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www/philosophy free-sw.fr.html proprietary-inse...


From: GNUN
Subject: www/philosophy free-sw.fr.html proprietary-inse...
Date: Tue, 27 May 2014 11:13:09 +0000

CVSROOT:        /web/www
Module name:    www
Changes by:     GNUN <gnun>     14/05/27 11:13:08

Modified files:
        philosophy     : free-sw.fr.html proprietary-insecurity.fr.html 
                         surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.html 
                         the-root-of-this-problem.fr.html 
        philosophy/po  : free-sw.fr-en.html 
                         proprietary-insecurity.fr-en.html 
                         proprietary-insecurity.fr.po 
                         surveillance-vs-democracy.fr-en.html 
                         surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.po 
                         the-root-of-this-problem.fr-en.html 

Log message:
        Automatic update by GNUnited Nations.

CVSWeb URLs:
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/free-sw.fr.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.127&r2=1.128
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/proprietary-insecurity.fr.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.12&r2=1.13
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.16&r2=1.17
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/the-root-of-this-problem.fr.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.27&r2=1.28
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/free-sw.fr-en.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.45&r2=1.46
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/proprietary-insecurity.fr-en.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.10&r2=1.11
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/proprietary-insecurity.fr.po?cvsroot=www&r1=1.30&r2=1.31
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr-en.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.14&r2=1.15
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.po?cvsroot=www&r1=1.44&r2=1.45
http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewcvs/www/philosophy/po/the-root-of-this-problem.fr-en.html?cvsroot=www&r1=1.21&r2=1.22

Patches:
Index: free-sw.fr.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/free-sw.fr.html,v
retrieving revision 1.127
retrieving revision 1.128
diff -u -b -r1.127 -r1.128
--- free-sw.fr.html     19 Apr 2014 12:35:42 -0000      1.127
+++ free-sw.fr.html     27 May 2014 11:13:05 -0000      1.128
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
-
+<!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE" value="/philosophy/free-sw.en.html" -->
 
 <!--#include virtual="/server/header.fr.html" -->
 <!-- Parent-Version: 1.77 -->
 
 <!-- This file is automatically generated by GNUnited Nations! -->
- <!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE" value="/philosophy/free-sw.en.html" -->
-
 <title>Qu'est-ce que le logiciel libre ? - Projet GNU - Free Software 
Foundation</title>
 
 <meta http-equiv="Keywords" content="GNU, FSF, Free Software Foundation, 
Linux, Emacs, GCC, Unix, logiciel libre,
@@ -112,6 +110,13 @@
 </p>
 
 <p>
+Que vous soyez libre d'exécuter le programme comme vous le souhaitez
+signifie que personne ne vous interdit ou ne vous empêche de le faire. Cela
+n'a rien à voir avec telle ou telle fonctionnalité que possède, ou non, le
+programme, ou avec le fait qu'il soit utile, ou non, pour ce que vous voulez
+faire.  </p>
+
+<p>
 La liberté de redistribuer des copies doit inclure les formes binaires ou
 exécutables du programme, tout comme le code source, que ce soit pour les
 versions modifiées ou non modifiées du programme (diffuser des programmes
@@ -404,6 +409,11 @@
 <ul>
 
 <li><a
+href="http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewvc/www/philosophy/free-sw.html?root=www&amp;r1=1.133&amp;r2=1.134";>Version
+1.134</a>: La liberté 0 ne fait pas intervenir la fonctionnalité du
+programme.</li>
+
+<li><a
 
href="http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewvc/www/philosophy/free-sw.html?root=www&amp;r1=1.130&amp;r2=1.131";>Version
 1.131</a>: Une licence libre ne peut pas exiger qu'on se conforme à une
 licence non libre d'un autre programme.</li>
@@ -630,7 +640,7 @@
 <p class="unprintable"><!-- timestamp start -->
 Dernière mise à jour :
 
-$Date: 2014/04/19 12:35:42 $
+$Date: 2014/05/27 11:13:05 $
 
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>

Index: proprietary-insecurity.fr.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/proprietary-insecurity.fr.html,v
retrieving revision 1.12
retrieving revision 1.13
diff -u -b -r1.12 -r1.13
--- proprietary-insecurity.fr.html      9 May 2014 08:27:57 -0000       1.12
+++ proprietary-insecurity.fr.html      27 May 2014 11:13:06 -0000      1.13
@@ -10,8 +10,9 @@
 <!--#include virtual="/server/banner.fr.html" -->
 <h2>Insécurité du logiciel privateur</h2>
 
-<p>Cette page répertorie des cas clairement établis de logiciels privateurs
-dont les failles de sécurité ont des conséquences graves. </p>
+<p>Cette page répertorie des failles de sécurité de logiciels privateurs,
+failles clairement établies qui ont des conséquences graves ou méritent
+d'être mentionnées pour d'autres raisons. </p>
 
 <p>Il ne serait pas juste de comparer le logiciel privateur avec un logiciel
 libre idéal réputé parfait. Chaque programme un peu complexe a ses bogues et
@@ -99,6 +100,23 @@
 </li>
 
 <li>
+<p>Une appli qui empêche le « vol d'identité » (accès aux données 
personnelles)
+en sauvegardant les données de l'utilisateur sur un serveur spécial <a
+href="http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/id-theft-protector-lifelock-deletes-user-data-over-concerns-that-app-isnt-safe/";>a
+été désactivée par son développeur</a> qui y avait découvert une faille 
de
+sécurité.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Ce développeur semble être consciencieux dans ses efforts de protection des
+données personnelles contre les tiers en général, mais il ne peut pas les
+protéger contre l'État. Au contraire ! Confier vos données au serveur de
+quelqu'un d'autre, si elles ne sont pas chiffrées au préalable, revient à
+fragiliser vos droits.
+</p>
+</li>
+
+<li>
 <p><a href="http://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?p=3554";>Certaines mémoires 
flash
 ont des logiciels modifiables</a>, ce qui les rend vulnérables aux virus.</p>
 
@@ -192,7 +210,7 @@
 <p class="unprintable"><!-- timestamp start -->
 Dernière mise à jour :
 
-$Date: 2014/05/09 08:27:57 $
+$Date: 2014/05/27 11:13:06 $
 
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>

Index: surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.html,v
retrieving revision 1.16
retrieving revision 1.17
diff -u -b -r1.16 -r1.17
--- surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.html   23 Apr 2014 17:58:43 -0000      1.16
+++ surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.html   27 May 2014 11:13:06 -0000      1.17
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
-
+<!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE" 
value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
 
 <!--#include virtual="/server/header.fr.html" -->
 <!-- Parent-Version: 1.77 -->
 
 <!-- This file is automatically generated by GNUnited Nations! -->
- <!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE" 
value="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.en.html" -->
-
 <title>Quel niveau de surveillance la démocratie peut-elle endurer ? - 
Projet GNU -
 Free Software Foundation</title>
 
@@ -157,7 +155,8 @@
 
 <p>Toutefois, ces protections juridiques sont précaires : comme nous l'ont
 montré les récents événements, ils peuvent être abrogés (comme dans la 
loi
-dite <cite>FISA Amendments Act</cite>), suspendus ou ignorés.</p>
+dite <cite>FISA Amendments Act</cite>), suspendus ou <a
+href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>ignorés</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Pendant ce temps, les démagogues fourniront les excuses habituelles pour
 justifier une surveillance totale ; toute attaque terroriste, y compris une
@@ -177,20 +176,19 @@
 
 <h3>En premier lieu, ne soyez pas imprudent</h3>
 
-<p>Pour avoir une vie privée, vous devez éviter de la jeter aux orties : le
-premier concerné par la protection de votre vie privée, c'est vous. À une
-entreprise comme Facebook, ne dites rien que vous hésiteriez à publier dans
-le journal. À une entreprise comme Facebook, ne dites rien sur vos amis
-qu'ils pourraient ne pas souhaiter publier dans le journal. Mieux,
-n'utilisez pas Facebook du tout.</p>
-
-<p>Ne donnez jamais à aucun site web l'ensemble de votre répertoire
-téléphonique ou des adresses de courriel de vos correspondants. Gardez vos
-données personnelles ; ne les stockez pas sur le serveur « si pratique »
-d'une entreprise. Il n'y a pas de risque, cependant, à confier la sauvegarde
-de vos données à un service commercial, pourvu qu'avant de les envoyer au
-serveur vous les chiffriez avec un logiciel libre sur votre propre
-ordinateur (y compris les noms de fichiers).</p>
+<p>Pour conserver une vie privée, il ne faut pas la jeter aux orties : le
+premier concerné par la protection de votre vie privée, c'est vous. Évitez
+de vous identifier sur les sites web, contactez-les avec Tor, et utilisez
+des navigateurs qui bloquent les stratagèmes dont ils se servent pour suivre
+les visiteurs à la trace. Utilisez <abbr title="GNU Privacy
+Guard">GPG</abbr> (le gardien de la vie privée) pour chiffrer le contenu de
+vos courriels. Payez en liquide.</p>
+
+<p>Gardez vos données personnelles ; ne les stockez pas sur le serveur « si
+pratique » d'une entreprise. Il n'y a pas de risque, cependant, à confier la
+sauvegarde de vos données à un service commercial, pourvu qu'avant de les
+envoyer au serveur vous les chiffriez avec un logiciel libre sur votre
+propre ordinateur (y compris les noms de fichiers).</p>
 
 <p>Par souci de votre vie privée, vous devez éviter les logiciels non libres
 car ils donnent à d'autres la maîtrise de votre informatique, et que par
@@ -201,11 +199,27 @@
 votre informatique, cela vous oblige à fournir toutes les données
 pertinentes au serveur.</p>
 
-<p>Toutefois, les mesures de protection individuelle les plus rigoureuses sont
-encore insuffisantes pour protéger votre vie privée sur des systèmes, ou
-contre des systèmes, qui ne vous appartiennent pas. Lors de nos
-communications avec d'autres ou de nos déplacements à travers la ville,
-notre vie privée dépend des pratiques de la société.</p>
+<p>Protégez aussi la vie privée de vos amis et connaissances. <a
+href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>Ne
+divulguez pas leurs informations personnelles</a>, sauf la manière de les
+contacter, et ne donnez jamais à aucun site l'ensemble de votre répertoire
+téléphonique ou des adresses de courriel de vos correspondants. Ne dites
+rien sur vos amis à une société comme Facebook qu'ils ne souhaiteraient pas
+voir publier dans le journal. Mieux, n'utilisez pas du tout
+Facebook. Rejetez les systèmes de communication qui obligent les
+utilisateurs à donner leur vrai nom, même si vous êtes disposé à donner le
+vôtre, car cela pousserait d'autres personnes à abandonner leurs droits à
+une vie privée.</p>
+
+<p>La protection individuelle est essentielle, mais les mesures de protection
+individuelle les plus rigoureuses sont encore insuffisantes pour protéger
+votre vie privée sur des systèmes, ou contre des systèmes, qui ne vous
+appartiennent pas. Lors de nos communications avec d'autres ou de nos
+déplacements à travers la ville, notre vie privée dépend des pratiques de 
la
+société. Nous pouvons éviter certains des systèmes qui surveillent nos
+communications et nos mouvements, mais pas tous. Il est évident que la
+meilleure solution est d'obliger ces systèmes à cesser de surveiller les
+gens qui sont pas légitimement suspects.</p>
 
 <h3>Nous devons intégrer à chaque système le respect de la vie privée</h3>
 
@@ -334,10 +348,9 @@
 Internet ; l'accès aux données doit être limité à la recherche d'une 
série
 de plaques minéralogiques faisant l'objet d'une décision de justice.</p>
 
-<p>La liste américaine des interdits de vol <cite>[no-fly list]</cite> doit
-être abolie car c'est <a
-href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes";>une
-punition sans procès</a>.</p>
+<p>The U.S. &ldquo;no-fly&rdquo; list must be abolished because it is <a
+href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes";>punishment
+without trial</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Il est acceptable d'établir une liste de personnes pour qui la fouille
 corporelle et celle des bagages seront particulièrement minutieuses, et l'on
@@ -417,6 +430,17 @@
 sorte de surveillance, il n'obtiendrait pas les données sur les appels
 téléphoniques passés avant cette date.</p>
 
+<p>Pour ce qui est du courriel, la solution partielle la plus simple est
+d'utiliser un service situé dans un pays qui ne risquera jamais de coopérer
+avec votre gouvernement, et qui chiffre ses communications avec les autres
+services de courriels. Toutefois, Ladar Levison (ex-Lavabit) a une idée plus
+sophistiquée : établir un système de chiffrement par lequel votre service 
de
+courriel saurait seulement que vous avez envoyé un message à un utilisateur
+de mon service de courriel, et mon service de courriel saurait seulement que
+j'ai reçu un message d'un utilisateur de votre service de courriel. Il
+serait ainsi difficile aux espions de découvrir que vous m'avez envoyé un
+message.</p>
+
 <h3>Mais un minimum de surveillance est nécessaire.</h3>
 
 <p>Pour que l'État puisse identifier les auteurs de crimes ou délits, il doit
@@ -568,7 +592,7 @@
 <p class="unprintable"><!-- timestamp start -->
 Dernière mise à jour :
 
-$Date: 2014/04/23 17:58:43 $
+$Date: 2014/05/27 11:13:06 $
 
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>

Index: the-root-of-this-problem.fr.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/the-root-of-this-problem.fr.html,v
retrieving revision 1.27
retrieving revision 1.28
diff -u -b -r1.27 -r1.28
--- the-root-of-this-problem.fr.html    19 Apr 2014 12:35:49 -0000      1.27
+++ the-root-of-this-problem.fr.html    27 May 2014 11:13:06 -0000      1.28
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
-
+<!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE" 
value="/philosophy/the-root-of-this-problem.en.html" -->
 
 <!--#include virtual="/server/header.fr.html" -->
 <!-- Parent-Version: 1.77 -->
 
 <!-- This file is automatically generated by GNUnited Nations! -->
- <!--#set var="ENGLISH_PAGE" 
value="/philosophy/the-root-of-this-problem.en.html" -->
-
 <title>Le problème est le logiciel contrôlé par son développeur - Projet 
GNU - Free
 Software Foundation</title>
 
@@ -42,12 +40,13 @@
 
 <p>
 Il est vrai qu'un ordinateur universel vous laisse exécuter des programmes
-conçus pour vous espionner, pour vous imposer des restrictions, ou même pour
-permettre au développeur de vous attaquer. Parmi eux il y a KaZaA,
-RealPlayer, Adobe Flash, Windows Media Player, Microsoft Windows et
-MacOS. Windows Vista fait ces trois choses à la fois ; il permet aussi à
-Microsoft de modifier les logiciels sans rien demander, ou d'ordonner
-l'arrêt définitif de leur fonctionnement normal.</p>
+conçus pour <a href="/philosophy/proprietary.html">vous espionner, pour vous
+imposer des restrictions, ou même pour permettre au développeur de vous
+attaquer</a>. Parmi eux il y a KaZaA, RealPlayer, le lecteur Flash d'Adobe,
+Windows Media Player, Microsoft Windows et MacOS. Windows Vista fait ces
+trois choses à la fois ; il permet aussi à Microsoft de modifier les
+logiciels sans rien demander, ou d'ordonner l'arrêt définitif de leur
+fonctionnement normal <a href="#note1">(1)</a>.</p>
 
 <p>
 Mais les ordinateurs bridés ne sont d'aucune aide, parce qu'ils présentent
@@ -176,6 +175,16 @@
 suffisante (voir  <a
 href="http://www.endsoftpatents.org";>http://www.endsoftpatents.org</a>).</p>
 
+<h3>Notes</h3>
+
+<p>1. Windows Vista avait à l'origine un « bouton d'arrêt » avec lequel
+Microsoft pouvait, à distance, ordonner à l'ordinateur de cesser de
+fonctionner. Par la suite, Microsoft <a
+href="http://badvista.fsf.org/blog/windows-genuine-disadvantage";>l'a
+enlevé</a> sous la pression du public, mais s'est réservé le droit de le
+remettre.
+</p>
+
 <div class="translators-notes">
 
 <!--TRANSLATORS: Use space (SPC) as msgstr if you don't have notes.-->
@@ -238,7 +247,7 @@
 <p class="unprintable"><!-- timestamp start -->
 Dernière mise à jour :
 
-$Date: 2014/04/19 12:35:49 $
+$Date: 2014/05/27 11:13:06 $
 
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>

Index: po/free-sw.fr-en.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/po/free-sw.fr-en.html,v
retrieving revision 1.45
retrieving revision 1.46
diff -u -b -r1.45 -r1.46
--- po/free-sw.fr-en.html       12 Apr 2014 13:58:48 -0000      1.45
+++ po/free-sw.fr-en.html       27 May 2014 11:13:07 -0000      1.46
@@ -102,6 +102,12 @@
 </p>
 
 <p>
+The freedom to run the program as you wish means that you are not
+forbidden or stopped from doing so.  It has nothing to do with what
+functionality the program has, or whether it is useful for what you
+want to do.</p>
+
+<p>
 The freedom to redistribute copies must include binary or executable
 forms of the program, as well as source code, for both modified and
 unmodified versions.  (Distributing programs in runnable form is necessary
@@ -374,6 +380,9 @@
 
 <ul>
 
+<li><a 
href="http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewvc/www/philosophy/free-sw.html?root=www&amp;r1=1.133&amp;r2=1.134";>Version
+1.134</a>: Freedom 0 is not a matter of the program's functionality.</li>
+
 <li><a 
href="http://web.cvs.savannah.gnu.org/viewvc/www/philosophy/free-sw.html?root=www&amp;r1=1.130&amp;r2=1.131";>Version
 1.131</a>: A free license may not require compliance with a nonfree license
 of another program.</li>
@@ -541,7 +550,7 @@
 
 <p class="unprintable">Updated:
 <!-- timestamp start -->
-$Date: 2014/04/12 13:58:48 $
+$Date: 2014/05/27 11:13:07 $
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>
 </div>

Index: po/proprietary-insecurity.fr-en.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/po/proprietary-insecurity.fr-en.html,v
retrieving revision 1.10
retrieving revision 1.11
diff -u -b -r1.10 -r1.11
--- po/proprietary-insecurity.fr-en.html        9 May 2014 08:27:57 -0000       
1.10
+++ po/proprietary-insecurity.fr-en.html        27 May 2014 11:13:07 -0000      
1.11
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
 <!--#include virtual="/server/banner.html" -->
 <h2>Proprietary Insecurity</h2>
 
-<p>This page lists clearly established cases of proprietary software
-whose insecurity has grave consequences.</p>
+<p>This page lists clearly established cases of insecurity in
+proprietary software that has grave consequences or is otherwise
+noteworthy.</p>
 
 <p>It would be incorrect to compare proprietary software with a
 fictitious idea of free software as perfect.  Every nontrivial program
@@ -82,6 +83,22 @@
 </li>
 
 <li>
+<p>An app to prevent &ldquo;identity theft&rdquo; (access to personal data)
+by storing users' data on a special server
+<a 
href="http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/id-theft-protector-lifelock-deletes-user-data-over-concerns-that-app-isnt-safe/";>was
+deactivated by its developer</a> which had discovered a security flaw.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+That developer seems to be conscientious about protecting personal
+data from third parties in general, but it can't protect that data
+from the state.  Quite the contrary: confiding your data to someone
+else's server, if not first encrypted by you with free software,
+undermines your rights.
+</p>
+</li>
+
+<li>
 <p><a href="http://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?p=3554";> Some flash
 memories have modifiable software</a>, which makes them vulnerable to
 viruses.</p>
@@ -157,7 +174,7 @@
 
 <p class="unprintable">Updated:
 <!-- timestamp start -->
-$Date: 2014/05/09 08:27:57 $
+$Date: 2014/05/27 11:13:07 $
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>
 </div>

Index: po/proprietary-insecurity.fr.po
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/po/proprietary-insecurity.fr.po,v
retrieving revision 1.30
retrieving revision 1.31
diff -u -b -r1.30 -r1.31
--- po/proprietary-insecurity.fr.po     27 May 2014 10:57:43 -0000      1.30
+++ po/proprietary-insecurity.fr.po     27 May 2014 11:13:07 -0000      1.31
@@ -235,9 +235,6 @@
 "corrections ou suggestions peuvent être signalés à <a href=\"mailto:";
 "address@hidden">&lt;address@hidden&gt;</a>."
 
-#
-#
-#
 #.  TRANSLATORS: Ignore the original text in this paragraph,
 #.         replace it with the translation of these two:
 #.         We work hard and do our best to provide accurate, good quality

Index: po/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr-en.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /web/www/www/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr-en.html,v
retrieving revision 1.14
retrieving revision 1.15
diff -u -b -r1.14 -r1.15
--- po/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr-en.html     23 Apr 2014 17:58:43 -0000      
1.14
+++ po/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr-en.html     27 May 2014 11:13:07 -0000      
1.15
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
 
 <p>by <a href="http://www.stallman.org/";>Richard Stallman</a></p>
 
-<blockquote><p>A version of this article was first published in <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance/";>
-Wired</a> in October 2013.</p></blockquote>
+<blockquote><p>A version of this article was first published
+in <a 
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance/";>Wired</a>
+in October 2013.</p></blockquote>
 
 <p>Thanks to Edward Snowden's disclosures, we know that the current
 level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human
@@ -25,26 +25,24 @@
 
 <p>Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on
 whistleblowers
-to <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama";>
-tell us what the state is doing</a>.  However, today's surveillance
+to <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama";>tell
+us what the state is doing</a>.  However, today's surveillance
 intimidates potential whistleblowers, which means it is too much.  To
 recover our democratic control over the state, we must reduce
 surveillance to the point where whistleblowers know they are safe.</p>
 
 <p>Using free/libre
-software, <a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">
-as I've advocated for 30 years</a>, is the first step in taking
-control of our digital lives, and that includes preventing
-surveillance.  We can't trust nonfree software; the NSA
-<a
-href="http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm";>
-uses</a> and
-even <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>
-creates</a> security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own
-computers and routers.  Free software gives us control of our own
-computers, but <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>
-that won't protect our privacy once we set foot on the
-Internet</a>.</p>
+software, <a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">as
+I've advocated for 30 years</a>, is the first step in taking control
+of our digital lives, and that includes preventing surveillance.  We
+can't trust nonfree software; the NSA
+<a 
href="http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm";>uses</a>
+and
+even <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security";>creates</a>
+security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers
+and routers.  Free software gives us control of our own computers,
+but <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/";>that won't
+protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>.</p>
 
 <p><a
 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill";>Bipartisan
@@ -65,22 +63,22 @@
 
 <p>An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in
 2011 that
-the <a 
href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river";>
-U.S. would not subpoena reporters because &ldquo;We know who you're
-talking to.&rdquo;</a>
-Sometimes <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>
-journalists' phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out,
-but Snowden has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone
-call records of everyone in the U.S., all the
-time, <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order";>
-from Verizon </a>
-and <a 
href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>
-from other companies too</a>.</p>
+the <a 
href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river";>U.S.
 would
+not subpoena reporters because &ldquo;We know who you're talking
+to.&rdquo;</a>
+Sometimes <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press";>journalists'
+phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden
+has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records
+of everyone in the U.S., all the
+time, <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order";>from
+Verizon</a>
+and <a 
href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07";>from
+other companies too</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from
 states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them.  The ACLU has
 demonstrated the U.S. government's <a
-href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";> systematic
+href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf";>systematic
 practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext
 that there might be terrorists among them.  The point at which
 surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who
@@ -92,23 +90,23 @@
 high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the
 accumulated data.  That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not
 even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules.
-(The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it was <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>
-unable to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a
-crime will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused
-of &ldquo;espionage,&rdquo; finding the &ldquo;spy&rdquo; will provide
-an excuse to access the accumulated material.</p>
+(The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it
+was <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/";>unable
+to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime
+will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of
+&ldquo;espionage,&rdquo; finding the &ldquo;spy&rdquo; will provide an
+excuse to access the accumulated material.</p>
 
 <p>The state's surveillance staff will misuse the data for personal
-reasons too.  Some NSA agents <a
-href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>
-used U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>&mdash;past,
+reasons too.  Some NSA
+agents <a 
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems";>used
+U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>&mdash;past,
 present, or wished-for&mdash;in a practice called
 &ldquo;LOVEINT.&rdquo; The NSA says it has caught and punished this a
 few times; we don't know how many other times it wasn't caught.  But
-these events shouldn't surprise us, because police have long <a
-href="http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm";>used their
-access to driver's license records to track down someone
+these events shouldn't surprise us, because police have
+long <a href="http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm";>used
+their access to driver's license records to track down someone
 attractive</a>, a practice known as &ldquo;running a plate for a
 date.&rdquo;</p>
 
@@ -116,10 +114,9 @@
 this is prohibited.  Once the data has been accumulated and the state
 has the possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in
 dreadful ways, as shown by examples
-from <a 
href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/";>
-Europe</a>
-and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment";>
-the US </a>.</p>
+from <a 
href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/";>Europe</a>
+and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment";>the
+US </a>.</p>
 
 <p>Total surveillance plus vague law provides an opening for a massive
 fishing expedition against any desired target.  To make journalism and
@@ -130,7 +127,7 @@
 
 <p>The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose
 a set of legal principles designed to <a
-href="https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text";> prevent the
+href="https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text";>prevent the
 abuses of massive surveillance</a>.  These principles include,
 crucially, explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a
 consequence, they would be adequate for protecting democratic
@@ -140,8 +137,7 @@
 <p>However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history
 shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act),
 suspended, or <a
-href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>
-ignored</a>.</p>
+href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html";>ignored</a>.</p>
 
 <p>Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for
 total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a
@@ -160,32 +156,45 @@
 <h3>First, Don't Be Foolish</h3>
 
 <p>To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has
-to protect your privacy is you.  Don't tell a company such as Facebook
-anything about you that you hesitate to publish in a newspaper.  Don't
-tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that they
-might not wish to publish in a newspaper.  Better yet, don't be one
-of Facebook's users at all.</p>
+to protect your privacy is you.  Avoid identifying yourself to web
+sites, contact them with Tor, and use browsers that block the schemes
+they use to track visitors.  Use the GNU Privacy Guard to encrypt the
+contents of your email.  Pay for things with cash.</p>
 
-<p>Never give any web site your entire list of email or phone
-contacts.  Keep your own data; don't store your data in a company's
+<p>Keep your own data; don't store your data in a company's
 &ldquo;convenient&rdquo; server.  It's safe, however, to entrust a
-data backup to a commercial service, provided you encrypted the data,
-including the file names, with free software on your own computer
-before uploading it.</p>
+data backup to a commercial service, provided you put the files in an
+archive and encrypt the whole archive, including the names of the
+files, with free software on your own computer before uploading
+it.</p>
 
 <p>For privacy's sake, you must avoid nonfree software since, as a
 consequence of giving others control of your computing, it
-is <a href="/philosophy/proprietary-surveillance.html"> likely to spy
-on you </a>.
-Avoid <a href="/philosophy/who-does-that-server-really-serve.html">
-service as a software substitute </a>; as well as giving others
-control of your computing, it requires you to hand over all the
-pertinent data to the server.</p>
-
-<p>However, even the most rigorous self-protection is insufficient to
-protect your privacy on or from systems that don't belong to you.
-When we communicate with others or move around the city, our
-privacy depends on the practices of society.</p>
+is <a href="/philosophy/proprietary-surveillance.html">likely to spy
+on you</a>.
+Avoid <a href="/philosophy/who-does-that-server-really-serve.html">service
+as a software substitute</a>; as well as giving others control of your
+computing, it requires you to hand over all the pertinent data to the
+server.</p>
+
+<p>Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy,
+too.  <a 
href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/";>Don't
+give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them,
+and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts.
+Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that
+they might not wish to publish in a newspaper.  Better yet, don't be
+used by Facebook at all.  Reject communication systems that require
+users to give their real names, even if you are going to give yours,
+since they pressure other people to surrender their privacy.</p>
+
+<p>Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous
+self-protection is insufficient to protect your privacy on or from
+systems that don't belong to you.  When we communicate with others or
+move around the city, our privacy depends on the practices of society.
+We can avoid some of the systems that surveil our communications and
+movements, but not all of them.  Clearly, the better solution is to
+make all these systems stop surveilling people other than legitimate
+suspects.</p>
 
 <h3>We Must Design Every System for Privacy</h3>
 
@@ -209,15 +218,14 @@
 
 <h3>Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed</h3>
 
-<p>One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to <a name="dispersal">
-keep the data
-dispersed and inconvenient to access</a>.  Old-fashioned security cameras
-were no threat to privacy.  The recording was stored on the premises,
-and kept for a few weeks at most.  Because of the inconvenience of
-accessing these recordings, it was never done massively; they were
-accessed only in the places where someone reported a crime.  It would
-not be feasible to physically collect millions of tapes every day and
-watch them or copy them.</p>
+<p>One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is
+to <a name="dispersal">keep the data dispersed and inconvenient to
+access</a>.  Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat to privacy.
+The recording was stored on the premises, and kept for a few weeks at
+most.  Because of the inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it
+was never done massively; they were accessed only in the places where
+someone reported a crime.  It would not be feasible to physically
+collect millions of tapes every day and watch them or copy them.</p>
 
 <p>Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they
 are connected to the Internet so recordings can be collected in a data
@@ -227,12 +235,12 @@
 who they talk with.</p>
 
 <p>Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security
-themselves, so <a
-href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/cia-wants-spy-you-through-your-appliances";>
-anyone could watch what the camera sees</a>.  To restore privacy, we
-should ban the use of Internet-connected cameras aimed where and when
-the public is admitted, except when carried by people.  Everyone must
-be free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the
+themselves,
+so <a 
href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/cia-wants-spy-you-through-your-appliances";>anyone
+could watch what the camera sees</a>.  To restore privacy, we should
+ban the use of Internet-connected cameras aimed where and when the
+public is admitted, except when carried by people.  Everyone must be
+free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the
 systematic accumulation of such data on the Internet must be
 limited.</p>
 
@@ -245,12 +253,12 @@
 business, because the data that the companies collect is
 systematically available to the state.</p>
 
-<p>The NSA, through PRISM, has <a
-href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2";> gotten into
-the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>.  AT&amp;T has
-saved all its phone call records since 1987 and <a
-href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>
-makes them available to the DEA</a> to search on request.  Strictly
+<p>The NSA, through PRISM,
+has <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2";>gotten
+into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>.  AT&amp;T
+has saved all its phone call records since 1987
+and <a 
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0";>makes
+them available to the DEA</a> to search on request.  Strictly
 speaking, the U.S.  government does not possess that data, but in
 practical terms it may as well possess it.</p>
 
@@ -273,11 +281,11 @@
 
 <p>We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
 payments&mdash;anonymous for the payer, that is.  (We don't want the
-payee to dodge taxes.)  <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>
-Bitcoin is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop
-ways to pay anonymously with Bitcoin.  However, technology for <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";> digital
+payee to dodge
+taxes.)  <a 
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/";>Bitcoin
+is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay
+anonymously with Bitcoin.  However, technology
+for <a href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html";>digital
 cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; we need only suitable
 business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct them.</p>
 
@@ -291,19 +299,18 @@
 
 <p>We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using
 digital cash, for instance).  License-plate recognition systems
-recognize all license plates, and the <a
-href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm";>
-data can be kept indefinitely</a>; they should be required by law to
-notice and record only those license numbers that are on a list of
-cars sought by court orders.  A less secure alternative would record
-all cars locally but only for a few days, and not make the full data
+recognize all license plates, and
+the <a 
href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm";>data
+can be kept indefinitely</a>; they should be required by law to notice
+and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars
+sought by court orders.  A less secure alternative would record all
+cars locally but only for a few days, and not make the full data
 available over the Internet; access to the data should be limited to
 searching for a list of court-ordered license-numbers.</p>
 
 <p>The U.S. &ldquo;no-fly&rdquo; list must be abolished because it is
-<a
-href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes";>
-punishment without trial</a>.</p>
+<a 
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes";>punishment
+without trial</a>.</p>
 
 <p>It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage
 will be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic
@@ -349,15 +356,14 @@
 
 <p>Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive
 data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc).  With
-mobile phones, they also <a
-href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>
-record the user's physical location</a>.  They keep these dossiers for
-a long time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&amp;T.  Soon they will
-even <a
-href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>
-record the user's body activities</a>.  It appears that the <a
-href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location";>
-NSA collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk.</p>
+mobile phones, they
+also <a 
href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz";>record
+the user's physical location</a>.  They keep these dossiers for a long
+time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&amp;T.  Soon they will
+even <a 
href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/";>record
+the user's body activities</a>.  It appears that
+the <a 
href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location";>NSA
+collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk.</p>
 
 <p>Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such
 dossiers.  So it should be illegal to create or keep them.  ISPs and
@@ -366,15 +372,25 @@
 
 <p>This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't
 physically stop the government from collecting all the information
-immediately as it is generated&mdash;which is what the <a
-href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>
-U.S. does with some or all phone companies</a>.  We would have to rely
-on prohibiting that by law.  However, that would be better than the
+immediately as it is generated&mdash;which is what
+the <a 
href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order";>U.S.
 does
+with some or all phone companies</a>.  We would have to rely on
+prohibiting that by law.  However, that would be better than the
 current situation, where the relevant law (the PATRIOT Act) does not
 clearly prohibit the practice.  In addition, if the government did
 resume this sort of surveillance, it would not get data about
 everyone's phone calls made prior to that time.</p>
 
+<p>For email, the simple partial solution is to use an email service
+in a country that would never cooperate with your own government, and
+which communicates using encryption with other email services.
+However, Ladar Levison (formerly owner of Lavabit) has a more
+sophisticated idea for an encryption system through which your email
+service would know only that you sent mail to some user of my email
+service, and my email service would know only that I received mail
+from some user of your email service.  This would make it difficult
+for spies to find out that you had sent mail to me.</p>
+
 <h3>But Some Surveillance Is Necessary</h3>
 
 <p>For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate
@@ -387,14 +403,14 @@
 
 <p>Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police,
 forfeit their right to privacy and must be monitored.  (In fact,
-police have their own jargon term for perjury, &ldquo;<a
-href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&amp;oldid=552608302";>testilying</a>,&rdquo;
 since they do
-it so frequently, particularly about protesters and <a
-href="http://photographyisnotacrime.com/";> photographers</a>.)  One
-city in California that required police to wear video cameras all the
-time found <a
-href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>
-their use of force fell by 60%</a>.  The ACLU is in favor of this.</p>
+police have their own jargon term for perjury,
+&ldquo;<a 
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&amp;oldid=552608302";>testilying</a>,&rdquo;
+since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters
+and <a href="http://photographyisnotacrime.com/";>photographers</a>.)
+One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all
+the time
+found <a 
href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition";>their
+use of force fell by 60%</a>.  The ACLU is in favor of this.</p>
 
 <p><a
 
href="http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266";>Corporations
@@ -414,11 +430,11 @@
 
 <p>Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the
 level of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications.
-It is far more than we experienced in the 1990s, and <a
-href="http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/06/your_iphone_works_for_the_secret_police.html";>
-far more than people behind the Iron Curtain experienced</a> in the
-1980s, and would still be far more even with additional legal limits
-on state use of the accumulated data.</p>
+It is far more than we experienced in the 1990s,
+and <a 
href="http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/06/your_iphone_works_for_the_secret_police.html";>far
+more than people behind the Iron Curtain experienced</a> in the 1980s,
+and would still be far more even with additional legal limits on state
+use of the accumulated data.</p>
 
 <p>Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from
 a grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the
@@ -483,7 +499,7 @@
 
 <p class="unprintable">Updated:
 <!-- timestamp start -->
-$Date: 2014/04/23 17:58:43 $
+$Date: 2014/05/27 11:13:07 $
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>
 </div>

Index: po/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.po
===================================================================
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retrieving revision 1.44
retrieving revision 1.45
diff -u -b -r1.44 -r1.45
--- po/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.po  27 May 2014 10:57:43 -0000      1.44
+++ po/surveillance-vs-democracy.fr.po  27 May 2014 11:13:08 -0000      1.45
@@ -1036,8 +1036,6 @@
 "corrections ou suggestions peuvent être signalés à <a href=\"mailto:";
 "address@hidden">&lt;address@hidden&gt;</a>."
 
-#
-#
 #.  TRANSLATORS: Ignore the original text in this paragraph,
 #.         replace it with the translation of these two:
 #.         We work hard and do our best to provide accurate, good quality

Index: po/the-root-of-this-problem.fr-en.html
===================================================================
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diff -u -b -r1.21 -r1.22
--- po/the-root-of-this-problem.fr-en.html      12 Apr 2014 13:59:53 -0000      
1.21
+++ po/the-root-of-this-problem.fr-en.html      27 May 2014 11:13:08 -0000      
1.22
@@ -33,11 +33,12 @@
 
 <p>
 It is true that a general computer lets you run programs designed to
-spy on you, restrict you, or even let the developer attack you. Such
-programs include KaZaA, RealPlayer, Adobe Flash, Windows Media Player,
-Microsoft Windows, and MacOS.  Windows Vista does all three of those
-things; it also lets Microsoft change the software without asking, or
-command it to permanently cease normal functioning.</p>
+<a href="/philosophy/proprietary.html">spy on you, restrict you, or
+even let the developer attack you</a>.  Such programs include KaZaA,
+RealPlayer, Adobe Flash Player, Windows Media Player, Microsoft
+Windows, and MacOS.  Windows Vista does all three of those things; it
+also lets Microsoft change the software without asking, or command it
+to permanently cease normal functioning.<a href="#note1">(1)</a></p>
 
 <p>
 But restricted computers are no help, because they present the
@@ -158,6 +159,16 @@
 political
 will. (See <a 
href="http://www.endsoftpatents.org";>http://www.endsoftpatents.org</a>.)</p>
 
+<h3>Notes</h3>
+
+<p>1. Windows Vista initially had a &ldquo;kill switch&rdquo; with
+which Microsoft could remotely command the computer to stop
+functioning.  Microsoft
+subsequently <a 
href="http://badvista.fsf.org/blog/windows-genuine-disadvantage";>removed
+this</a>, ceding to public pressure, but reserved the
+&ldquo;right&rdquo; to put it back in.
+</p>
+
 </div><!-- for id="content", starts in the include above -->
 <!--#include virtual="/server/footer.html" -->
 <div id="footer">
@@ -198,7 +209,7 @@
 
 <p class="unprintable">Updated:
 <!-- timestamp start -->
-$Date: 2014/04/12 13:59:53 $
+$Date: 2014/05/27 11:13:08 $
 <!-- timestamp end -->
 </p>
 </div>



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