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Re: [Taler] [address@hidden: 'Oh, that's an idea...': U.S. parents respo

From: Jacob Bachmeyer
Subject: Re: [Taler] [address@hidden: 'Oh, that's an idea...': U.S. parents respond to China screen time ban]
Date: Tue, 07 Sep 2021 20:05:49 -0500
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; en-US; rv: Gecko/20090807 MultiZilla/ SeaMonkey/1.1.17 Mnenhy/

Jeff Burdges wrote:
On 7 Sep 2021, at 05:17, Richard Stallman <rms@gnu.org> wrote:
how does that relate to practical questions, such as whether the server 
DRM and the browser helps?

I've never spoke about DRM here and DRM seems totally off-topic.
Jacob miss-read my comment because I wrote "their own browser would not do so” when 
I should’ve written "their own browser could not do so.”  In my defence, my entire 
long comment was about a type of cryptographic ring signature, and human language has 
plenty of error correction, so it’s completely disingenuous to suddenly read in DRM over 
one c being a w.

Correct; I misread your comment. A better way to write that would have been "their browser would be unable to complete the session negotiation" or similar and explain that the server is specifically demanding a zero-knowledge proof.

On balance, this looks similar to TLS client certificates, except that the server is unable to determine *which* client is opening a session. This is considerably less nasty than your imprecision had hinted at earlier.

How does your proposed system handle a "borrowed" or outright stolen user key? The server cannot identify the user, so how can Mallory walking off with a copy of Alice's key be detected?

-- Jacob

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