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Re: [PATCH v4 03/10] kvm: dirty-ring: Fix race with vcpu creation
From: |
Peter Xu |
Subject: |
Re: [PATCH v4 03/10] kvm: dirty-ring: Fix race with vcpu creation |
Date: |
Tue, 4 Apr 2023 10:10:59 -0400 |
Hi, Paolo!
On Tue, Apr 04, 2023 at 03:32:38PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 2/16/23 17:18, huangy81@chinatelecom.cn wrote:
> > diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> > index 9b26582655..47483cdfa0 100644
> > --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> > +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> > @@ -685,6 +685,15 @@ static uint32_t kvm_dirty_ring_reap_one(KVMState *s,
> > CPUState *cpu)
> > uint32_t ring_size = s->kvm_dirty_ring_size;
> > uint32_t count = 0, fetch = cpu->kvm_fetch_index;
> > + /*
> > + * It's possible that we race with vcpu creation code where the vcpu is
> > + * put onto the vcpus list but not yet initialized the dirty ring
> > + * structures. If so, skip it.
> > + */
> > + if (!cpu->created) {
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
>
> Is there a lock that protects cpu->created?
>
> If you don't want to use a lock you need to use qatomic_load_acquire
> together with
>
> diff --git a/softmmu/cpus.c b/softmmu/cpus.c
> index fed20ffb5dd2..15b64e7f4592 100644
> --- a/softmmu/cpus.c
> +++ b/softmmu/cpus.c
> @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ void qemu_cond_timedwait_iothread(QemuCond *cond, int ms)
> /* signal CPU creation */
> void cpu_thread_signal_created(CPUState *cpu)
> {
> - cpu->created = true;
> + qatomic_store_release(&cpu->created, true);
> qemu_cond_signal(&qemu_cpu_cond);
> }
Makes sense.
When looking at such a possible race, I also found that when destroying the
vcpu we may have another relevant issue, where we flip "vcpu->created"
after destroying the vcpu. IIUC it means the same issue can occur when
vcpu unplugged?
Meanwhile I think the memory ordering trick won't play there, because
firstly to do that we'll need to update created==false:
- kvm_destroy_vcpu(cpu);
cpu_thread_signal_destroyed(cpu);
+ kvm_destroy_vcpu(cpu);
And even if we order the operations we still cannot assume the data is safe
to access even if created==true.
Maybe we'd better need (unfortunately) a per-vcpu mutex to protect both
cases?
Thanks,
--
Peter Xu