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Re: [Sks-devel] Fwd [from schleuder dev team]: Signature-flooded keys: c
Re: [Sks-devel] Fwd [from schleuder dev team]: Signature-flooded keys: current situation and mitigation
Thu, 18 Jul 2019 18:35:52 +0100
> On 18 Jul 2019, at 17:46, Todd Fleisher <address@hidden> wrote:
> "Unfortunately, there is currently no
> good way to distribute revocations that doesn't also reveal the revoked
> identity itself. We don't want to distribute revoked identities, so we can't
> distribute the identity at all."
We can kill two birds with one stone here, using two simple
extensions-by-convention of the protocol.
A key owner can (preferably automatically) create a “self-identity” on her
primary key consisting of a well-known string that contains no personal
information. To avoid breaking legacy search-by-id systems this string should
be unique to the primary key. I suggest using
“fpr:00000000000000000000000000000000000”, where the zeros are replaced by the
fingerprint of the key. The self-identity (and any revocations on it) can then
be safely distributed by keystores that would otherwise refuse to distribute
A recipient can then infer from revocation of the self-identity that the
primary key itself has been revoked (and by extension all associated
identities, whether published or not).