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<h2>Kiek daug sekimo demokratija gali atlaikyti?</h2>
<p>pagal <a href="http://www.stallman.org/";>Richard Stallman</a></p>
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+<body><pre>
+<!--#include virtual="/server/header.html" -->
+<!-- Parent-Version: 1.77 -->
+<title>How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?
+- GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title>
+<!--#include virtual="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.translist"
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+<!--#include virtual="/server/banner.html" -->
+<h2>How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?</h2>
+
+<p>by <a href="http://www.stallman.org/">Richard
Stallman</a></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>A version of this article was first published
+in <a
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance/">Wired</a>
+in October 2013.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Thanks to Edward Snowden's disclosures, we know that the current
+level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human
+rights. The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents,
+sources, and journalists in the US and elsewhere provides
+confirmation. We need to reduce the level of general surveillance,
+but how far? Where exactly is the
+<em>maximum tolerable level of surveillance</em>, which we must
ensure
+is not exceeded? It is the level beyond which surveillance starts to
+interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that whistleblowers
+(such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.</p>
+
+<p>Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on
+whistleblowers
+to <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama">tell
+us what the state is doing</a>. However, today's surveillance
+intimidates potential whistleblowers, which means it is too much. To
+recover our democratic control over the state, we must reduce
+surveillance to the point where whistleblowers know they are safe.</p>
+
+<p>Using free/libre
+software, <a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">as
+I've advocated for 30 years</a>, is the first step in taking control
+of our digital lives, and that includes preventing surveillance. We
+can't trust nonfree software; the NSA
+<a <span
class="removed"><del><strong>href="http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm">uses</a></strong></del></span>
<span
class="inserted"><ins><em>href="http://www.computerworlduk.com/blogs/open-enterprise/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again-3569376/">uses</a></em></ins></span>
+and
+even <a
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security">creates</a>
+security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers
+and routers. Free software gives us control of our own computers,
+but <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/">that won't
+protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>.</p>
+
+<p><a
+href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill">Bipartisan
+legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance
+powers”</a> in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on
+limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers. That won't
+suffice to protect whistleblowers if “catching the
+whistleblower” is grounds for access sufficient to identify him
+or her. We need to go further.</p>
+
+<h3>The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a Democracy</h3>
+
+<p>If whistleblowers don't dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the
+last shred of effective control over our government and institutions.
+That's why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has
+talked with a reporter is too much surveillance—too much for
+democracy to endure.</p>
+
+<p>An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in
+2011 that
+the <a
href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river">U.S.
would
+not subpoena reporters because “We know who you're talking
+to.”</a>
+Sometimes <a
href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press">journalists'
+phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden
+has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records
+of everyone in the U.S., all the
+time, <a
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">from
+Verizon</a>
+and <a
href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07">from
+other companies too</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from
+states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has
+demonstrated the U.S. government's <a
+href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf">systematic
+practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext
+that there might be terrorists among them. The point at which
+surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who
+spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident.</p>
+
+<h3>Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused</h3>
+
+<p>When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too
+high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the
+accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not
+even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules.
+(The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it
+was <a
href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/">unable
+to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime
+will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of
+“espionage,” finding the “spy” will provide an
+excuse to access the accumulated material.</p>
+
+<p>In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data for
+personal reasons. Some NSA
+agents <a
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems">used
+U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>—past,
+present, or wished-for—in a practice called
+“LOVEINT.” The NSA says it has caught and punished this a
+few times; we don't know how many other times it wasn't caught. But
+these events shouldn't surprise us, because police have
+long <a href="http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm">used
+their access to driver's license records to track down someone
+attractive</a>, a practice known as “running a plate for a
+date.”</p>
+
+<p>Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if
+this is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state
+has the possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in
+dreadful ways, as shown by examples
+from <a
href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/">Europe</a>
+and <a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment">the
+US </a>.</p>
+
+<p>Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained
+by outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even
+by <a
href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml">crackers
+working for hostile states</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability
+to <a
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html">subvert
+democracy directly</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to
+launch a massive fishing expedition against any person. To make
+journalism and democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data
+that is easily accessible to the state.</p>
+
+<h3>Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical</h3>
+
+<p>The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose
+a set of legal principles designed to <a
+href="https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text">prevent the
+abuses of massive surveillance</a>. These principles include,
+crucially, explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a
+consequence, they would be adequate for protecting democratic
+freedoms—if adopted completely and enforced without exception
+forever.</p>
+
+<p>However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history
+shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act),
+suspended, or <a
+href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html">ignored</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for
+total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a
+handful of people, can be hyped to provide an opportunity.</p>
+
+<p>If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if
+they had never existed: years worth of dossiers would suddenly become
+available for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by
+companies, for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the
+collection of dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won't exist, and
+there will be no way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal
+regime would have to implement surveillance afresh, and it would only
+collect data starting at that date. As for suspending or momentarily
+ignoring this law, the idea would hardly make sense.</p>
+
+<h3>First, Don't Be Foolish</h3>
+
+<p>To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has
+to protect your privacy is you. Avoid identifying yourself to web
+sites, contact them with Tor, and use browsers that block the schemes
+they use to track visitors. Use the GNU Privacy Guard to encrypt the
+contents of your email. Pay for things with cash.</p>
+
+<p>Keep your own data; don't store your data in a company's
+“convenient” server. It's safe, however, to entrust a
+data backup to a commercial service, provided you put the files in an
+archive and encrypt the whole archive, including the names of the
+files, with free software on your own computer before uploading
+it.</p>
+
+<p>For privacy's sake, you must avoid nonfree software since, as a
+consequence of giving others control of your computing, it
+is <a href="/philosophy/proprietary-surveillance.html">likely to spy
+on you</a>.
+Avoid <a
href="/philosophy/who-does-that-server-really-serve.html">service
+as a software substitute</a>; as well as giving others control of your
+computing, it requires you to hand over all the pertinent data to the
+server.</p>
+
+<p>Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy,
+too. <a
href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/">Don't
+give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them,
+and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts.
+Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that
+they might not wish to publish in a newspaper. Better yet, don't be
+used by Facebook at all. Reject communication systems that require
+users to give their real names, even if you are going to give yours,
+since they pressure other people to surrender their privacy.</p>
+
+<p>Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous
+self-protection is insufficient to protect your privacy on or from
+systems that don't belong to you. When we communicate with others or
+move around the city, our privacy depends on the practices of society.
+We can avoid some of the systems that surveil our communications and
+movements, but not all of them. Clearly, the better solution is to
+make all these systems stop surveilling people other than legitimate
+suspects.</p>
+
+<h3>We Must Design Every System for Privacy</h3>
+
+<p>If we don't want a total surveillance society, we must consider
+surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance
+impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental
+impact of physical construction.</p>
+
+<p>For example: “smart” meters for electricity are touted
+for sending the power company moment-by-moment data about each
+customer's electric usage, including how usage compares with users in
+general. This is implemented based on general surveillance, but does
+not require any surveillance. It would be easy for the power company
+to calculate the average usage in a residential neighborhood by
+dividing the total usage by the number of subscribers, and send that
+to the meters. Each customer's meter could compare her usage, over
+any desired period of time, with the average usage pattern for that
+period. The same benefit, with no surveillance!</p>
+
+<p>We need to design such privacy into all our digital systems.</p>
+
+<h3>Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed</h3>
+
+<p>One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is
+to <a name="dispersal">keep the data dispersed and inconvenient to
+access</a>. Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat to
privacy(<a href="#privatespace">*</a>).
+The recording was stored on the premises, and kept for a few weeks at
+most. Because of the inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it
+was never done massively; they were accessed only in the places where
+someone reported a crime. It would not be feasible to physically
+collect millions of tapes every day and watch them or copy them.</p>
+
+<p>Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they
+are connected to the Internet so recordings can be collected in a data
+center and saved forever. This is already dangerous, but it is going
+to get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when
+suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see
+who they talk with.</p>
+
+<p>Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security
+themselves,
+so <a
href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/cia-wants-spy-you-through-your-appliances">anyone
+could watch what the camera sees</a>. To restore privacy, we should
+ban the use of Internet-connected cameras aimed where and when the
+public is admitted, except when carried by people. Everyone must be
+free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the
+systematic accumulation of such data on the Internet must be
+limited.</p>
+
+<p><a name="privatespace"><b>*</b></a>I assume
here that the security
+camera points at the inside of a store, or at the street. Any camera
+pointed at someone's private space by someone else violates privacy,
+but that is another issue.</p>
+
+<h3 id="digitalcash">Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance</h3>
+
+<p>Most data collection comes from people's own digital activities.
+Usually the data is collected first by companies. But when it comes
+to the threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether
+surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a
+business, because the data that the companies collect is
+systematically available to the state.</p>
+
+<p>The NSA, through PRISM,
+has <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2">gotten
+into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>. AT&T
+has saved all its phone call records since 1987
+and <a
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0">makes
+them available to the DEA</a> to search on request. Strictly
+speaking, the U.S. government does not possess that data, but in
+practical terms it may as well possess it.</p>
+
+<p>The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires
+that we reduce the data collected about people by any organization,
+not just by the state. We must redesign digital systems so that they
+do not accumulate data about their users. If they need digital data
+about our transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more
+than a short time beyond what is inherently necessary for their
+dealings with us.</p>
+
+<p>One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the
+Internet is that sites are financed through advertising based on
+tracking users' activities and propensities. This converts a mere
+annoyance—advertising that we can learn to ignore—into a
+surveillance system that harms us whether we know it or not.
+Purchases over the Internet also track their users. And we are all
+aware that “privacy policies” are more excuses to violate
+privacy than commitments to uphold it.</p>
+
+<p>We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
+payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don't want the
+payee to dodge
+taxes.) <a
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/">Bitcoin
+is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay
+anonymously with Bitcoin. However, technology
+for <a
href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html">digital
+cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; we need only suitable
+business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct them.</p>
+
+<p>A further threat from sites' collection of personal data is that
+security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes
+customers' credit card details. An anonymous payment system would end
+this danger: a security hole in the site can't hurt you if the site
+knows nothing about you.</p>
+
+<h3>Remedy for Travel Surveillance</h3>
+
+<p>We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using
+digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems
+recognize all license plates, and
+the <a
href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm">data
+can be kept indefinitely</a>; they should be required by law to notice
+and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars
+sought by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all
+cars locally but only for a few days, and not make the full data
+available over the Internet; access to the data should be limited to
+searching for a list of court-ordered license-numbers.</p>
+
+<p>The U.S. “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is
+<a
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes">punishment
+without trial</a>.</p>
+
+<p>It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage
+will be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic
+flights could be treated as if they were on this list. It is also
+acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the
+country at all, from boarding flights to the country. This ought to
+be enough for all legitimate purposes.</p>
+
+<p>Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for
+payment. These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the
+mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card
+permanently with your name. Furthermore, they record all travel
+associated with each card. Together they amount to massive
+surveillance. This data collection must be reduced.</p>
+
+<p>Navigation services do surveillance: the user's computer tells the
+map service the user's location and where the user wants to go; then
+the server determines the route and sends it back to the user's
+computer, which displays it. Nowadays, the server probably records
+the user's locations, since there is nothing to prevent it. This
+surveillance is not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it:
+free/libre software in the user's computer could download map data for
+the pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the
+route, and display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is
+or wants to go.</p>
+
+<p>Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the
+borrower's identity is known only inside the station where the item
+was borrowed. Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is
+“out,” so when the user returns it at any station (in
+general, a different one), that station will know where and when that
+item was borrowed. It will inform the other station that the item is
+no longer “out.” It will also calculate the user's bill,
+and send it (after waiting some random number of minutes) to
+headquarters along a ring of stations, so that headquarters would not
+find out which station the bill came from. Once this is done, the
+return station would forget all about the transaction. If an item
+remains “out” for too long, the station where it was
+borrowed can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the
+borrower's identity immediately.</p>
+
+<h3>Remedy for Communications Dossiers</h3>
+
+<p>Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive
+data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc). With
+mobile phones, they
+also <a
href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz">record
+the user's physical location</a>. They keep these dossiers for a long
+time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&T. Soon they will
+even <a
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/">record
+the user's body activities</a>. It appears that
+the <a
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location">NSA
+collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk.</p>
+
+<p>Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such
+dossiers. So it should be illegal to create or keep them. ISPs and
+phone companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very
+long, in the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.</p>
+
+<p>This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't
+physically stop the government from collecting all the information
+immediately as it is generated—which is what
+the <a
href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order">U.S.
does
+with some or all phone companies</a>. We would have to rely on
+prohibiting that by law. However, that would be better than the
+current situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not
+clearly prohibit the practice. In addition, if the government did
+resume this sort of surveillance, it would not get data about
+everyone's phone calls made prior to that time.</p>
+
+<p>For privacy about who you exchange email with, a simple partial
+solution is for you and others to use email services in a country that
+would never cooperate with your own government, and which communicate
+with each other using encryption. However, Ladar Levison (owner of
+the mail service Lavabit that US surveillance sought to corrupt
+completely) has a more sophisticated idea for an encryption system
+through which your email service would know only that you sent mail to
+some user of my email service, and my email service would know only
+that I received mail from some user of your email service, but it
+would be hard to determine that you had sent mail to me.</p>
+
+<h3>But Some Surveillance Is Necessary</h3>
+
+<p>For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate
+specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court
+order. With the Internet, the power to tap phone conversations would
+naturally extend to the power to tap Internet connections. This power
+is easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary.
+Fortunately, this won't make it possible to find whistleblowers after
+the fact, if (as I recommend) we prevent digital systems from accumulating
+massive dossiers before the fact.</p>
+
+<p>Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police,
+forfeit their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact,
+police have their own jargon term for perjury,
+“<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&oldid=552608302">testilying</a>,”
+since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters
+and <a
href="http://photographyisnotacrime.com/">photographers</a>.)
+One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all
+the time
+found <a
href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition">their
+use of force fell by 60%</a>. The ACLU is in favor of this.</p>
+
+<p><a
+href="http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266">Corporations
+are not people, and not entitled to human rights</a>. It is
+legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes
+that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational
+(e.g., <a href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org">DRM</a>) or political
+(e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for
+public well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP
+oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs
+that of terrorism.</p>
+
+<p>However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when
+it is carried out as part of a business.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p>Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the
+level of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications.
+It is far more than we experienced in the 1990s,
+and <a
href="http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/06/your_iphone_works_for_the_secret_police.html">far
+more than people behind the Iron Curtain experienced</a> in the 1980s,
+and proposed legal limits on state use of the accumulated data would
+not alter that.</p>
+
+<p>Companies are designing even more intrusive surveillance. Some
+project that pervasive surveillance, hooked to companies such as
+Facebook, could have deep effects
+on <a
href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people">how
+people think</a>. Such possibilities are imponderable; but the threat
+to democracy is not speculation. It exists and is visible today.</p>
+
+<p>Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from
+a grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the
+Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase.
+That requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.</p>
+
+</div><!-- for id="content", starts in the include above -->
+<!--#include virtual="/server/footer.html" -->
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+
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+</div>
+
+<!-- Regarding copyright, in general, standalone pages (as opposed to
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+
+ There is more detail about copyright years in the GNU Maintainers
+ Information document, www.gnu.org/prep/maintain. -->
+
+<p>Copyright © 2015 Richard Stallman</p>
+
+<p>This page is licensed under a <a rel="license"
+href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">Creative
+Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
License</a>.</p>
+
+<!--#include virtual="/server/bottom-notes.html" -->
+
+<p class="unprintable">Updated:
+<!-- timestamp start -->
+$Date: 2015/12/16 10:30:25 $
+<!-- timestamp end -->
+</p>
+</div>
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+</body>
+</html>
+</pre></body></html>
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