Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v7 RFC] block/vxhs: Initial commit to add Veritas HyperScale VxHS block device support

[Ketan Nilangekar]

> On Nov 18, 2016, at 5:25 PM, Daniel P. Berrange <address@hidden> wrote:
> 
>> On Fri, Nov 18, 2016 at 11:36:02AM +0000, Ketan Nilangekar wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On 11/18/16, 3:32 PM, "Stefan Hajnoczi" <address@hidden> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On Fri, Nov 18, 2016 at 02:26:21AM -0500, Jeff Cody wrote:
>>>> * Daniel pointed out that there is no authentication method for taking to a
>>>>  remote server.  This seems a bit scary.  Maybe all that is needed here is
>>>>  some clarification of the security scheme for authentication?  My
>>>>  impression from above is that you are relying on the networks being
>>>>  private to provide some sort of implicit authentication, though, and this
>>>>  seems fragile (and doesn't protect against a compromised guest or other
>>>>  process on the server, for one).
>>> 
>>> Exactly, from the QEMU trust model you must assume that QEMU has been
>>> compromised by the guest.  The escaped guest can connect to the VxHS
>>> server since it controls the QEMU process.
>>> 
>>> An escaped guest must not have access to other guests' volumes.
>>> Therefore authentication is necessary.
>> 
>> Just so I am clear on this, how will such an escaped guest get to know
>> the other guest vdisk IDs?
> 
> There can be a multiple approaches depending on the deployment scenario.
> At the very simplest it could directly read the IDs out of the libvirt
> XML files in /var/run/libvirt. Or it can rnu "ps" to list other running
> QEMU processes and see the vdisk IDs in the command line args of those
> processes. Or the mgmt app may be creating vdisk IDs based on some
> particular scheme, and the attacker may have info about this which lets
> them determine likely IDs.  Or the QEMU may have previously been
> permitted to the use the disk and remembered the ID for use later
> after access to the disk has been removed.
> 

Are we talking about a compromised guest here or compromised hypervisor? How 
will a compromised guest read the xml file or list running qemu processes?

> IOW, you can't rely on security-through-obscurity of the vdisk IDs
> 
> Regards,
> Daniel
> -- 
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