To keep the intended change I wanted to do (remove unneeded
labels in do_ioctl_blkpg() and do_sendrecvmsg_locked())
trivial, this patch is another trivial change to fix the
trailing whitespaces and the code style errors that
checkpatch.pl warns about. Doing this change beforehand will
keep the next patch focused just on the label removal changes.
CC: Riku Voipio <address@hidden>
CC: Laurent Vivier <address@hidden>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <address@hidden>
---
linux-user/syscall.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/linux-user/syscall.c b/linux-user/syscall.c
index 171c0caef3..49c6151c2d 100644
--- a/linux-user/syscall.c
+++ b/linux-user/syscall.c
@@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ static inline rlim_t target_to_host_rlim(abi_ulong
target_rlim)
{
abi_ulong target_rlim_swap;
rlim_t result;
-
+
target_rlim_swap = tswapal(target_rlim);
if (target_rlim_swap == TARGET_RLIM_INFINITY)
return RLIM_INFINITY;
@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static inline rlim_t target_to_host_rlim(abi_ulong
target_rlim)
result = target_rlim_swap;
if (target_rlim_swap != (rlim_t)result)
return RLIM_INFINITY;
-
+
return result;
}
@@ -1078,13 +1078,13 @@ static inline abi_ulong host_to_target_rlim(rlim_t rlim)
{
abi_ulong target_rlim_swap;
abi_ulong result;
-
+
if (rlim == RLIM_INFINITY || rlim != (abi_long)rlim)
target_rlim_swap = TARGET_RLIM_INFINITY;
else
target_rlim_swap = rlim;
result = tswapal(target_rlim_swap);
-
+
return result;
}
@@ -1526,10 +1526,11 @@ static inline abi_long target_to_host_cmsg(struct msghdr *msgh,
abi_ulong target_cmsg_addr;
struct target_cmsghdr *target_cmsg, *target_cmsg_start;
socklen_t space = 0;
-
+
msg_controllen = tswapal(target_msgh->msg_controllen);
- if (msg_controllen < sizeof (struct target_cmsghdr))
+ if (msg_controllen < sizeof(struct target_cmsghdr)) {
goto the_end;
+ }
target_cmsg_addr = tswapal(target_msgh->msg_control);
target_cmsg = lock_user(VERIFY_READ, target_cmsg_addr, msg_controllen, 1);
target_cmsg_start = target_cmsg;
@@ -1610,8 +1611,9 @@ static inline abi_long host_to_target_cmsg(struct
target_msghdr *target_msgh,
socklen_t space = 0;
msg_controllen = tswapal(target_msgh->msg_controllen);
- if (msg_controllen < sizeof (struct target_cmsghdr))
+ if (msg_controllen < sizeof(struct target_cmsghdr)) {
goto the_end;
+ }
target_cmsg_addr = tswapal(target_msgh->msg_control);
target_cmsg = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, target_cmsg_addr, msg_controllen,
0);
target_cmsg_start = target_cmsg;
@@ -5592,9 +5594,9 @@ abi_long do_set_thread_area(CPUX86State *env, abi_ulong
ptr)
}
unlock_user_struct(target_ldt_info, ptr, 1);
- if (ldt_info.entry_number < TARGET_GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN ||
+ if (ldt_info.entry_number < TARGET_GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN ||
ldt_info.entry_number > TARGET_GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
- return -TARGET_EINVAL;
+ return -TARGET_EINVAL;
seg_32bit = ldt_info.flags & 1;
contents = (ldt_info.flags >> 1) & 3;
read_exec_only = (ldt_info.flags >> 3) & 1;
@@ -5670,7 +5672,7 @@ static abi_long do_get_thread_area(CPUX86State *env,
abi_ulong ptr)
lp = (uint32_t *)(gdt_table + idx);
entry_1 = tswap32(lp[0]);
entry_2 = tswap32(lp[1]);
-
+
read_exec_only = ((entry_2 >> 9) & 1) ^ 1;
contents = (entry_2 >> 10) & 3;
seg_not_present = ((entry_2 >> 15) & 1) ^ 1;
@@ -5686,8 +5688,8 @@ static abi_long do_get_thread_area(CPUX86State *env,
abi_ulong ptr)
(read_exec_only << 3) | (limit_in_pages << 4) |
(seg_not_present << 5) | (useable << 6) | (lm << 7);
limit = (entry_1 & 0xffff) | (entry_2 & 0xf0000);
- base_addr = (entry_1 >> 16) |
- (entry_2 & 0xff000000) |
+ base_addr = (entry_1 >> 16) |
+ (entry_2 & 0xff000000) |
((entry_2 & 0xff) << 16);
target_ldt_info->base_addr = tswapal(base_addr);
target_ldt_info->limit = tswap32(limit);
@@ -10554,8 +10556,10 @@ static abi_long do_syscall1(void *cpu_env, int num,
abi_long arg1,
return get_errno(fchown(arg1, low2highuid(arg2), low2highgid(arg3)));
#if defined(TARGET_NR_fchownat)
case TARGET_NR_fchownat:
- if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg2)))
+ p = lock_user_string(arg2);
+ if (!p) {
return -TARGET_EFAULT;
+ }
ret = get_errno(fchownat(arg1, p, low2highuid(arg3),
low2highgid(arg4), arg5));
unlock_user(p, arg2, 0);