Re: [PATCH] docs: Add measurement calculation details to amd-memory-encryption.txt

[Dov Murik]

On 14/12/2021 20:39, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 14, 2021 at 01:59:10PM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
>> Add a section explaining how the Guest Owner should calculate the
>> expected guest launch measurement for SEV and SEV-ES.
>>
>> Also update the name and link to the SEV API Spec document.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
>> Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
>> ---
>>  docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>>  1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
>> index ffca382b5f..f97727482f 100644
>> --- a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
>> +++ b/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
>> @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ The guest policy is passed as plaintext. A hypervisor may 
>> choose to read it,
>>  but should not modify it (any modification of the policy bits will result
>>  in bad measurement). The guest policy is a 4-byte data structure containing
>>  several flags that restricts what can be done on a running SEV guest.
>> -See KM Spec section 3 and 6.2 for more details.
>> +See SEV API Spec [1] section 3 and 6.2 for more details.
>>  
>>  The guest policy can be provided via the 'policy' property (see below)
>>  
>> @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ expects.
>>  LAUNCH_FINISH finalizes the guest launch and destroys the cryptographic
>>  context.
>>  
>> -See SEV KM API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the
>> +See SEV API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the
>>  complete flow chart.
>>  
>>  To launch a SEV guest
>> @@ -113,6 +113,45 @@ a SEV-ES guest:
>>   - Requires in-kernel irqchip - the burden is placed on the hypervisor to
>>     manage booting APs.
>>  
>> +Calculating expected guest launch measurement
>> +---------------------------------------------
>> +In order to verify the guest launch measurement, The Guest Owner must 
>> compute
>> +it in the exact same way as it is calculated by the AMD-SP.  SEV API Spec 
>> [1]
>> +section 6.5.1 describes the AMD-SP operations:
>> +
>> +    GCTX.LD is finalized, producing the hash digest of all plaintext data
>> +    imported into the guest.
>> +
>> +    The launch measurement is calculated as:
>> +
>> +    HMAC(0x04 || API_MAJOR || API_MINOR || BUILD || GCTX.POLICY || GCTX.LD 
>> || MNONCE; GCTX.TIK)
>> +
>> +    where "||" represents concatenation.
>> +
>> +The values of API_MAJOR, API_MINOR, BUILD, and GCTX.POLICY can be obtained
>> +from the 'query-sev' qmp command.
>> +
>> +The value of MNONCE is part of the response of 'query-sev-launch-measure': 
>> it
>> +is the last 16 bytes of the base64-decoded data field (see SEV API Spec [1]
>> +section 6.5.2 Table 52: LAUNCH_MEASURE Measurement Buffer).
>> +
>> +The value of GCTX.LD is SHA256(firmware_blob || kernel_hashes_blob || 
>> vmsas_blob),
>> +where:
>> +
>> +* firmware_blob is the content of the entire firmware flash file (for 
>> example,
>> +  OVMF.fd).
> 
> Lets add a caveat that the firmware flash should be built to be stateless
> ie that it is not secure to attempt to measure a guest where the firmware
> uses an NVRAM store.
> 

* firmware_blob is the content of the entire firmware flash file (for   
  example, OVMF.fd).  Note that you must build a stateless firmware file    
  which doesn't use an NVRAM store, because the NVRAM area is not
  measured, and therefore it is not secure to use a firmware which uses 
  state from an NVRAM store.



>> +* if kernel is used, and kernel-hashes=on, then kernel_hashes_blob is the
>> +  content of PaddedSevHashTable (including the zero padding), which itself
>> +  includes the hashes of kernel, initrd, and cmdline that are passed to the
>> +  guest.  The PaddedSevHashTable struct is defined in target/i386/sev.c .
>> +* if SEV-ES is enabled (policy & 0x4 != 0), vmsas_blob is the concatenation 
>> of
>> +  all VMSAs of the guest vcpus.  Each VMSA is 4096 bytes long; its content 
>> is
>> +  defined inside Linux kernel code as struct vmcb_save_area, or in AMD APM
>> +  Volume 2 [2] Table B-2: VMCB Layout, State Save Area.
> 
> Is there any practical guidance we can give apps on the way the VMSAs
> can be expected to be initialized ? eg can they assume essentially
> all fields in vmcb_save_area are 0 initialized except for certain
> ones ? Is initialization likely to vary at all across KVM or EDK2
> vesions or something ?

>From my own experience, the VMSA of vcpu0 doesn't change; it is basically what 
>QEMU
sets up in x86_cpu_reset() (which is mostly zeros but not all).  I don't know 
if it
may change in newer QEMU (machine types?) or kvm.  As for vcpu1+, in SEV-ES the
CS:EIP for the APs is taken from a GUIDed table at the end of the OVMF image, 
and has
actually changed a few months ago when the memory layout changed to support 
both TDX
and SEV.


Here are the VMSAs for my 2-vcpu SEV-ES VM:


$ hd vmsa/vmsa_cpu0.bin
00000000  00 00 93 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 f0 9b 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000020  00 00 93 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
00000060  00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000070  00 00 82 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000080  00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000090  00 00 8b 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
000000d0  00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
00000140  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |........@.......|
00000150  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000160  00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00  f0 0f ff ff 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000170  02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  f0 ff 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000180  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
00000260  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  06 04 07 00 06 04 07 00  |................|
00000270  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
00000310  10 0f 83 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000320  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
000003e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000003f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
00001000



$ hd vmsa/vmsa_cpu1.bin
00000000  00 00 93 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 f0 9b 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 80 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000020  00 00 93 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
00000060  00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000070  00 00 82 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000080  00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000090  00 00 8b 00 ff ff 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
000000d0  00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
00000140  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |........@.......|
00000150  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000160  00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00  f0 0f ff ff 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000170  02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 b0 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000180  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
00000260  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  06 04 07 00 06 04 07 00  |................|
00000270  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
00000310  10 0f 83 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000320  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
000003e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000003f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
*
00001000





-Dov