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Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/12] i386/sev: sev-snp: add support for CPUID valida
From: |
Dov Murik |
Subject: |
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/12] i386/sev: sev-snp: add support for CPUID validation |
Date: |
Sun, 5 Sep 2021 13:02:12 +0300 |
User-agent: |
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.13.0 |
Hi Michael,
On 27/08/2021 1:26, Michael Roth wrote:
> SEV-SNP firmware allows a special guest page to be populated with a
> table of guest CPUID values so that they can be validated through
> firmware before being loaded into encrypted guest memory where they can
> be used in place of hypervisor-provided values[1].
>
> As part of SEV-SNP guest initialization, use this process to validate
> the CPUID entries reported by KVM_GET_CPUID2 prior to initial guest
> start.
>
> [1]: SEV SNP Firmware ABI Specification, Rev. 0.8, 8.13.2.6
>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> ---
> target/i386/sev.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 143 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> index 0009c93d28..72a6146295 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
> @@ -153,6 +153,36 @@ static const char *const sev_fw_errlist[] = {
>
> #define SEV_FW_MAX_ERROR ARRAY_SIZE(sev_fw_errlist)
>
> +/* <linux/kvm.h> doesn't expose this, so re-use the max from kvm.c */
> +#define KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES 100
> +
> +typedef struct KvmCpuidInfo {
> + struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
> + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES];
> +} KvmCpuidInfo;
> +
> +#define SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT 64
> +#define SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_UNKNOWN 0xFFFFFFFF
> +
> +typedef struct {
> + uint32_t eax_in;
> + uint32_t ecx_in;
> + uint64_t xcr0_in;
> + uint64_t xss_in;
> + uint32_t eax;
> + uint32_t ebx;
> + uint32_t ecx;
> + uint32_t edx;
> + uint64_t reserved;
> +} __attribute__((packed)) SnpCpuidFunc;
> +
> +typedef struct {
> + uint32_t count;
> + uint32_t reserved1;
> + uint64_t reserved2;
> + SnpCpuidFunc entries[SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT];
> +} __attribute__((packed)) SnpCpuidInfo;
> +
> static int
> sev_ioctl(int fd, int cmd, void *data, int *error)
> {
> @@ -1141,6 +1171,117 @@ detect_first_overlap(uint64_t start, uint64_t end,
> Range *range_list,
> return overlap;
> }
>
> +static int
> +sev_snp_cpuid_info_fill(SnpCpuidInfo *snp_cpuid_info,
> + const KvmCpuidInfo *kvm_cpuid_info)
> +{
> + size_t i;
> +
> + memset(snp_cpuid_info, 0, sizeof(*snp_cpuid_info));
> +
> + for (i = 0; kvm_cpuid_info->entries[i].function != 0xFFFFFFFF; i++) {
Maybe iterate only while i < kvm_cpuid_info.cpuid.nent ?
> + const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_cpuid_entry;
> + SnpCpuidFunc *snp_cpuid_entry;
> +
> + kvm_cpuid_entry = &kvm_cpuid_info->entries[i];
> + snp_cpuid_entry = &snp_cpuid_info->entries[i];
There's no explicit check that i < KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES and i <
SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT. The !=0xFFFFFFFF condition might protect
against this but this is not really clear (the memset to 0xFF is done in
another function).
Since KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES is 100 and SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT is
64, it seems possible that i will be 65 for example and then
snp_cpuid_info->entries[i] is an out-of-bounds read access.
> +
> + snp_cpuid_entry->eax_in = kvm_cpuid_entry->function;
> + if (kvm_cpuid_entry->flags == KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX) {
> + snp_cpuid_entry->ecx_in = kvm_cpuid_entry->index;
> + }
> + snp_cpuid_entry->eax = kvm_cpuid_entry->eax;
> + snp_cpuid_entry->ebx = kvm_cpuid_entry->ebx;
> + snp_cpuid_entry->ecx = kvm_cpuid_entry->ecx;
> + snp_cpuid_entry->edx = kvm_cpuid_entry->edx;
> +
> + if (snp_cpuid_entry->eax_in == 0xD &&
> + (snp_cpuid_entry->ecx_in == 0x0 || snp_cpuid_entry->ecx_in ==
> 0x1)) {
> + snp_cpuid_entry->ebx = 0x240;
> + }
Can you please add a comment explaining this special case?
> + }
> +
> + if (i > SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT) {
This can be checked at the top (before the for loop): compare
kvm_cpuid_info.cpuid.nent with SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT.
> + error_report("SEV-SNP: CPUID count '%lu' exceeds max '%u'",
> + i, SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT);
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + snp_cpuid_info->count = i;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_snp_cpuid_report_mismatches(SnpCpuidInfo *old,
> + SnpCpuidInfo *new)
> +{
> + size_t i;
> +
Add check that new->count == old->count.
> + for (i = 0; i < old->count; i++) {
> + SnpCpuidFunc *old_func, *new_func;
> +
> + old_func = &old->entries[i];
> + new_func = &new->entries[i];
> +
> + if (memcmp(old_func, new_func, sizeof(SnpCpuidFunc))) {
Maybe clearer:
if (*old_func != *new_func) ...
> + error_report("SEV-SNP: CPUID validation failed for function %x,
> index: %x.\n"
Add "0x" prefixes before printing hex values (%x), otherwise we might
have confusing outputs such as "failed for function 13, index: 25" which
is unclear whether it's decimal or hex.
> + "provided: eax:0x%08x, ebx: 0x%08x, ecx: 0x%08x,
> edx: 0x%08x\n"
> + "expected: eax:0x%08x, ebx: 0x%08x, ecx: 0x%08x,
> edx: 0x%08x",
> + old_func->eax_in, old_func->ecx_in,
> + old_func->eax, old_func->ebx, old_func->ecx,
> old_func->edx,
> + new_func->eax, new_func->ebx, new_func->ecx,
> new_func->edx);
> + }
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static int
> +sev_snp_launch_update_cpuid(uint32_t cpuid_addr, uint32_t cpuid_len)
> +{
> + KvmCpuidInfo kvm_cpuid_info;
> + SnpCpuidInfo snp_cpuid_info;
> + CPUState *cs = first_cpu;
> + MemoryRegion *mr = NULL;
> + void *snp_cpuid_hva;
> + int ret;
> +
> + snp_cpuid_hva = gpa2hva(&mr, cpuid_addr, cpuid_len, NULL);
> + if (!snp_cpuid_hva) {
> + error_report("SEV-SNP: unable to access CPUID memory range at GPA
> %d",
> + cpuid_addr);
> + return 1;
> + }
I think that moving this section just before the memcpy(snp_cpuid_hva,
...) below would make the flow of this function clearer to the reader
(no functional difference, I believe).
> +
> + /* get the cpuid list from KVM */
> + memset(&kvm_cpuid_info.entries, 0xFF,
> + KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2));
The third argument can be: sizeof(kvm_cpuid_info.entries)
> + kvm_cpuid_info.cpuid.nent = KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES;
> +
> + ret = kvm_vcpu_ioctl(cs, KVM_GET_CPUID2, &kvm_cpuid_info);
> + if (ret) {
> + error_report("SEV-SNP: unable to query CPUID values for CPU: '%s'",
> + strerror(-ret));
Missing return 1 or exit(1) here?
-Dov
> + }
> +
> + ret = sev_snp_cpuid_info_fill(&snp_cpuid_info, &kvm_cpuid_info);
> + if (ret) {
> + error_report("SEV-SNP: failed to generate CPUID table information");
> + exit(1);
> + }
> +
> + memcpy(snp_cpuid_hva, &snp_cpuid_info, sizeof(snp_cpuid_info));
Before memcpy, maybe add sanity test (assert?) that
sizeof(snp_cpuid_info) <= cpuid_len .
> +
> + ret = sev_snp_launch_update_gpa(cpuid_addr, cpuid_len,
> + KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID);
> + if (ret) {
> + sev_snp_cpuid_report_mismatches(&snp_cpuid_info, snp_cpuid_hva);
> + error_report("SEV-SNP: failed update CPUID page");
> + exit(1);
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static void snp_ovmf_boot_block_setup(void)
> {
> SevSnpBootInfoBlock *info;
> @@ -1176,10 +1317,9 @@ static void snp_ovmf_boot_block_setup(void)
> }
>
> /* Populate the cpuid page */
> - ret = sev_snp_launch_update_gpa(info->cpuid_addr, info->cpuid_len,
> - KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID);
> + ret = sev_snp_launch_update_cpuid(info->cpuid_addr, info->cpuid_len);
> if (ret) {
> - error_report("SEV-SNP: failed to insert cpuid page GPA 0x%x",
> + error_report("SEV-SNP: failed to populate cpuid tables GPA 0x%x",
> info->cpuid_addr);
> exit(1);
> }
>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/12] i386/sev: sev-snp: add support for CPUID validation,
Dov Murik <=