[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] x86/sev: Measured Linux SEV guest with kernel/initrd/
From: |
Connor Kuehl |
Subject: |
Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] x86/sev: Measured Linux SEV guest with kernel/initrd/cmdline |
Date: |
Thu, 8 Jul 2021 09:41:24 -0700 |
User-agent: |
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.11.0 |
Hi Paolo,
Please consider this series[1] for inclusion into your next pull request.
Just a note that this series has a companion series that is getting
upstreamed into OVMF[2]
[1] Patchwork link, if convenient:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/qemu-devel/cover/20210624102040.2015280-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
[2] https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457#c6
Thank you,
Connor
On 6/24/21 3:20 AM, Dov Murik wrote:
> Currently booting with -kernel/-initrd/-append is not supported in SEV
> confidential guests, because the content of these blobs is not measured
> and therefore not trusted by the SEV guest.
>
> However, in some cases the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are not secret
> but should not be modified by the host. In such a case, we want to
> verify inside the trusted VM that the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are
> indeed the ones expected by the Guest Owner, and only if that is the
> case go on and boot them up (removing the need for grub inside OVMF in
> that mode).
>
> To support that, OVMF adds a special area for hashes of
> kernel/initrd/cmdline; that area is expected to be filled by QEMU and
> encrypted as part of the initial SEV guest launch. This in turn makes
> the hashes part of the PSP measured content, and OVMF can trust these
> inputs if they match the hashes.
>
> This series adds an SEV function to generate the table of hashes for
> OVMF and encrypt it (patch 1/2), and calls this function if SEV is
> enabled when the kernel/initrd/cmdline are prepared (patch 2/2).
>
> Corresponding OVMF support was submitted to edk2-devel [1] (patch series
> "Measured SEV boot with kernel/initrd/cmdline"); it's still under
> review.
>
> [1] https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/topic/patch_v1_0_8_measured_sev/83074450
>
> ---
>
> v3 changes:
> - initrd hash is now mandatory; if no -initrd is passed, calculate the
> hash of the empty buffer. This is now aligned with the OVMF
> behaviour which verifies the empty initrd (correctly).
> - make SevHashTable entries fixed: 3 entries for cmdline, initrd, and kernel.
> - in sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes: first calculate all the hashes, only then
> fill-in the hashes table in the guest's memory.
> - Use g_assert_not_reached in sev-stub.c.
> - Use QEMU_PACKED attribute for structs.
> - Use QemuUUID type for guids.
> - in sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes: use ARRAY_SIZE(iov) instead of literal 2.
>
> v2:
> https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210621190553.1763020-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v2 changes:
> - Extract main functionality to sev.c (with empty stub in sev-stub.c)
> - Use sev_enabled() instead of machine->cgs->ready to detect SEV guest
> - Coding style changes
>
> v1:
> https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210525065931.1628554-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
>
> Dov Murik (2):
> sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes for measured linux
> boot
> x86/sev: generate SEV kernel loader hashes in x86_load_linux
>
> target/i386/sev_i386.h | 12 ++++
> hw/i386/x86.c | 25 +++++++-
> target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++
> target/i386/sev.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
>
> base-commit: b22726abdfa54592d6ad88f65b0297c0e8b363e2
>
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] x86/sev: Measured Linux SEV guest with kernel/initrd/cmdline,
Connor Kuehl <=