,” published in
+<cite>The Guardian</cite> in
April 2018.</p></blockquote></em></ins></span>
<div class="article">
@@ -105,7 +109,7 @@
phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden
has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records
of everyone in the U.S., all the
-time, <a
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131226044537/http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">from
+time, <a <span
class="removed"><del><strong>href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131226044537/http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">from</strong></del></span>
<span
class="inserted"><ins><em>href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">from</em></ins></span>
Verizon</a>
and <a
href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07">from
other companies too</a>.</p>
@@ -135,6 +139,14 @@
“espionage,” finding the “spy” will provide an
excuse to access the accumulated material.</p>
+<p>In practice, we can't expect state agencies even to make up excuses
+to satisfy the rules for using surveillance data—because US
+agencies
+already <a
href="https://theintercept.com/2018/01/09/dark-side-fbi-dea-illegal-searches-secret-evidence/">
+lie to cover up breaking the rules</a>. These rules are not seriously
+meant to be obeyed; rather, they are a fairy-tale we can believe if we
+like.</p>
+
<p>In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data
for personal reasons. Some NSA
agents <a
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems">used
@@ -161,9 +173,14 @@
this is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state
has the possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in
dreadful ways, as shown by examples
-from <a
href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/">Europe</a>
-and <a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment">the
-US </a>.</p>
+from <a
href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/">Europe</a>,
+<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment">the
+US</a>, and most
+recently <a
href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021">Turkey</a>.
+(Turkey's confusion about who had really used the Bylock program only
+exacerbated the basic deliberate injustice of arbitrarily punishing
+people for having used it.)
+</p>
<p>Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained
by outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even
@@ -228,15 +245,14 @@
files, with free software on your own computer before uploading
it.</p>
-<p>For privacy's sake, you must avoid nonfree software since, as a
-consequence of giving others control of your computing, it
-is <a <span
class="removed"><del><strong>href="/philosophy/proprietary-surveillance.html">likely</strong></del></span>
<span
class="inserted"><ins><em>href="/malware/proprietary-surveillance.html">likely</em></ins></span>
to spy
-on you</a>.
+<p>For privacy's sake, you must avoid nonfree software; if you give
+control of your computer's operations to companies, they
+are <a href="/malware/proprietary-surveillance.html">likely to make it
+spy on you</a>.
Avoid <a
href="/philosophy/who-does-that-server-really-serve.html">service
-as a software substitute</a>; <span class="removed"><del><strong>as well
as</strong></del></span> <span class="inserted"><ins><em>in addition
to</em></ins></span> giving others control of <span
class="inserted"><ins><em>how</em></ins></span> your
-<span class="removed"><del><strong>computing,</strong></del></span>
-<span class="inserted"><ins><em>computing is done,</em></ins></span> it
requires you to hand over all the pertinent data to the
-server.</p>
+as a software substitute</a>; in addition to giving others control of
+how your computing is done, it requires you to hand over all the
+pertinent data to the company's server.</p>
<p>Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy,
too. <a
href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/">Don't
@@ -245,7 +261,7 @@
Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that
they might not wish to publish in a newspaper. Better yet, don't be
used by Facebook at all. Reject communication systems that require
-users to give their real names, even if you are going to give yours,
+users to give their real names, even if you are happy to divulge yours,
since they pressure other people to surrender their privacy.</p>
<p>Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous
@@ -294,7 +310,11 @@
<p>Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they
are connected to the Internet so recordings can be collected in a data
-center and saved forever. This is already dangerous, but it is going
+center and saved forever. <span class="inserted"><ins><em>In Detroit, the
cops pressure businesses to
+give
+them <a
href="http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2018/01/23/detroit-green-light/109524794/">unlimited
+access to their surveillance cameras</a> so that they can look through
+them at any and all times.</em></ins></span> This is already dangerous, but
it is going
to get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when
suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see
who they talk with.</p>
@@ -369,10 +389,10 @@
only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct
them.</p>
-<span class="inserted"><ins><em><p>Another possible method for anonymous
payments would
+<p>Another possible method for anonymous payments would
use <a
href="https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html">prepaid
phone cards</a>. It is less convenient, but very easy to
-implement.</p></em></ins></span>
+implement.</p>
<p>A further threat from sites' collection of personal data is that
security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes
@@ -591,7 +611,7 @@
There is more detail about copyright years in the GNU Maintainers
Information document, www.gnu.org/prep/maintain. -->
-<p>Copyright © 2015, <span
class="removed"><del><strong>2016</strong></del></span> <span
class="inserted"><ins><em>2016, 2017</em></ins></span> Richard
Stallman</p>
+<p>Copyright © 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 Richard Stallman</p>
<p>This page is licensed under a <a rel="license"
href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">Creative
@@ -601,7 +621,7 @@
<p class="unprintable">Updated:
<!-- timestamp start -->
-$Date: 2017/11/09 19:29:05 $
+$Date: 2018/04/18 21:28:56 $
<!-- timestamp end -->
</p>
</div>
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diff -N po/surveillance-vs-democracy.it-diff.html
--- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
+++ po/surveillance-vs-democracy.it-diff.html 18 Apr 2018 21:28:56 -0000
1.1
@@ -0,0 +1,631 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd";>
+<!-- Generated by GNUN -->
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"; xml:lang="en" lang="en">
+<head>
+<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
+<title>/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.html-diff</title>
+<style type="text/css">
+span.removed { background-color: #f22; color: #000; }
+span.inserted { background-color: #2f2; color: #000; }
+</style></head>
+<body><pre>
+<!--#include virtual="/server/header.html" -->
+<!-- Parent-Version: 1.84 -->
+<title>How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?
+- GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title>
+<style type="text/css" media="print,screen"><!--
+#intro { margin: <span class="removed"><del><strong>1.5em
auto;</strong></del></span> <span class="inserted"><ins><em>2em auto
1.5em;</em></ins></span> }
+.pict.wide { width: 23em; }
+.pict p { margin-top: .2em; }
address@hidden (min-width: 55em) {
+ #intro { max-width: 55em; }
+ .pict.wide { margin-bottom: 0; }
+}
+--></style>
+<!-- GNUN: localize URL /graphics/dog.small.jpg -->
+<!--#include virtual="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.translist"
-->
+<!--#include virtual="/server/banner.html" -->
+<h2 class="center">How Much Surveillance Can Democracy
Withstand?</h2>
+
+<p class="byline center">by <a
href="http://www.stallman.org/">Richard Stallman</a></p>
+
+<!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced
+ anti-ad-block system -->
+<blockquote class="center"><p>A version of this article was first
published in <span class="removed"><del><strong>Wired</strong></del></span>
+<span
class="inserted"><ins><em><cite>Wired</cite></em></ins></span> in
<span class="removed"><del><strong>October
2013.</p></blockquote></strong></del></span> <span
class="inserted"><ins><em>October 2013.<br />
+Also consider reading “<a
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/03/facebook-abusing-data-law-privacy-big-tech-surveillance">A
+radical proposal to keep your personal data safe</a>,” published in
+<cite>The Guardian</cite> in
April 2018.</p></blockquote></em></ins></span>
+
+<div class="article">
+
+<div id="intro">
+<div class="pict wide">
+<a href="/graphics/dog.html">
+<img src="/graphics/dog.small.jpg" alt="Cartoon of a dog, wondering at the
three ads that popped up on his computer screen..." /></a>
+<p>“How did they find out I'm a dog?”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Thanks to Edward Snowden's disclosures, we know that the current
+level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human
+rights. The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents,
+sources, and journalists in the US and elsewhere provides
+confirmation. We need to reduce the level of general surveillance,
+but how far? Where exactly is the
+<em>maximum tolerable level of surveillance</em>, which we must
ensure
+is not exceeded? It is the level beyond which surveillance starts to
+interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that whistleblowers
+(such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="columns" style="clear:both">
+<p>Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on
+whistleblowers
+to <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama">tell
+us what the state is doing</a>. However, today's surveillance
+intimidates potential whistleblowers, which means it is too much. To
+recover our democratic control over the state, we must reduce
+surveillance to the point where whistleblowers know they are safe.</p>
+
+<p>Using free/libre
+software, <a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">as
+I've advocated for 30 years</a>, is the first step in taking control
+of our digital lives, and that includes preventing surveillance. We
+can't trust nonfree software; the NSA
+<a
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm">uses</a>
+and
+even <a
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security">creates</a>
+security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers
+and routers. Free software gives us control of our own computers,
+but <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/">that won't
+protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>.</p>
+
+<p><a
+href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill">Bipartisan
+legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance
+powers”</a> in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on
+limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers. That won't
+suffice to protect whistleblowers if “catching the
+whistleblower” is grounds for access sufficient to identify him
+or her. We need to go further.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader" style="clear: both">The Upper Limit on
Surveillance in a Democracy</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>If whistleblowers don't dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the
+last shred of effective control over our government and institutions.
+That's why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has
+talked with a reporter is too much surveillance—too much for
+democracy to endure.</p>
+
+<p>An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in
+2011 that
+the <a
href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river">U.S.
would
+not subpoena reporters because “We know who you're talking
+to.”</a>
+Sometimes <a
href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press">journalists'
+phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden
+has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records
+of everyone in the U.S., all the
+time, <a <span
class="removed"><del><strong>href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131226044537/http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">from</strong></del></span>
<span
class="inserted"><ins><em>href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">from</em></ins></span>
+Verizon</a>
+and <a
href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07">from
+other companies too</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from
+states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has
+demonstrated the U.S. government's <a
+href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf">systematic
+practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext
+that there might be terrorists among them. The point at which
+surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who
+spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">Information, Once Collected, Will Be
Misused</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p id="willbemisused">When people recognize
+that the level of general surveillance is too
+high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the
+accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not
+even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules.
+(The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it
+was <a
href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/">unable
+to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime
+will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of
+“espionage,” finding the “spy” will provide an
+excuse to access the accumulated material.</p>
+
+<p>In practice, we can't expect state agencies even to make up excuses
+to satisfy the rules for using surveillance data—because US
+agencies
+already <a
href="https://theintercept.com/2018/01/09/dark-side-fbi-dea-illegal-searches-secret-evidence/">
+lie to cover up breaking the rules</a>. These rules are not seriously
+meant to be obeyed; rather, they are a fairy-tale we can believe if we
+like.</p>
+
+<p>In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data
+for personal reasons. Some NSA
+agents <a
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems">used
+U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>—past,
+present, or wished-for—in a practice called
+“LOVEINT.” The NSA says it has caught and punished this a
+few times; we don't know how many other times it wasn't caught. But
+these events shouldn't surprise us, because police have
+long <a
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160401102120/http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.V_mKlYbb69I">used
+their access to driver's license records to track down someone
+attractive</a>, a practice known as “running a plate for a
+date.” This practice has expanded
+with <a
href="https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared">new
+digital systems</a>. In 2016, a prosecutor was accused of forging
+judges' signatures to get authorization
+to <a
href="http://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933">
+wiretap someone who was the object of a romantic obsession</a>. The AP
+knows
+of <a
href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43/ap-across-us-police-officers-abuse-confidential-databases">many
+other instances in the US</a>.
+</p>
+
+<p>Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if
+this is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state
+has the possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in
+dreadful ways, as shown by examples
+from <a
href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/">Europe</a>,
+<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment">the
+US</a>, and most
+recently <a
href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021">Turkey</a>.
+(Turkey's confusion about who had really used the Bylock program only
+exacerbated the basic deliberate injustice of arbitrarily punishing
+people for having used it.)
+</p>
+
+<p>Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained
+by outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even
+by <a
href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml">crackers
+working for hostile states</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability
+to <a
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html">subvert
+democracy directly</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to
+launch a massive fishing expedition against any person. To make
+journalism and democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data
+that is easily accessible to the state.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be
Technical</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose
+a set of legal principles designed to <a
+href="https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text">prevent the
+abuses of massive surveillance</a>. These principles include,
+crucially, explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a
+consequence, they would be adequate for protecting democratic
+freedoms—if adopted completely and enforced without exception
+forever.</p>
+
+<p>However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history
+shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act),
+suspended, or <a
+href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html">ignored</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for
+total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a
+handful of people, can be hyped to provide an opportunity.</p>
+
+<p>If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if
+they had never existed: years worth of dossiers would suddenly become
+available for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by
+companies, for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the
+collection of dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won't exist, and
+there will be no way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal
+regime would have to implement surveillance afresh, and it would only
+collect data starting at that date. As for suspending or momentarily
+ignoring this law, the idea would hardly make sense.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">First, Don't Be Foolish</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has
+to protect your privacy is you. Avoid identifying yourself to web
+sites, contact them with Tor, and use browsers that block the schemes
+they use to track visitors. Use the GNU Privacy Guard to encrypt the
+contents of your email. Pay for things with cash.</p>
+
+<p>Keep your own data; don't store your data in a company's
+“convenient” server. It's safe, however, to entrust a
+data backup to a commercial service, provided you put the files in an
+archive and encrypt the whole archive, including the names of the
+files, with free software on your own computer before uploading
+it.</p>
+
+<p>For privacy's sake, you must avoid nonfree software; if you give
+control of your computer's operations to companies, they
+are <a href="/malware/proprietary-surveillance.html">likely to make it
+spy on you</a>.
+Avoid <a
href="/philosophy/who-does-that-server-really-serve.html">service
+as a software substitute</a>; in addition to giving others control of
+how your computing is done, it requires you to hand over all the
+pertinent data to the company's server.</p>
+
+<p>Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy,
+too. <a
href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/">Don't
+give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them,
+and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts.
+Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that
+they might not wish to publish in a newspaper. Better yet, don't be
+used by Facebook at all. Reject communication systems that require
+users to give their real names, even if you are happy to divulge yours,
+since they pressure other people to surrender their privacy.</p>
+
+<p>Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous
+self-protection is insufficient to protect your privacy on or from
+systems that don't belong to you. When we communicate with others or
+move around the city, our privacy depends on the practices of society.
+We can avoid some of the systems that surveil our communications and
+movements, but not all of them. Clearly, the better solution is to
+make all these systems stop surveilling people other than legitimate
+suspects.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">We Must Design Every System for Privacy</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>If we don't want a total surveillance society, we must consider
+surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance
+impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental
+impact of physical construction.</p>
+
+<p>For example: “smart” meters for electricity are touted
+for sending the power company moment-by-moment data about each
+customer's electric usage, including how usage compares with users in
+general. This is implemented based on general surveillance, but does
+not require any surveillance. It would be easy for the power company
+to calculate the average usage in a residential neighborhood by
+dividing the total usage by the number of subscribers, and send that
+to the meters. Each customer's meter could compare her usage, over
+any desired period of time, with the average usage pattern for that
+period. The same benefit, with no surveillance!</p>
+
+<p>We need to design such privacy into all our digital systems.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It
Dispersed</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is
+to <a name="dispersal">keep the data dispersed and inconvenient to
+access</a>. Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat to
privacy(<a href="#privatespace">*</a>).
+The recording was stored on the premises, and kept for a few weeks at
+most. Because of the inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it
+was never done massively; they were accessed only in the places where
+someone reported a crime. It would not be feasible to physically
+collect millions of tapes every day and watch them or copy them.</p>
+
+<p>Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they
+are connected to the Internet so recordings can be collected in a data
+center and saved forever. <span class="inserted"><ins><em>In Detroit, the
cops pressure businesses to
+give
+them <a
href="http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2018/01/23/detroit-green-light/109524794/">unlimited
+access to their surveillance cameras</a> so that they can look through
+them at any and all times.</em></ins></span> This is already dangerous, but
it is going
+to get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when
+suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see
+who they talk with.</p>
+
+<p>Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security
+themselves, which
+means <a
href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/cia-wants-spy-you-through-your-appliances">anyone
+can watch what those cameras see</a>. This makes internet-connected
+cameras a major threat to security as well as privacy. For privacy's
+sake, we should ban the use of Internet-connected cameras aimed where
+and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people.
+Everyone must be free to post photos and video recordings
+occasionally, but the systematic accumulation of such data on the
+Internet must be limited.</p>
+
+<p><a name="privatespace"><b>*</b></a>I assume
here that the security
+camera points at the inside of a store, or at the street. Any camera
+pointed at someone's private space by someone else violates privacy,
+but that is another issue.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="digitalcash" class="subheader">Remedy for Internet Commerce
Surveillance</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>Most data collection comes from people's own digital activities.
+Usually the data is collected first by companies. But when it comes
+to the threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether
+surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a
+business, because the data that the companies collect is
+systematically available to the state.</p>
+
+<p>The NSA, through PRISM,
+has <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2">gotten
+into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>. AT&T
+has saved all its phone call records since 1987
+and <a
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0">makes
+them available to the DEA</a> to search on request. Strictly
+speaking, the U.S. government does not possess that data, but in
+practical terms it may as well possess it. Some companies are praised
+for <a
href="https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-government-data-requests-2015">resisting
+government data requests to the limited extent they can</a>, but that
+can only partly compensate for the harm they do to by collecting that
+data in the first place. In addition, many of those companies misuse
+the data directly or provide it to data brokers.</p>
+
+<p>The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires
+that we reduce the data collected about people by any organization,
+not just by the state. We must redesign digital systems so that they
+do not accumulate data about their users. If they need digital data
+about our transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more
+than a short time beyond what is inherently necessary for their
+dealings with us.</p>
+
+<p>One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the
+Internet is that sites are financed through advertising based on
+tracking users' activities and propensities. This converts a mere
+annoyance—advertising that we can learn to ignore—into a
+surveillance system that harms us whether we know it or not.
+Purchases over the Internet also track their users. And we are all
+aware that “privacy policies” are more excuses to violate
+privacy than commitments to uphold it.</p>
+
+<p>We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
+payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don't want to
+help the payee dodge
+taxes.) <a
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/">Bitcoin
+is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay
+anonymously with Bitcoin. However, technology
+for <a
href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html">digital
+cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; the GNU software for doing
+this is called <a href="http://taler.net/">GNU Taler</a>. Now we
need
+only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct
+them.</p>
+
+<p>Another possible method for anonymous payments would
+use <a
href="https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html">prepaid
+phone cards</a>. It is less convenient, but very easy to
+implement.</p>
+
+<p>A further threat from sites' collection of personal data is that
+security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes
+customers' credit card details. An anonymous payment system would end
+this danger: a security hole in the site can't hurt you if the site
+knows nothing about you.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Travel Surveillance</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using
+digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems
+recognize all license plates, and
+the <a
href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm">data
+can be kept indefinitely</a>; they should be required by law to notice
+and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars
+sought by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all
+cars locally but only for a few days, and not make the full data
+available over the Internet; access to the data should be limited to
+searching for a list of court-ordered license-numbers.</p>
+
+<p>The U.S. “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is
+<a
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes">punishment
+without trial</a>.</p>
+
+<p>It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage
+will be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic
+flights could be treated as if they were on this list. It is also
+acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the
+country at all, from boarding flights to the country. This ought to
+be enough for all legitimate purposes.</p>
+
+<p>Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for
+payment. These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the
+mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card
+permanently with your name. Furthermore, they record all travel
+associated with each card. Together they amount to massive
+surveillance. This data collection must be reduced.</p>
+
+<p>Navigation services do surveillance: the user's computer tells the
+map service the user's location and where the user wants to go; then
+the server determines the route and sends it back to the user's
+computer, which displays it. Nowadays, the server probably records
+the user's locations, since there is nothing to prevent it. This
+surveillance is not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it:
+free/libre software in the user's computer could download map data for
+the pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the
+route, and display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is
+or wants to go.</p>
+
+<p>Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the
+borrower's identity is known only inside the station where the item
+was borrowed. Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is
+“out,” so when the user returns it at any station (in
+general, a different one), that station will know where and when that
+item was borrowed. It will inform the other station that the item is
+no longer “out.” It will also calculate the user's bill,
+and send it (after waiting some random number of minutes) to
+headquarters along a ring of stations, so that headquarters would not
+find out which station the bill came from. Once this is done, the
+return station would forget all about the transaction. If an item
+remains “out” for too long, the station where it was
+borrowed can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the
+borrower's identity immediately.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Communications Dossiers</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive
+data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc). With
+mobile phones, they
+also <a
href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz">record
+the user's physical location</a>. They keep these dossiers for a long
+time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&T. Soon they will
+even <a
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/">record
+the user's body activities</a>. It appears that
+the <a
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location">NSA
+collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk.</p>
+
+<p>Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such
+dossiers. So it should be illegal to create or keep them. ISPs and
+phone companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very
+long, in the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.</p>
+
+<p>This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't
+physically stop the government from collecting all the information
+immediately as it is generated—which is what
+the <a
href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order">U.S.
does
+with some or all phone companies</a>. We would have to rely on
+prohibiting that by law. However, that would be better than the
+current situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not
+clearly prohibit the practice. In addition, if the government did
+resume this sort of surveillance, it would not get data about
+everyone's phone calls made prior to that time.</p>
+
+<p>For privacy about who you exchange email with, a simple partial
+solution is for you and others to use email services in a country that
+would never cooperate with your own government, and which communicate
+with each other using encryption. However, Ladar Levison (owner of
+the mail service Lavabit that US surveillance sought to corrupt
+completely) has a more sophisticated idea for an encryption system
+through which your email service would know only that you sent mail to
+some user of my email service, and my email service would know only
+that I received mail from some user of your email service, but it
+would be hard to determine that you had sent mail to me.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">But Some Surveillance Is Necessary</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate
+specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court
+order. With the Internet, the power to tap phone conversations would
+naturally extend to the power to tap Internet connections. This power
+is easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary.
+Fortunately, this won't make it possible to find whistleblowers after
+the fact, if (as I recommend) we prevent digital systems from accumulating
+massive dossiers before the fact.</p>
+
+<p>Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police,
+forfeit their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact,
+police have their own jargon term for perjury,
+“<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&oldid=552608302">testilying</a>,”
+since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters
+and <a
href="http://photographyisnotacrime.com/">photographers</a>.)
+One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all
+the time
+found <a
href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition">their
+use of force fell by 60%</a>. The ACLU is in favor of this.</p>
+
+<p><a
+href="http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266">Corporations
+are not people, and not entitled to human rights</a>. It is
+legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes
+that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational
+(e.g., <a href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org">DRM</a>) or political
+(e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for
+public well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP
+oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs
+that of terrorism.</p>
+
+<p>However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when
+it is carried out as part of a business.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="column-limit"></div>
+
+<div class="reduced-width">
+<p>Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the
+level of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications.
+It is far more than we experienced in the 1990s, and <a
+href="https://hbr.org/2013/06/your-iphone-works-for-the-secret-police">far
+more than people behind the Iron Curtain experienced</a> in the 1980s,
+and proposed legal limits on state use of the accumulated data would
+not alter that.</p>
+
+<p>Companies are designing even more intrusive surveillance. Some
+project that pervasive surveillance, hooked to companies such as
+Facebook, could have deep effects on <a
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people">how
+people think</a>. Such possibilities are imponderable; but the threat
+to democracy is not speculation. It exists and is visible today.</p>
+
+<p>Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from
+a grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the
+Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase.
+That requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+</div><!-- for id="content", starts in the include above -->
+<!--#include virtual="/server/footer.html" -->
+<div id="footer">
+<div class="unprintable">
+
+<p>Please send general FSF & GNU inquiries to
+<a href="mailto:address@hidden"><address@hidden></a>.
+There are also <a href="/contact/">other ways to contact</a>
+the FSF. Broken links and other corrections or suggestions can be sent
+to <a
href="mailto:address@hidden"><address@hidden></a>.</p>
+
+<p><!-- TRANSLATORS: Ignore the original text in this paragraph,
+ replace it with the translation of these two:
+
+ We work hard and do our best to provide accurate, good quality
+ translations. However, we are not exempt from imperfection.
+ Please send your comments and general suggestions in this regard
+ to <a href="mailto:address@hidden">
+ <address@hidden></a>.</p>
+
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+Please see the <a
+href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations
+README</a> for information on coordinating and submitting translations
+of this article.</p>
+</div>
+
+<!-- Regarding copyright, in general, standalone pages (as opposed to
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+ be under CC BY-ND 4.0. Please do NOT change or remove this
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+
+ If you wish to list earlier years, that is ok too.
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+ year, i.e., a year in which the document was published (including
+ being publicly visible on the web or in a revision control system).
+
+ There is more detail about copyright years in the GNU Maintainers
+ Information document, www.gnu.org/prep/maintain. -->
+
+<p>Copyright © 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 Richard Stallman</p>
+
+<p>This page is licensed under a <a rel="license"
+href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">Creative
+Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
License</a>.</p>
+
+<!--#include virtual="/server/bottom-notes.html" -->
+
+<p class="unprintable">Updated:
+<!-- timestamp start -->
+$Date: 2018/04/18 21:28:56 $
+<!-- timestamp end -->
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