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[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 06/13] doc: update AMD SEV to include Live migrat
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 06/13] doc: update AMD SEV to include Live migration flow
Wed, 10 Jul 2019 20:23:03 +0000
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <address@hidden>
docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
index abb9a976f5..374f4b0a94 100644
@@ -89,7 +89,47 @@ TODO
+AMD SEV encrypts the memory of VMs and because a different key is used
+in each VM, the hypervisor will be unable to simply copy the
+ciphertext from one VM to another to migrate the VM. Instead the AMD SEV Key
+Management API provides sets of function which the hypervisor can use
+to package a guest page for migration, while maintaining the confidentiality
+provided by AMD SEV.
+SEV guest VMs have the concept of private and shared memory. The private
+memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared memory may
+be encrypted with the hypervisor key. The migration APIs provided by the
+SEV API spec should be used for migrating the private pages. The
+KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl can be used to get the guest page encryption
+bitmap. The bitmap can be used to check if the given guest page is
+private or shared.
+Before initiating the migration, we need to know the targets machine's public
+Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and certificate chain. It can be retrieved
+with the 'query-sev-capabilities' QMP command or using the sev-tool. The
+migrate-set-sev-info object can be used to pass the target machine's PDH and
+(QMP) migrate-sev-set-info pdh=<target_pdh> plat-cert=<target_cert_chain> \
+(QMP) migrate tcp:0:4444
+During the migration flow, the SEND_START is called on the source hypervisor
+to create outgoing encryption context. The SEV guest policy dectates whether
+the certificate passed through the migrate-sev-set-info command will be
+validate. SEND_UPDATE_DATA is called to encrypt the guest private pages.
+After migration is completed, SEND_FINISH is called to destroy the encryption
+context and make the VM non-runnable to protect it against the cloning.
+On the target machine, RECEIVE_START is called first to create an
+incoming encryption context. The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA is called to copy
+the receieved encrypted page into guest memory. After migration has
+completed, RECEIVE_FINISH is called to make the VM runnable.
+For more information about the migration see SEV API Appendix A
+Usage flow (Live migration section).
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 05/13] doc: update AMD SEV API spec web link, Singh, Brijesh, 2019/07/10
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 06/13] doc: update AMD SEV to include Live migration flow,
Singh, Brijesh <=
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 04/13] kvm: add support to sync the page encryption state bitmap, Singh, Brijesh, 2019/07/10
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 07/13] target/i386: sev: do not create launch context for an incoming guest, Singh, Brijesh, 2019/07/10
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 08/13] misc.json: add migrate-set-sev-info command, Singh, Brijesh, 2019/07/10
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 02/13] kvm: introduce high-level API to support encrypted page migration, (continued)