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Re: [Sks-devel] new attack on sks keyserver ?

From: Jorge Gonzalez
Subject: Re: [Sks-devel] new attack on sks keyserver ?
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2019 12:16:24 +0200
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.7.0

Hi, all,

just in case anyone is interested, these are the first measures that I have implemented (or plan to implement) on ICIJ key server:

* Stop accepting SKS updates from peers (by removing all peers from our "membership" file). - DONE

* Stop accepting SKS updates from external sources (by configuring our HTTP gateway with a URL blacklist, so that POSTs for new keys are not accepted except from our internal networks) - ONGOING

* Tell users to upload any needed PGP key manually to our own keyserver - DONE

* Tell users and partners to use ICIJ keyserver (and not others) for communicating with us using PGP. - DONE

* Stop serving poisoned certificates to any client (by configuring our HTTP gateway with another URL blacklist, so that GETs for poisoned keys are not allowed). I'm planning to use some of the existing DB statistics scripts to extract the list of keys which have more than N signatures (which N would be reasonable? 10? 30? 300?) - ONGOING

Effectively, this has turned our server into a PGP island which does not receive updates, but it servers our porpose, since we regularly update it manually. YMMV.

Any comments are welcome.


Jorge Gonzalez Villalonga
Systems Engineer
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
910 17th Street NW, Suite 410 | Washington DC 20006 | United States
Phone: +34 672 173 200 (Madrid, Spain)
El 1/7/19 a las 12:17, Robert J. Hansen escribió:
As the guy who wrote that, yeah, I'm pretty sure we here are aware of
it.  ;)

Kristian, who is the major figure behind the SKS keyserver network, has
also apparently been targeted.  We are keenly aware of the issue.  But
thank you for your thoughtfulness!  :)

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