[PATCH] target/riscv: PMP violation due to wrong size parameter

[Dayeol Lee]

riscv_cpu_tlb_fill() uses the `size` parameter to check PMP violation
using pmp_hart_has_privs().
However, if the size is unknown (=0), the ending address will be
`addr - 1` as it is `addr + size - 1` in `pmp_hart_has_privs()`.
This always causes a false PMP violation on the starting address of the
range, as `addr - 1` is not in the range.

In order to fix, we just assume that all bytes from addr to the end of
the page will be accessed if the size is unknown.

Signed-off-by: Dayeol Lee <address@hidden>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <address@hidden>
---
 target/riscv/cpu_helper.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c b/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
index e32b6126af..7d9a22b601 100644
--- a/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
+++ b/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
@@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ bool riscv_cpu_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address, int 
size,
     CPURISCVState *env = &cpu->env;
     hwaddr pa = 0;
     int prot;
+    int pmp_size = 0;
     bool pmp_violation = false;
     int ret = TRANSLATE_FAIL;
     int mode = mmu_idx;
@@ -460,9 +461,19 @@ bool riscv_cpu_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address, int 
size,
                   "%s address=%" VADDR_PRIx " ret %d physical " TARGET_FMT_plx
                   " prot %d\n", __func__, address, ret, pa, prot);
 
+    /*
+     * if size is unknown (0), assume that all bytes
+     * from addr to the end of the page will be accessed.
+     */
+    if (size == 0) {
+        pmp_size = -(address | TARGET_PAGE_MASK);
+    } else {
+        pmp_size = size;
+    }
+
     if (riscv_feature(env, RISCV_FEATURE_PMP) &&
         (ret == TRANSLATE_SUCCESS) &&
-        !pmp_hart_has_privs(env, pa, size, 1 << access_type, mode)) {
+        !pmp_hart_has_privs(env, pa, pmp_size, 1 << access_type, mode)) {
         ret = TRANSLATE_PMP_FAIL;
     }
     if (ret == TRANSLATE_PMP_FAIL) {
-- 
2.20.1