[Savannah-cvs] [Compromise2010] (edit) syntax

[Beuc]

??changed:
-Recap: there's been a SQL SELECT injection leading to a leak of unsalted MD5 
account passwords, some of them discovered through online passwords recovery 
services, leading in turn to project membership and admin access, used for 
vandalism on the 'www' project that backs www.gnu.org.
Recap
-----

There's been a SQL SELECT injection leading to a leak of unsalted MD5 account 
passwords, some of them discovered through online passwords recovery services, 
leading in turn to project membership and admin access, used for vandalism on 
the 'www' project that backs www.gnu.org.


++added:


++added:


++added:


??changed:
-Counter-measures:
-
- * Crack analysis before re-enabling any service
- * SQL injection fix and code audit before re-enabling the web front-end
- * Removed all passwords (users and system) and sessions
- * Use crypt's SHA-512 for passwords, and phpass's entropy code for salt
- * Enforced password strength (through passwdqc)
- * Added logs analysis reporting tool that keeps us informed of SQL injection 
attacks
- * Upgraded friend website gna.org to our version of Savane
Counter-measures
----------------

* Crack analysis before re-enabling any service
* SQL injection fix and code audit before re-enabling the web front-end
* Removed all passwords (users and system) and sessions
* Use crypt's SHA-512 for passwords, and phpass's entropy code for salt
* Enforced password strength (through passwdqc)
* Added logs analysis reporting tool that keeps us informed of SQL injection 
attacks
* Upgraded friend website gna.org to our version of Savane

??changed:
- * Auditing changes between the 23th and the 27th to see what was committed 
(no code commits found so far)
* Auditing changes between the 23th and the 27th to see what was committed (no 
code commits found so far)

??changed:
-Timeline:
-
- * 2010/11/24 21:30 UTC: SQL SELECT injection attack originated from Tbilisi, 
Georgia, access to user encrypted passwords
- * 2010/11/24 21:27 UTC: one Savannah admin password cracked, account 
compromised
- * 2010/11/26 16:02 UTC: cracker gained membership to the www project
- * 2010/11/26 23:51 UTC: cracker tested commit to the www CVS repository
- * 2010/11/27 00:51 UTC: cracker defaced www.gnu.org
- * 2010/11/27 01:35 UTC: cracker committed a reverse shell using unexpectedly 
enabled PHP support
- * 2010/11/27 01:36 UTC: notification of the intrusion
- * 2010/11/27 01:37 UTC: website restored
- * 2010/11/27 04:42 UTC: emergency fix to Savane code (unknowing that an admin 
account was still compromised)
- * 2010/11/27 19:05 UTC: new cracker activity on www.gnu.org - we shutdown the 
machines
- * 2010/11/27 21:35 UTC: reinstalled www.gnu.org
- * 2010/11/29 15:23 UTC: reinstalled Savannah machines to be safe
- * 2010/11/29 21:30 UTC: access to the base host restored, extracting 
incremental backup from the 23th
- * 2010/11/29 23:30 UTC: finished diagnosing original attack
- * 2010/11/30 12:30 UTC: data transfers in progress
- * 2010/11/30 13:30 UTC: read-only access to source repositories
- * 2010/11/30 14:30 UTC: write access to source repositories
-[9 more lines...]
Timeline
--------

* 2010/11/24 21:30 UTC: SQL SELECT injection attack originated from Tbilisi, 
Georgia, access to user encrypted passwords
* 2010/11/24 21:27 UTC: one Savannah admin password cracked, account compromised
* 2010/11/26 16:02 UTC: cracker gained membership to the www project
* 2010/11/26 23:51 UTC: cracker tested commit to the www CVS repository
* 2010/11/27 00:51 UTC: cracker defaced www.gnu.org
* 2010/11/27 01:35 UTC: cracker committed a reverse shell using unexpectedly 
enabled PHP support
* 2010/11/27 01:36 UTC: notification of the intrusion
* 2010/11/27 01:37 UTC: website restored
* 2010/11/27 04:42 UTC: emergency fix to Savane code (unknowing that an admin 
account was still compromised)
* 2010/11/27 19:05 UTC: new cracker activity on www.gnu.org - we shutdown the 
machines
* 2010/11/27 21:35 UTC: reinstalled www.gnu.org
* 2010/11/29 15:23 UTC: reinstalled Savannah machines to be safe
* 2010/11/29 21:30 UTC: access to the base host restored, extracting 
incremental backup from the 23th
* 2010/11/29 23:30 UTC: finished diagnosing original attack
* 2010/11/30 12:30 UTC: data transfers in progress
* 2010/11/30 13:30 UTC: read-only access to source repositories
* 2010/11/30 14:30 UTC: write access to source repositories
* 2010/11/30 16:30 UTC: data transfers finished
* 2010/11/30 18:00 UTC: access to downloads and GNU Arch
* 2010/11/30 21:00 UTC: audited code and found no other SQL injection
* 2010/11/30 22:30 UTC: found trace of earlier attack on Nov 23th 04:00
* 2010/11/30 22:45 UTC: stopped write access
* 2010/11/30 23:45 UTC: found trace of earlier read-only SQL injections as back 
as January, but none with actual account cracking
* 2010/12/01 00:55 UTC: after fishing through logs, it appears that there was 
no other account cracking
* 2010/12/01 11:00 UTC: restored write access
* 2010/12/02 08:02 UTC: web front-end improved and re-enabled


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