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Re: [PATCH v2 01/23] iotests: Introduce $SOCK_DIR
From: |
Max Reitz |
Subject: |
Re: [PATCH v2 01/23] iotests: Introduce $SOCK_DIR |
Date: |
Fri, 18 Oct 2019 11:03:46 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.1.0 |
On 17.10.19 16:52, Eric Blake wrote:
> On 10/17/19 8:31 AM, Max Reitz wrote:
>> Unix sockets generally have a maximum path length. Depending on your
>> $TEST_DIR, it may be exceeded and then all tests that create and use
>> Unix sockets there may fail.
>>
>> Circumvent this by adding a new scratch directory specifically for
>> Unix socket files. It defaults to a temporary directory (mktemp -d)
>> that is completely removed after the iotests are done.
>>
>> (By default, mktemp -d creates a /tmp/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX directory, which
>> should be short enough for our use cases.)
>>
>> Use mkdir -p to create the directory (because it seems right), and do
>> the same for $TEST_DIR (because there is no reason for that to be
>> created in any different way).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <address@hidden>
>> ---
>> tests/qemu-iotests/check | 15 +++++++++++++--
>> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
>> @@ -116,10 +117,14 @@ set_prog_path()
>> if [ -z "$TEST_DIR" ]; then
>> TEST_DIR=$PWD/scratch
>> fi
>> +mkdir -p "$TEST_DIR" || _init_error 'Failed to create TEST_DIR'
>
> This one seems fine. We are either using the user's name (and if it is
> pre-existing, not fail) or using a well-known name (if someone else
> slams in files into that directory in parallel with our test run, oh
> well). But at least the well-known name is a directory that is probably
> already accessible only to the current user, not world-writable.
>
>> -if [ ! -e "$TEST_DIR" ]; then
>> - mkdir "$TEST_DIR"
>> +tmp_sock_dir=false
>> +if [ -z "$SOCK_DIR" ]; then
>> + SOCK_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
>> + tmp_sock_dir=true
>> fi
>> +mkdir -p "$SOCK_DIR" || _init_error 'Failed to create SOCK_DIR'
>
> Thinking about this again: if the user passed in a name, we probably
> want to use it no matter whether the directory already exists (mkdir -p
> makes sense: either the directory did not exist, or the user is in
> charge of passing us a directory that they already secured). But if we
> generate our own name in a world-writable location in /tmp, using mkdir
> -p means someone else can race us to the creation of the directory, and
> potentially populate it in a way to cause us a security hole while we
> execute our tests.
I don’t quite see how this is a security hole. mktemp -d creates the
directory, so noone can race us.
Max
> I would be a bit more comfortable with:
>
> tmp_sock_dir=false
> tmp_sock_opt=-p
> if [ -z "$SOCK_DIR" ]; then
> SOCK_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
> tmp_sock_dir=true
> tmp_sock_opt= # disable -p for our generated name
> fi
> mkdir $tmp_sock_opt "$SOCK_DIR" || _init_error 'Failed to create SOCK_DIR'
>
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- [PATCH v2 00/23] iotests: Add and use $SOCK_DIR, Max Reitz, 2019/10/17
- [PATCH v2 02/23] iotests.py: Store socket files in $SOCK_DIR, Max Reitz, 2019/10/17
- [PATCH v2 03/23] iotests.py: Add @base_dir to FilePaths etc., Max Reitz, 2019/10/17
- [PATCH v2 04/23] iotests: Filter $SOCK_DIR, Max Reitz, 2019/10/17
- [PATCH v2 06/23] iotests/083: Create socket in $SOCK_DIR, Max Reitz, 2019/10/17
- [PATCH v2 05/23] iotests: Let common.nbd create socket in $SOCK_DIR, Max Reitz, 2019/10/17
- [PATCH v2 07/23] iotests/140: Create socket in $SOCK_DIR, Max Reitz, 2019/10/17
- [PATCH v2 08/23] iotests/143: Create socket in $SOCK_DIR, Max Reitz, 2019/10/17