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Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] vfio: move the function vfio_get_xlat_addr() to memor
From: |
Alex Williamson |
Subject: |
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] vfio: move the function vfio_get_xlat_addr() to memory.c |
Date: |
Tue, 25 Oct 2022 10:55:18 -0600 |
On Wed, 26 Oct 2022 00:37:33 +0800
Cindy Lu <lulu@redhat.com> wrote:
> diff --git a/softmmu/memory.c b/softmmu/memory.c
> index 7ba2048836..03940c551d 100644
> --- a/softmmu/memory.c
> +++ b/softmmu/memory.c
...
> + /*
> + * Malicious VMs might trigger discarding of IOMMU-mapped memory. The
> + * pages will remain pinned inside vfio until unmapped, resulting in
> a
> + * higher memory consumption than expected. If memory would get
> + * populated again later, there would be an inconsistency between
> pages
> + * pinned by vfio and pages seen by QEMU. This is the case until
> + * unmapped from the IOMMU (e.g., during device reset).
> + *
> + * With malicious guests, we really only care about pinning more
> memory
> + * than expected. RLIMIT_MEMLOCK set for the user/process can never
> be
> + * exceeded and can be used to mitigate this problem.
> + */
> + warn_report_once("Using vfio with vIOMMUs and coordinated discarding
> of"
> + " RAM (e.g., virtio-mem) works, however, malicious"
> + " guests can trigger pinning of more memory than"
> + " intended via an IOMMU. It's possible to mitigate "
> + " by setting/adjusting RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.");
Looks like the comment and warning still need to be generalized for
shared use here. Thanks,
Alex