www/philosophy po/surveillance-vs-democracy.tra...

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Changes by:     GNUN <gnun>     17/10/21 08:29:16

Modified files:
        philosophy/po  : surveillance-vs-democracy.translist 
                         surveillance-vs-democracy.zh-cn.po 
Added files:
        philosophy     : surveillance-vs-democracy.zh-cn.html 
        philosophy/po  : surveillance-vs-democracy.zh-cn-en.html 

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CVSWeb URLs:
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.zh-cn.html?cvsroot=www&rev=1.1
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.translist?cvsroot=www&r1=1.13&r2=1.14
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 <span dir="ltr"><a lang="ru" hreflang="ru" 
href="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.ru.html">русский</a>&nbsp;[ru]</span>
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href="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.sq.html">Shqip</a>&nbsp;[sq]</span> 
&nbsp;
 <span dir="ltr"><a lang="uk" hreflang="uk" 
href="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.uk.html">українська</a>&nbsp;[uk]</span>
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+<span dir="ltr"><a lang="zh-cn" hreflang="zh-cn" 
href="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.zh-cn.html">简体中文</a>&nbsp;[zh-cn]</span>
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+++ po/surveillance-vs-democracy.zh-cn.po       21 Oct 2017 12:29:16 -0000      
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@@ -851,8 +851,8 @@
 "a>&rdquo;ï¼Œå› ä¸ºè¿™äº‹å„¿ç»å¸¸å‘ç”Ÿï¼Œç‰¹åˆ«æ˜¯æœ‰å…³æŠ—è®®è€…å’Œ<a 
href=\"http://";
 "photographyisnotacrime.com/\">摄影者</a>æ—¶ã€‚ï¼‰åŠ 
州的一个城市要求警察全程穿戴"
 "录像机，结果是<a href=\"http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/";
-"ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition\">警察使用武力的现象减少60%</a>。"
-"ACLU（美国公民自由联盟）很支持这个做法。"
+"ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition\">警察使用武力的现象减少60%</a>。ACLU"
+"（美国公民自由联盟）很支持这个做法。"
 
 #. type: Content of: <div><div><p>
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+<!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE" 
value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
+
+<!--#include virtual="/server/header.zh-cn.html" -->
+<!-- Parent-Version: 1.79 -->
+
+<!-- This file is automatically generated by GNUnited Nations! -->
+<title>民主能够承受多少监控？ - GNU工程 - 
自由软件基金会</title>
+<style type="text/css" media="print,screen"><!--
+#intro { margin: 1.5em auto; }
+.pict.wide { width: 23em; }
+.pict p { margin-top: .2em; }
address@hidden (min-width: 55em) {
+   #intro { max-width: 55em; }
+   .pict.wide { margin-bottom: 0; }
+}
+-->
+</style>
+
+<!-- GNUN: localize URL /graphics/dog.small.jpg -->
+<!--#include virtual="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.translist" -->
+<!--#include virtual="/server/banner.zh-cn.html" -->
+<h2 class="center">民主能够承受多少监控？</h2>
+
+<p class="byline center"><a href="http://www.stallman.org/";>Richard 
Stallman</a> 著</p>
+
+<!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced
+     anti-ad-block system -->
+<blockquote 
class="center"><p>本文的初版在2013年10月发表于连线（Wired）。</p></blockquote>
+
+<div class="article">
+
+<div id="intro">
+<div class="pict wide">
+<a href="/graphics/dog.html">
+<img src="/graphics/dog.small.jpg" 
alt="一只狗的卡通画，它正疑惑地看着电脑屏幕上弹出的3个广告......"
 /></a>
+<p>&ldquo;他们是怎么知道我是狗的？&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>感谢Edward
+Snowden的揭露，我们知道了目前社会的常规监控已经违背了人权。在美国和世界各地不断重复发生的对持不同政见è€
…、消息来源以及新闻工作者
的骚扰和迫害也印证了这个事实。我们需要降低常规监控的水平，但是降低到什么水平呢？哪个水平正好是<em>最大可容忍的监控</em>，是我们要确保不能è¶
…越的水平呢？这个水平是一旦被超
越，监控就开始干扰正常的民主制度，表现为报警者
（象Snowden）可能会被捕。</p>
+</div>
+<div class="columns" style="clear:both">
+<p>面对政府秘密，我们普通民众有赖报警者来<a
+href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama";>告诉我们政府在做什么</a>。然而，目前的监控威胁到了潜在的报警è€
…，这就是说有点过了。要重振民主对政府的控制，我们必
须把监控的水平降低到报警者感到安全的水平。</p>
+
+<p>使用自由（free/libre）软件，<a
+href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">正如我已经提倡了30å¹´</a>，是我们控制数字生活的第一步，å
…¶ä¸­å°±åŒ…括防止监控。我们不能相信非自由软件；NSA<sup><a
+href="#TransNote1">1</a></sup><a
+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm";>利用</a>甚至<a
+href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>制é€
 </a>非自由软件的安全弱点来å…
¥ä¾µæˆ‘们的电脑和路由器。自由软件让我们能够控制自己的电脑，但是<a
+href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>这并不能在我们上网时保护我们的隐私。</a>。</p>
+
+<p><a
+href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>在美国，两å
…šç«‹æ³•æ¥&ldquo;限制国内
监控权力&rdquo;</a>正在计划中，但是它依赖于限制政府使用我们的虚拟档案<sup><a
+href="#TransNote2">2</a></sup>。如果&ldquo;抓捕报警者
&rdquo;的前提是获取指认她/他的足够资料，那么这æ 
·çš„立法不足以保护报警者。我们需要更进一步。</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader" style="clear: both">民主社会中监控的上限</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>如果报警者
不敢披露罪恶和谎言，我们就失去了对政府和制度的最后一丝控制。这就是为什么å
…è®¸æ”¿åºœå‘现谁是报告者的监控是过度的监控&mdash;æ˜¯æ°‘ä¸»æ— 
法承受的过度监控。</p>
+
+<p>在2011年，某美国政府官员幸灾乐祸地告诉记者<a
+href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river";>美国政府不会ä¼
 å”¤æŠ¥å‘Šè€…ï¼Œå› ä¸º&ldquo;æˆ‘ä»¬çŸ¥é“ä½ 
和谁谈过。&rdquo;</a>有时，<a
+href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>è®°è€
…
的通话记录会被调取</a>以查明通话人，但是Snowden向我们展示了å
…¶å®žç¾Žå›½æ‰€æœ‰äººçš„通话记录都被调取，随时调取，<a
+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131226044537/http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order";>从Verizon</a>和<a
+href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>å
…¶ä»–公司</a>。</p>
+
+<p>反对派和持不同证件者需要曝å…
‰å½“局的秘密，以防止政府利用秘密干坏事。ACLU<sup><a
+href="#TransNote3">3</a></sup>展示了美国政府<a
+href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>系统性å…
¥ä¾µå’Œå¹³çš„持不同证件者组织的活动</a>，å…
¶å€Ÿå£å°±æ˜¯è¿™äº›ç»„织中可能有恐怖分子。监控过度的水平就是政府能够通过监控发现谁和记è€
…或持不同证件者谈过话的水平。</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">信息，一旦被搜集，就会被滥用</h3>
+
+<div  class="columns">
+<p 
id="willbemisused">当人们认识到监控的水平过高时，他们的第一反应是提议限制获取数据。这听起来不错，但不解决问题，一点儿也不解决问题，即使假设政府会遵守这些条款也是一æ
 ·ã€‚（NSA误导了FISA<sup><a
+href="#TransNote4">4</a></sup>法庭，该法庭说它<a
+href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>不能有效地让NSA负责</a>。）å›
 为怀疑有罪就能够成为获取数据的理由，所以一旦报警者
被指控&ldquo;从事谍报活动，&rdquo;那么搜索&ldquo;间谍&rdquo;就会成为获取数据的借口。</p>
+
+<p>å¦å¤–ï¼Œæ”¿åºœçš„ç›‘æŽ§äººå‘˜è¿˜ä¼šå› 
私滥用这些数据。某些NSA人员<a
+href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>使用政府的监控系统来追踪å
…¶æƒ…
人</a>&mdash;的过去、现在或计划&mdash;这在实践中称为&ldquo;LOVEINT。&rdquo;NSA声称它曾抓获和惩罚了å‡
 
起此类事件；我们并不知道还有多少起并未抓到。但这并不意外，å›
 为一直以来警察就<a
+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160401102120/http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.V_mKlYbb69I";>使用访问驾ç
…
§è®°å½•çš„权力来追踪迷人的人</a>，这在实践中叫做&ldquo;查驾ç…
§çº¦ä¼šã€‚&rdquo;该行为还随着<a
+href="https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared";>新的数字系统</a>扩å¼
 。在2016å¹´ï¼ŒæŸå…¬è¯‰äººè¢«æŒ‡æŽ§ä¼ªé€ æ³•å®˜ç­¾åä»¥èŽ·å‡†<a
+href="http://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933";>搭线窃听一个å
…¶è¿·æ‹çš„对象</a>。AP<sup><a
+href="#TransNote5">5</a></sup>了解<a
+href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43/ap-across-us-police-officers-abuse-confidential-databases";>更多美国的å
…¶ä»–案例</a>。
+</p>
+
+<p>即使禁止，监控数据总是会用于å…
¶ä»–目的。一旦数据已收集并且政府可以访问，那么政府有很多恶劣的方法使用该数据，比如<a
+href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/";>欧洲</a>和<a
+href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment";>美国</a>的例子。</p>
+
+<p>由政府收集的个人数据也有可能被骇客通过入侵安å…
¨æœåŠ¡å™¨èŽ·å¾—，甚至被<a
+href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml";>为敌对国家工作的骇客获得</a>。</p>
+
+<p>政府可以轻易使用其强大的监控能力<a
+href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html";>直接毁灭民主</a>。</p>
+
+<p>对监控的å…
¨é¢æŽŒæŽ§ä½¿å¾—政府可以对任何人开展大规模的钓鱼调查。要使言论和民主安å
…¨ï¼Œæˆ‘们必须限制政府对监控数据的访问。</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">对隐私的有力保护必须是技术性的</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>电子前线基金会（Electronic Frontier Foundation）和å…
¶ä»–一些组织提议了一组法律原则来<a
+href="https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text";>禁止大规模监控的滥用</a>。这些原则åŒ
…括，对报警者严æ 
¼ã€æ˜Žç¡®çš„法律保护；作为结果，这些原则足够来保护民主自由&mdash;如果完å
…¨é‡‡çº³å¹¶æ°¸æ— 例外地执行。</p>
+
+<p>然而，这种法律保护是不确定的：正如当代历史展示的，法律会被废除（象FISA修正案）、终止或<a
+href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>忽略</a>。</p>
+
+<p>同时，恶意政客会引用搜集证据的条款来作为å…
¨é¢ç›‘控的法律支持；恐怖袭击，即使只是杀死极少数人，也能作为他们发挥的理由。</p>
+
+<p>如果获取数据的限制被搁置一边，那么情
况就变得和限制不存在一æ 
·ï¼šåŽ†å¹´çš„档案突然就变得可能会被政府及å…
¶ä»£ç†äººæ»¥ç”¨ï¼Œå¦‚果由公司收集，å…
¬å¸ä¹Ÿä¼šç§è‡ªæ»¥ç”¨ã€‚但是，如果终止收集这些档案，那么就没有档案，当然也就没有可能做回溯ç
 ”ç©¶ã€‚ä¸€ä¸ªæ–°çš„éžè‡ªç”±æ”¿æƒåªèƒ½é‡æ–°æž„é€ 
监控，而且只能收集从那以后的数据。如果可以终止或暂时忽略该法律，那么这个想法就å‡
 ä¹Žæ¯«æ— æ„ä¹‰ã€‚</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">首先，不要被愚弄</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>è¦æ‹¥æœ‰éšç§ï¼Œä½ å°±ä¸èƒ½æŠ›å¼ƒå®ƒï¼šä½ 
是第一个要保护自己隐私的人。避å…
åœ¨ç½‘站暴露身份、使用Tor<sup><a
+href="#TransNote6">6</a></sup>上网、使用带有阻止跟踪功能的浏览器。使用GNU
 Privacy
+Guardï¼ˆéšç§æŠ¤å«ï¼‰æ¥åŠ å¯†ç”µå­é‚®ä»¶ã€‚ç”¨çŽ°é‡‘ä»˜æ¬¾ã€‚</p>
+
+<p>ä¿æŠ¤ä½ çš„æ•°æ®ï¼›ä¸è¦å°†è‡ªå·±çš„æ•°æ®ä¿å­˜åœ¨å…¶ä»–å…
¬å¸&ldquo;便利的&rdquo;服务器上。然而，商用的数据备份服务是安å
…¨çš„ï¼Œå¦‚æžœä½ åœ¨ä¸Šä¼ 
ä¹‹å‰ï¼Œä½¿ç”¨è‡ªç”±è½¯ä»¶åœ¨è‡ªå·±çš„ç”µè„‘ä¸ŠæŠŠæ–‡ä»¶å½’æ¡£å¹¶åŠ å¯†ï¼ŒåŒ…
æ‹¬åŠ å¯†æ–‡ä»¶åã€‚</p>
+
+<p>ä¸ºéšç§è€ƒè™‘ï¼Œä½ è¦é¿å…ä½¿ç”¨éžè‡ªç”±è½¯ä»¶ï¼Œå› ä¸ºé‚£æ ·ä½ 
就把计算的控制交给了他人，他们<a
+href="/philosophy/proprietary-surveillance.html">å¯èƒ½ä¼šå€Ÿæ­¤çª¥æŽ¢ä½ 
</a>。避免<a
+href="/philosophy/who-does-that-server-really-serve.html">用软件代替服务</a>；这也是把计算控制交给了别人，å›
 ä¸ºè¿™è¦æ±‚ä½ æŠŠå…¨éƒ¨ç›¸å…³æ•°æ®äº¤ç»™æœåŠ¡å™¨ã€‚</p>
+
+<p>è¯·ä½ ä¹Ÿä¿æŠ¤æœ‹å‹å’Œç†Ÿäººçš„éšç§ã€‚<a
+href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>不要暴露他们的个人信息</a>除了如何联系他们，不要把邮件联系人和电话联系人交给任何网站。不要告诉诸如Facebook这æ
 ·çš„ç½‘ç«™ä½ 朋友们不愿在报纸上公开的事。最好就是æ 
¹æœ¬ä¸è¦ä½¿ç”¨Facebookã€‚è¯·æ‹’ç»ä½¿ç”¨è¦æ±‚å®žåçš„ç³»ç»Ÿï¼Œå³ä½¿ä½ 
æ„¿æ„å®žåï¼Œä¹Ÿä¸è¦å› æ­¤è€Œç»™ä»–äººçš„éšç§å¸¦æ¥åŽ‹åŠ›ã€‚</p>
+
+<p>è‡ªæˆ‘ä¿æŠ¤å¾ˆé‡è¦ï¼Œä½†æ˜¯å³ä½¿æœ€ä¸¥è°¨çš„è‡ªæˆ‘ä¿æŠ¤ä¹Ÿæ— 
æ³•åœ¨åˆ«äººçš„è®¾å¤‡ä¸Šä¿æŠ¤ä½ çš„éšç§ã€‚å½“æˆ‘ä»¬å’Œå…¶ä»–äººäº¤æµæˆ–è€…
流连于城市之中时，我们的隐私依赖于社会的实践。我们可以避å
…ä¸€äº›ç›‘æŽ§æˆ‘ä»¬äº¤æµå’Œæ´»åŠ¨çš„ç³»ç»Ÿï¼Œä½†æ˜¯æ— 法避å…
æ‰€æœ‰çš„监控系统。很明显，最好就是终止所有的监控，除了针对法律å
…è®¸çš„嫌疑犯。</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">我们设计每个系统时都必须考虑隐私</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>如果我们不要完全监控的社会，我们必
须视监控为社会污染，我们要象限制建筑工程对环境的影响一æ
 ·é™åˆ¶ç›‘控对每个新数字系统的影响。</p>
+
+<p>比如：&ldquo;智能&rdquo;电表设计为按时向电力å…
¬å¸å‘送每个用户的用电数据，包
括用电量和平均水平的比较。该设计是一种普遍性监控，而我们不应该对此进行监控。电力å
…¬å¸å¾ˆå®¹æ˜“æ 
¹æ®åœ°åŒºçš„总用电量除以登记用户数计算出平均用电量，并将此数据发送到电表。每个电表用户可以使用获得的数据，自己比较某个时段的用电量æƒ
…å†µã€‚åŒæ ·çš„ç»“æžœï¼Œä½†æ˜¯æ²¡æœ‰ç›‘æŽ§ï¼</p>
+
+<p>我们需要为每个数字设备设计此类隐私保护。</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">针对数据收集的解药：分散数据</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>让隐私在监控下安全的一个方法是<a 
name="dispersal">分散数据并使之不容易获取</a>。老式的安å…
¨æ‘„像头对隐私不构成威胁（<a
+href="#privatespace">*</a>）。它的记录都保存在本地，最多保留数周。å›
 
为获取这些记录并不方便，所以从来没有大规模地收集此类数据；只有有人报告犯罪活动时，数据才被从本地调取。每天收集上百万的磁带并查看或复制实é™
…上是不可能完成的任务。</p>
+
+<p>今天，安å…
¨æ‘„像头变成了监控摄像头：他们连接到互联网，所以记录能够由数据中心收集并永ä¹
…保存。这本身已经很危险，但情
况正变得更糟。人脸识别技术的进展有一天会å…
¨ç¨‹è¿½è¸ªè¢«æ€€ç–‘的记者，从而查看他们在和谁说话。</p>
+
+<p>网络摄像头本身的数字安全性通常很差劲，<a
+href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/cia-wants-spy-you-through-your-appliances";>任何人都可以查看这些摄像头在观察什么</a>。这使网络摄像头成为安å
…¨å’Œéšç§çš„主要威胁。为了保护隐私，我们应该禁止针对å…
¬ä¼—行踪的网络摄像头，除了那些人们随身携带的摄像设备。人们å¿
…须有自由间或发布一些ç…
§ç‰‡å’Œè§†é¢‘，但是在网络上系统收集此类数据的行为必
须受到限制。</p>
+
+<p><a
+name="privatespace"><b>*</b></a>此处，我假设安å…
¨æ‘„像头指向商店内部或者
指向街道。指向他人私有空间的摄像头侵犯了隐私权，但那是另一个问题。</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="digitalcash" class="subheader">针对商业网络监控的解药</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>大多数数据来自人们自己的数字活动。通常这些数据首å…
ˆè¢«å…
¬å¸æ”¶é›†ã€‚但是当数据威胁的是隐私和民主时，监控来自政府还是来自商业å
…¬å¸å¹¶æ— åˆ†åˆ«ï¼Œå› ä¸ºæ”¿åºœæ˜¯å¯ä»¥ç³»ç»Ÿæ€§åœ°èŽ·å–ç”±å…
¬å¸æ”¶é›†çš„数据的。</p>
+
+<p>NSA，通过PRISM<sup><a href="#TransNote7">7</a></sup>，可以<a
+href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2";>进å…
¥è®¸å¤šå¤§åž‹ç½‘络集团的数据库</a>。AT&amp;T保存着自1987年以来的电话记录并<a
+href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>让DEA<sup><a
+href="#TransNote8">8</a></sup>有权</a>按需查询。严æ 
¼æ¥è¯´ï¼Œç¾Žå›½æ”¿åºœä¸æ‹¥æœ‰è¿™äº›æ•°æ®ï¼Œä½†å®žé™…
上它就算拥有这些数据。某些公司由于<a
+href="https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-government-data-requests-2015";>尽量阻挡政府调取数据的请求</a>而受到赞扬，但是这只能部分补偿å
…¶é¦–先收集数据带来的伤害。另外，很多此类å…
¬å¸è‡ªå·±ä¹Ÿç›´æŽ¥æ»¥ç”¨è¿™äº›æ•°æ®æˆ–者卖给数据掮客。</p>
+
+<p>要达成保护言论自由和民主的目的就需要我们减少不止是政府对人们的数据收集，还要减少组织和å
…¬å¸çš„数据收集。我们必
须重新设计数字系统以确保它们不会收集用户数据。如果系统的确需要我们的交易数据，它们也不能保留数据è¶
…过业务本身需要的短时间。</p>
+
+<p>网络监控到达目前水平的一个动机是很多网站æ 
¹æ®ç”¨æˆ·çš„æ´»åŠ¨å’Œå€¾å‘åšå¹¿å‘Šï¼Œå¹¶å› 
此获得经济回报。这使得原本只是令人讨厌的&mdash;可以忽略的广告&mdash;变成了æ—
 è®ºæˆ‘ä»¬æ˜¯å¦çŸ¥æ™“éƒ½ä¼šé€ 
成伤害的监控系统。网络购买也会跟踪用户。我们都很清
楚&ldquo;隐私政策&rdquo;只是违反隐私的借口而非保护隐私的承诺。</p>
+
+<p>我们可以采取匿名付款的系统同时改正以上两个问题&mdash;就是付款è€
…匿名。（我们并不想帮助收款人避税。）<a
+href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>比特币并不匿名</a>，虽然有人开发了用比特币匿名付款的方法。然而，技术上，<a
+href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>数字现金最早于1980年代首次被开发</a>；最早实现该功能的GNU软件叫做<a
+href="http://taler.net/";>GNU 
Taler</a>。现在我们只需要合适的商业规划，以及政府不要阻æŒ
 这些规划。</p>
+
+<p>另一个匿名付款的可能方法是使用<a
+href="https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html";>预付款电话卡</a>。它虽然不太方便，但是很容易实现。</p>
+
+<p>网站收集个人数据的另一个威胁是安全攻击者会侵å…
¥ï¼ŒèŽ·å–数据并滥用之。这包括客户信用卡的详情
。匿名付款系统会结束这个危险：网站的安å…
¨æ¼æ´žä¸ä¼šä¼¤å®³åˆ°ä½ ï¼Œå› ä¸ºç½‘ç«™ä¸çŸ¥é“ä½ æ˜¯è°ã€‚</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">针对旅行监控的解药</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>æˆ‘ä»¬å¿…é¡»å°†ç”µå­è¿‡è·¯è´¹æ”¶å–ç³»ç»Ÿæ”¹é€ 
为匿名付费系统（比如，使用数字现金）。车牌识别系统会识别所有的牌ç
…§ï¼Œè€Œä¸”<a
+href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm";>å…
¶æ•°æ®æ— 
限期保留</a>；法律应该要求这些系统注意并只记录已经有法庭命令需要追踪的车牌号ç
 ã€‚另一个不太安å…
¨çš„æ›¿ä»£æ–¹æ¡ˆæ˜¯å°†æ‰€æœ‰è½¦ç‰Œè®°å½•ï¼Œä½†åªåœ¨æœ¬åœ°ä¿å­˜å‡ 
天，并且不把全部数据通过网络存取；只å…
è®¸æœç´¢é‚£äº›å·²ç»æœ‰æ³•åº­å‘½ä»¤éœ€è¦è¿½è¸ªçš„è½¦ç‰Œå·ç ã€‚</p>
+
+<p>美国的&ldquo;禁止飞行&rdquo;åå•åº”è¯¥å–æ¶ˆï¼Œå› ä¸ºå®ƒæ˜¯<a
+href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes";>未经审理的惩罚</a>。</p>
+
+<p>将一些人列å…
¥éœ€è¦ç‰¹åˆ«äººèº«å’Œè¡ŒæŽæ£€æŸ¥çš„名单是可以接受的，国内
èˆªç­çš„åŒ¿åä¹˜å®¢ä¹Ÿå¯ä»¥åŒæ ·å¯¹å¾…ã€‚ä»Žå…
¥å¢ƒèˆªç­æ‹¦æˆªé‚£äº›æœ¬æ¥å°±ä¸è®¸å…
¥å¢ƒçš„人员也是可以接受的。这些措施应该可以满足所有的法律目的了。</p>
+
+<p>许多大额支付系统使用某类智能卡或射频卡（RFID）来支付。这些系统会收集个人数据：如果ä½
 æœ‰ä¸€æ¬¡æ²¡æœ‰ä½¿ç”¨çŽ°é‡‘æ”¯ä»˜ï¼Œå®ƒä»¬å°±ä¼šæ°¸ä¹…æŠŠä½ 
的名字和所使用的卡绑定。这æ 
·å®ƒä»¬å°±ç­‰äºŽåœ¨è¿›è¡Œå¤§è§„模的监控。这类数据收集必
须减少。</p>
+
+<p>导航服务也监控：用户的电脑设备会告诉地图服务商用户的位置以及用户要去哪里；然后服务器计算路线并发回给用户的设备，设备再显示路线。今天，服务器可能会记录用户的位置，å›
 ä¸ºæ²¡ä»€ä¹ˆå¯ä»¥é˜»æ­¢å®ƒä»¬è¿™ä¹ˆåšã€‚è¿™ç§ç›‘æŽ§æœ¬èº«å¹¶æ— å¿…
要，重新设计可以避免：用户设备上的自由软件可以下载相å…
³çš„地图区域（如果不是事å…
ˆä¸‹è½½å¥½äº†ï¼‰ï¼Œè®¡ç®—路线并显示，这就没有必
要告诉任何人用户要去哪里。</p>
+
+<p>诸如租借自行车之类的系统，可以设计为租借者的身份仅
被当事出借站所知。该出借站可以通知所有å…
¶ä»–站点某物品已经&ldquo;借出&rdquo;ï¼Œè¿™æ ·ç§Ÿå€Ÿè€…
就可以在任意站点归还物品（一般来说，是另一个站点），而归还站已知该物品是何时在何地被借出。它会通知å
…
¶ä»–站点该物品不再是&ldquo;借出&rdquo;。归还站还会计算用户的账单，并将之（在等å¾
…随机时间段后）经由多个站点发回总部，这æ 
·æ€»éƒ¨å°±ä¸èƒ½çŸ¥é“账单来自哪里。完成发送之后，归还站将忘掉该交易。如果物品长时间保持&ldquo;借出&rdquo;，借出站可以通知总部；此时，它可以立即把租借è€
…的身份发送过去。</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">针对通讯档案的解药</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>网络服务商和电话公司保留å…
¶ç”¨æˆ·çš„大量数据（浏览记录、通话记录等等）。对移动电话用户，他们还会<a
+href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>记录用户的å
…·ä½“位置</a>。这些档案会保留很长时间：对AT&amp;T来说，超
过30年。在不久的将来他们甚至会<a
+href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>记录用户的身体动作</a>。看起来<a
+href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location";>NSA也会大量收集移动电话的位置信息</a>。</p>
+
+<p>åœ¨åˆ¶é€ 
æ­¤ç±»æ¡£æ¡ˆçš„ç³»ç»Ÿä¸­ï¼Œé€šè®¯ä¸è¢«ç›‘æŽ§æ˜¯ä¸å¯èƒ½çš„ã€‚æ‰€ä»¥åˆ¶é€ 
和保留这些档案应该是非法的。必须禁止网络提供商和电话å…
¬å¸é•¿æ—¶é—´ä¿ç•™è¿™äº›ä¿¡æ¯ï¼Œé™¤éžé’ˆå¯¹æŸäº›æœ‰æ³•åº­å‘½ä»¤çš„对象。</p>
+
+<p>è¯¥è§£å†³æ–¹æ¡ˆä¸å®Œå…¨ä»¤äººæ»¡æ„ï¼Œå› ä¸ºå®ƒæ— æ³•å®žé™…
阻止政府在数据产生之后立即获得&mdash;这正是<a
+href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>美国政府对某些或å
…¨éƒ¨ç”µè¯å…
¬å¸çš„所作所为</a>。我们还是不得不依赖法律来禁止这种行为。但是，这总好过目前的æƒ
…况，相关法律（PAT
+RIOT 
Act）并不明确地禁止这种行为。另外，如果政府要恢复监控，它也æ—
 法获得在恢复之前的通话记录。</p>
+
+<p>ä¸ºäº†ä¿æŠ¤ä½ 
ç”µå­é‚®ä»¶é€šè®¯çš„éšç§ï¼Œä¸€ä¸ªç®€å•çš„å±€éƒ¨è§£å†³åŠžæ³•æ˜¯ä½ 
和通讯者
ä½¿ç”¨ä¸ä¼šå’Œå½“åœ°æ”¿åºœåˆä½œçš„é‚®ä»¶æœåŠ¡å•†ï¼Œå¹¶äº’ç›¸ä½¿ç”¨åŠ 
密通讯。但是，Ladar
+Levison（Lavabit邮件服务的拥有者，美国监控机构企图彻底ç 
´åè¯¥é‚®ä»¶ç³»ç»Ÿï¼‰å¯¹é‚®ä»¶åŠ å¯†ç³»ç»Ÿæœ‰ä¸€ä¸ªæ›´å¤æ‚çš„æƒ³æ³•ï¼šä½ 
çš„é‚®ä»¶æœåŠ¡å•†åªä¼šçŸ¥é“ä½ 
向我的邮件服务商的某个用户发送了邮件，同时我的邮件服务商只会知道我收到了来自ä½
 çš„é‚®ä»¶æœåŠ¡å•†çš„æŸä¸ªç”¨æˆ·çš„é‚®ä»¶ï¼Œä½†æ˜¯å®ƒå¾ˆéš¾ç¡®å®šæ˜¯ä½ 
发邮件给了我。</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">但是某些监控还是必要的</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>政府要抓到罪犯，它要能够在法庭命令下调查指定的罪案或è€
…
指定的可疑预谋。有了互联网，监听电话的权力会自然延伸到监听互联网。虽然政府很容易滥用该权力，但是它也是å¿
…要的。所幸的是，如果（按我的建议）事å…
ˆå·²ç»ç¦æ­¢äº†æ¡£æ¡ˆæ”¶é›†ï¼Œåœ¨äº‹åŽæŸ¥æ‰¾æŠ¥è­¦è€…就不太可能。</p>
+
+<p>å…
·æœ‰æ”¿åºœç‰¹æƒçš„个人，比如警察，将失去隐私权并被监控。（事实上，警察自己就有å
…³äºŽåšä¼ªè¯çš„专用术语&ldquo;<a
+href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&amp;oldid=552608302";>警察伪证罪（testilying）</a>&rdquo;，å›
 为这事儿经常发生，特别是有关抗议者和<a
+href="http://photographyisnotacrime.com/";>摄影者</a>æ—¶ã€‚ï¼‰åŠ 
州的一个城市要求警察全程穿戴录像机，结果是<a
+href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>警察使用武力的现象减少60%</a>。ACLU（美国å
…¬æ°‘自由联盟）很支持这个做法。</p>
+
+<p><a
+href="http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266";>企业不是人，它们没有人权</a>。要求商业å
…¬å¸å…¬å¼€å…¶å¯èƒ½å¯¹ç¤¾ä¼šå¯¼è‡´åŒ–学、生物、æ 
¸ã€é‡‘融、计算（比如<a
+href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org";>DRM</a>）或政治（比如游说）等风险的活动的细节是合法的，如果这些风险对大众利益的影响达到了一定的水平。这些活动的危险（想想BP原油泄漏、福岛æ
 ¸ç”µç«™ååº”å †æ ¸å¿ƒç†”æ¯å’Œ2008金融危机）超过了恐怖袭击。</p>
+
+<p>但是，言论自由必
须不受监控，即使它是以商业的形式呈现的。</p>
+</div>
+<div class="column-limit"></div>
+
+<div class="reduced-width">
+<p>数字技术大大提高了对我们的活动、行为和通讯的监控水平。它远远è¶
…过了1990年代我们所经历的水平，也<a
+href="https://hbr.org/2013/06/your-iphone-works-for-the-secret-police";>远超
人们在1980年代的铁幕<sup><a
+href="#TransNote9">9</a></sup>经历</a>，政府提议的对所搜集数据的使用限制也æ—
 法改变这一点。</p>
+
+<p>公司正在设计更具侵略性的监控。有些项目充
斥着监控，以诸如Facebook等公司的形式，可能会对<a
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people";>人们如何思考</a>有深远的影响。这种可能性是很难估量的；但是它对民主的威胁却不是遐想。它存在而且现在就可以看得到。</p>
+
+<p>é™¤éžæˆ‘ä»¬ç¡®ä¿¡æˆ‘ä»¬çš„è‡ªç”±å›½å®¶è¿‡åŽ»ä¸¥é‡ç¼ºå¤±ç›‘æŽ§ï¼Œå› 
而应该进行超过苏联和东德所进行的监控，我们必
须逆转监控的增长。这就需要停止对人民的大数据收集。</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="translators-notes">
+
+<!--TRANSLATORS: Use space (SPC) as msgstr if you don't have notes.-->
+<h3>译注</h3>
+<ol>
+<li id="TransNote1">NSA，National Security Agency。美国国家安å…
¨å±€ã€‚</li>
+<li id="TransNote2">virtual
+dossier，虚拟档案。是指非纸质的归档文件，通常会搜集å…
³äºŽä¸ªäººçš„所有电子资料作为虚拟档案。</li>
+<li id="TransNote3">ACLU，American Civil Liberties
+Unionã€‚ç¾Žå›½å…¬æ°‘è‡ªç”±è”ç›Ÿï¼Œæå«å’Œä¿æŠ¤ä¸ªäººæƒåˆ©å’Œè‡ªç”±çš„æ— å…
šæ´¾ã€éžç›ˆåˆ©ç»„织。</li>
+<li id="TransNote4">FISA，Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Act，外国情报监听法。美国FISA法庭处理政府相å…
³çš„监听、搜查以及其他调查活动的合法性事物。</li>
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id="TransNote6">Tor，www.torproject.org。保护隐私的自由软件项目。</li>
+<li 
id="TransNote7">PRISM，美国国安局的监控系统，它从美国许多电话å
…¬å¸èŽ·å–网络通讯数据。</li>
+<li id="TransNote8">DEA，美国稽毒局。</li>
+<li id="TransNote9">Iron
+Curtain，铁幕。指二战结束（1945年）到冷战结束（1991年）期间，苏联和欧洲以及西方国家在意识形态和物理边界的对立和隔绝期。</li>
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+<!--#include virtual="/server/header.html" -->
+<!-- Parent-Version: 1.79 -->
+<title>How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?
+- GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title>
+<style type="text/css" media="print,screen"><!--
+#intro { margin: 1.5em auto; }
+.pict.wide { width: 23em; }
+.pict p { margin-top: .2em; }
address@hidden (min-width: 55em) {
+   #intro { max-width: 55em; }
+   .pict.wide { margin-bottom: 0; }
+}
+--></style>
+<!-- GNUN: localize URL /graphics/dog.small.jpg -->
+<!--#include virtual="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.translist" -->
+<!--#include virtual="/server/banner.html" -->
+<h2 class="center">How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?</h2>
+
+<p class="byline center">by <a href="http://www.stallman.org/";>Richard 
Stallman</a></p>
+
+<!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced
+     anti-ad-block system -->
+<blockquote class="center"><p>A version of this article was first published in 
Wired
+in October 2013.</p></blockquote>
+
+<div class="article">
+
+<div id="intro">
+<div class="pict wide">
+<a href="/graphics/dog.html">
+<img src="/graphics/dog.small.jpg" alt="Cartoon of a dog, wondering at the 
three ads that popped up on his computer screen..." /></a>
+<p>&ldquo;How did they find out I'm a dog?&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Thanks to Edward Snowden's disclosures, we know that the current
+level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human
+rights.  The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents,
+sources, and journalists in the US and elsewhere provides
+confirmation.  We need to reduce the level of general surveillance,
+but how far?  Where exactly is the
+<em>maximum tolerable level of surveillance</em>, which we must ensure
+is not exceeded?  It is the level beyond which surveillance starts to
+interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that whistleblowers
+(such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="columns" style="clear:both">
+<p>Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on
+whistleblowers
+to <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama";>tell
+us what the state is doing</a>.  However, today's surveillance
+intimidates potential whistleblowers, which means it is too much.  To
+recover our democratic control over the state, we must reduce
+surveillance to the point where whistleblowers know they are safe.</p>
+
+<p>Using free/libre
+software, <a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">as
+I've advocated for 30 years</a>, is the first step in taking control
+of our digital lives, and that includes preventing surveillance.  We
+can't trust nonfree software; the NSA
+<a 
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm";>uses</a>
+and
+even <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>creates</a>
+security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers
+and routers.  Free software gives us control of our own computers,
+but <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>that won't
+protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>.</p>
+
+<p><a
+href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>Bipartisan
+legislation to &ldquo;curtail the domestic surveillance
+powers&rdquo;</a> in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on
+limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers.  That won't
+suffice to protect whistleblowers if &ldquo;catching the
+whistleblower&rdquo; is grounds for access sufficient to identify him
+or her.  We need to go further.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader" style="clear: both">The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a 
Democracy</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>If whistleblowers don't dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the
+last shred of effective control over our government and institutions.
+That's why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has
+talked with a reporter is too much surveillance&mdash;too much for
+democracy to endure.</p>
+
+<p>An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in
+2011 that
+the <a 
href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river";>U.S.
 would
+not subpoena reporters because &ldquo;We know who you're talking
+to.&rdquo;</a>
+Sometimes <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>journalists'
+phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden
+has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records
+of everyone in the U.S., all the
+time, <a 
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131226044537/http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order";>from
+Verizon</a>
+and <a 
href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>from
+other companies too</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from
+states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them.  The ACLU has
+demonstrated the U.S. government's <a
+href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>systematic
+practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext
+that there might be terrorists among them.  The point at which
+surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who
+spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused</h3>
+
+<div  class="columns">
+<p id="willbemisused">When people recognize
+that the level of general surveillance is too
+high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the
+accumulated data.  That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not
+even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules.
+(The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it
+was <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>unable
+to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime
+will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of
+&ldquo;espionage,&rdquo; finding the &ldquo;spy&rdquo; will provide an
+excuse to access the accumulated material.</p>
+
+<p>In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data
+for personal reasons.  Some NSA
+agents <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>used
+U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>&mdash;past,
+present, or wished-for&mdash;in a practice called
+&ldquo;LOVEINT.&rdquo; The NSA says it has caught and punished this a
+few times; we don't know how many other times it wasn't caught.  But
+these events shouldn't surprise us, because police have
+long <a 
href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160401102120/http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.V_mKlYbb69I";>used
+their access to driver's license records to track down someone
+attractive</a>, a practice known as &ldquo;running a plate for a
+date.&rdquo; This practice has expanded
+with <a 
href="https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared";>new
+digital systems</a>.  In 2016, a prosecutor was accused of forging
+judges' signatures to get authorization
+to <a 
href="http://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933";>
+wiretap someone who was the object of a romantic obsession</a>. The AP
+knows
+of <a 
href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43/ap-across-us-police-officers-abuse-confidential-databases";>many
+other instances in the US</a>.
+</p>
+
+<p>Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if
+this is prohibited.  Once the data has been accumulated and the state
+has the possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in
+dreadful ways, as shown by examples
+from <a 
href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/";>Europe</a>
+and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment";>the
+US </a>.</p>
+
+<p>Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained
+by outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even
+by <a 
href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml";>crackers
+working for hostile states</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability
+to <a 
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html";>subvert
+democracy directly</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to
+launch a massive fishing expedition against any person.  To make
+journalism and democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data
+that is easily accessible to the state.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose
+a set of legal principles designed to <a
+href="https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text";>prevent the
+abuses of massive surveillance</a>.  These principles include,
+crucially, explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a
+consequence, they would be adequate for protecting democratic
+freedoms&mdash;if adopted completely and enforced without exception
+forever.</p>
+
+<p>However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history
+shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act),
+suspended, or <a
+href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>ignored</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for
+total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a
+handful of people, can be hyped to provide an opportunity.</p>
+
+<p>If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if
+they had never existed: years worth of dossiers would suddenly become
+available for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by
+companies, for their private misuse as well.  If, however, we stop the
+collection of dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won't exist, and
+there will be no way to compile them retroactively.  A new illiberal
+regime would have to implement surveillance afresh, and it would only
+collect data starting at that date.  As for suspending or momentarily
+ignoring this law, the idea would hardly make sense.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">First, Don't Be Foolish</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has
+to protect your privacy is you.  Avoid identifying yourself to web
+sites, contact them with Tor, and use browsers that block the schemes
+they use to track visitors.  Use the GNU Privacy Guard to encrypt the
+contents of your email.  Pay for things with cash.</p>
+
+<p>Keep your own data; don't store your data in a company's
+&ldquo;convenient&rdquo; server.  It's safe, however, to entrust a
+data backup to a commercial service, provided you put the files in an
+archive and encrypt the whole archive, including the names of the
+files, with free software on your own computer before uploading
+it.</p>
+
+<p>For privacy's sake, you must avoid nonfree software since, as a
+consequence of giving others control of your computing, it
+is <a href="/philosophy/proprietary-surveillance.html">likely to spy
+on you</a>.
+Avoid <a href="/philosophy/who-does-that-server-really-serve.html">service
+as a software substitute</a>; as well as giving others control of your
+computing, it requires you to hand over all the pertinent data to the
+server.</p>
+
+<p>Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy,
+too.  <a 
href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>Don't
+give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them,
+and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts.
+Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that
+they might not wish to publish in a newspaper.  Better yet, don't be
+used by Facebook at all.  Reject communication systems that require
+users to give their real names, even if you are going to give yours,
+since they pressure other people to surrender their privacy.</p>
+
+<p>Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous
+self-protection is insufficient to protect your privacy on or from
+systems that don't belong to you.  When we communicate with others or
+move around the city, our privacy depends on the practices of society.
+We can avoid some of the systems that surveil our communications and
+movements, but not all of them.  Clearly, the better solution is to
+make all these systems stop surveilling people other than legitimate
+suspects.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">We Must Design Every System for Privacy</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>If we don't want a total surveillance society, we must consider
+surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance
+impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental
+impact of physical construction.</p>
+
+<p>For example: &ldquo;smart&rdquo; meters for electricity are touted
+for sending the power company moment-by-moment data about each
+customer's electric usage, including how usage compares with users in
+general.  This is implemented based on general surveillance, but does
+not require any surveillance.  It would be easy for the power company
+to calculate the average usage in a residential neighborhood by
+dividing the total usage by the number of subscribers, and send that
+to the meters.  Each customer's meter could compare her usage, over
+any desired period of time, with the average usage pattern for that
+period.  The same benefit, with no surveillance!</p>
+
+<p>We need to design such privacy into all our digital systems.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is
+to <a name="dispersal">keep the data dispersed and inconvenient to
+access</a>.  Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat to privacy(<a 
href="#privatespace">*</a>).
+The recording was stored on the premises, and kept for a few weeks at
+most.  Because of the inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it
+was never done massively; they were accessed only in the places where
+someone reported a crime.  It would not be feasible to physically
+collect millions of tapes every day and watch them or copy them.</p>
+
+<p>Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they
+are connected to the Internet so recordings can be collected in a data
+center and saved forever.  This is already dangerous, but it is going
+to get worse.  Advances in face recognition may bring the day when
+suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see
+who they talk with.</p>
+
+<p>Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security
+themselves, which
+means <a 
href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/cia-wants-spy-you-through-your-appliances";>anyone
+can watch what those cameras see</a>.  This makes internet-connected
+cameras a major threat to security as well as privacy.  For privacy's
+sake, we should ban the use of Internet-connected cameras aimed where
+and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people.
+Everyone must be free to post photos and video recordings
+occasionally, but the systematic accumulation of such data on the
+Internet must be limited.</p>
+
+<p><a name="privatespace"><b>*</b></a>I assume here that the security
+camera points at the inside of a store, or at the street.  Any camera
+pointed at someone's private space by someone else violates privacy,
+but that is another issue.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="digitalcash" class="subheader">Remedy for Internet Commerce 
Surveillance</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>Most data collection comes from people's own digital activities.
+Usually the data is collected first by companies.  But when it comes
+to the threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether
+surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a
+business, because the data that the companies collect is
+systematically available to the state.</p>
+
+<p>The NSA, through PRISM,
+has <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2";>gotten
+into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>.  AT&amp;T
+has saved all its phone call records since 1987
+and <a 
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>makes
+them available to the DEA</a> to search on request.  Strictly
+speaking, the U.S.  government does not possess that data, but in
+practical terms it may as well possess it.  Some companies are praised
+for <a 
href="https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-government-data-requests-2015";>resisting
+government data requests to the limited extent they can</a>, but that
+can only partly compensate for the harm they do to by collecting that
+data in the first place.  In addition, many of those companies misuse
+the data directly or provide it to data brokers.</p>
+
+<p>The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires
+that we reduce the data collected about people by any organization,
+not just by the state.  We must redesign digital systems so that they
+do not accumulate data about their users.  If they need digital data
+about our transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more
+than a short time beyond what is inherently necessary for their
+dealings with us.</p>
+
+<p>One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the
+Internet is that sites are financed through advertising based on
+tracking users' activities and propensities.  This converts a mere
+annoyance&mdash;advertising that we can learn to ignore&mdash;into a
+surveillance system that harms us whether we know it or not.
+Purchases over the Internet also track their users.  And we are all
+aware that &ldquo;privacy policies&rdquo; are more excuses to violate
+privacy than commitments to uphold it.</p>
+
+<p>We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
+payments&mdash;anonymous for the payer, that is.  (We don't want to
+help the payee dodge
+taxes.)  <a 
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>Bitcoin
+is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay
+anonymously with Bitcoin.  However, technology
+for <a href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>digital
+cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; the GNU software for doing
+this is called <a href="http://taler.net/";>GNU Taler</a>.  Now we need
+only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct
+them.</p>
+
+<p>Another possible method for anonymous payments would
+use <a 
href="https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html";>prepaid
+phone cards</a>.  It is less convenient, but very easy to
+implement.</p>
+
+<p>A further threat from sites' collection of personal data is that
+security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it.  This includes
+customers' credit card details.  An anonymous payment system would end
+this danger: a security hole in the site can't hurt you if the site
+knows nothing about you.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Travel Surveillance</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using
+digital cash, for instance).  License-plate recognition systems
+recognize all license plates, and
+the <a 
href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm";>data
+can be kept indefinitely</a>; they should be required by law to notice
+and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars
+sought by court orders.  A less secure alternative would record all
+cars locally but only for a few days, and not make the full data
+available over the Internet; access to the data should be limited to
+searching for a list of court-ordered license-numbers.</p>
+
+<p>The U.S. &ldquo;no-fly&rdquo; list must be abolished because it is
+<a 
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes";>punishment
+without trial</a>.</p>
+
+<p>It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage
+will be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic
+flights could be treated as if they were on this list.  It is also
+acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the
+country at all, from boarding flights to the country.  This ought to
+be enough for all legitimate purposes.</p>
+
+<p>Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for
+payment.  These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the
+mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card
+permanently with your name.  Furthermore, they record all travel
+associated with each card.  Together they amount to massive
+surveillance.  This data collection must be reduced.</p>
+
+<p>Navigation services do surveillance: the user's computer tells the
+map service the user's location and where the user wants to go; then
+the server determines the route and sends it back to the user's
+computer, which displays it.  Nowadays, the server probably records
+the user's locations, since there is nothing to prevent it.  This
+surveillance is not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it:
+free/libre software in the user's computer could download map data for
+the pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the
+route, and display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is
+or wants to go.</p>
+
+<p>Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the
+borrower's identity is known only inside the station where the item
+was borrowed.  Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is
+&ldquo;out,&rdquo; so when the user returns it at any station (in
+general, a different one), that station will know where and when that
+item was borrowed.  It will inform the other station that the item is
+no longer &ldquo;out.&rdquo; It will also calculate the user's bill,
+and send it (after waiting some random number of minutes) to
+headquarters along a ring of stations, so that headquarters would not
+find out which station the bill came from.  Once this is done, the
+return station would forget all about the transaction.  If an item
+remains &ldquo;out&rdquo; for too long, the station where it was
+borrowed can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the
+borrower's identity immediately.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Communications Dossiers</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive
+data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc).  With
+mobile phones, they
+also <a 
href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>record
+the user's physical location</a>.  They keep these dossiers for a long
+time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&amp;T.  Soon they will
+even <a 
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>record
+the user's body activities</a>.  It appears that
+the <a 
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location";>NSA
+collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk.</p>
+
+<p>Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such
+dossiers.  So it should be illegal to create or keep them.  ISPs and
+phone companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very
+long, in the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.</p>
+
+<p>This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't
+physically stop the government from collecting all the information
+immediately as it is generated&mdash;which is what
+the <a 
href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>U.S.
 does
+with some or all phone companies</a>.  We would have to rely on
+prohibiting that by law.  However, that would be better than the
+current situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not
+clearly prohibit the practice.  In addition, if the government did
+resume this sort of surveillance, it would not get data about
+everyone's phone calls made prior to that time.</p>
+
+<p>For privacy about who you exchange email with, a simple partial
+solution is for you and others to use email services in a country that
+would never cooperate with your own government, and which communicate
+with each other using encryption.  However, Ladar Levison (owner of
+the mail service Lavabit that US surveillance sought to corrupt
+completely) has a more sophisticated idea for an encryption system
+through which your email service would know only that you sent mail to
+some user of my email service, and my email service would know only
+that I received mail from some user of your email service, but it
+would be hard to determine that you had sent mail to me.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3 class="subheader">But Some Surveillance Is Necessary</h3>
+
+<div class="columns">
+<p>For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate
+specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court
+order.  With the Internet, the power to tap phone conversations would
+naturally extend to the power to tap Internet connections.  This power
+is easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary.
+Fortunately, this won't make it possible to find whistleblowers after
+the fact, if (as I recommend) we prevent digital systems from accumulating
+massive dossiers before the fact.</p>
+
+<p>Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police,
+forfeit their right to privacy and must be monitored.  (In fact,
+police have their own jargon term for perjury,
+&ldquo;<a 
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&amp;oldid=552608302";>testilying</a>,&rdquo;
+since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters
+and <a href="http://photographyisnotacrime.com/";>photographers</a>.)
+One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all
+the time
+found <a 
href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>their
+use of force fell by 60%</a>.  The ACLU is in favor of this.</p>
+
+<p><a
+href="http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266";>Corporations
+are not people, and not entitled to human rights</a>.  It is
+legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes
+that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational
+(e.g., <a href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org";>DRM</a>) or political
+(e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for
+public well-being.  The danger of these operations (consider the BP
+oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs
+that of terrorism.</p>
+
+<p>However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when
+it is carried out as part of a business.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="column-limit"></div>
+
+<div class="reduced-width">
+<p>Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the
+level of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications.
+It is far more than we experienced in the 1990s, and <a
+href="https://hbr.org/2013/06/your-iphone-works-for-the-secret-police";>far
+more than people behind the Iron Curtain experienced</a> in the 1980s,
+and proposed legal limits on state use of the accumulated data would
+not alter that.</p>
+
+<p>Companies are designing even more intrusive surveillance.  Some
+project that pervasive surveillance, hooked to companies such as
+Facebook, could have deep effects on <a
+href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people";>how
+people think</a>.  Such possibilities are imponderable; but the threat
+to democracy is not speculation.  It exists and is visible today.</p>
+
+<p>Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from
+a grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the
+Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase.
+That requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
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+<p>Copyright &copy; 2015, 2016, 2017 Richard Stallman</p>
+
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+
+<p class="unprintable">Updated:
+<!-- timestamp start -->
+$Date: 2017/10/21 12:29:16 $
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