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Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 22/22] loader: reload bios image on ROM r
From: |
Paolo Bonzini |
Subject: |
Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 22/22] loader: reload bios image on ROM reset in SEV-enabled guest |
Date: |
Wed, 14 Sep 2016 23:11:04 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.2.0 |
On 14/09/2016 23:09, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > Does the guest have to check the measured data (e.g. with a hash) too,
> > > > to check that it hasn't been tampered with outside the secure
> > > > processor's control? Of course this would result in garbage written to
> > > > the modified page, but that might be a valid attack vector.
> > >
> > > Guest does not need to check the measurement.
> >
> > Can you explain why not?
>
> For example, guest can boot in a secure environment and then be migrated
> to cloud. In fact that seems much easier to manage than all the hash
> based stuff.
This is not what I was asking. My question was: assuming that the guest
is interested in checking the measurement, does it also have to
recompute it independently, and if not why?
Paolo
- Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 05/22] i386: add new option to enable SEV guest, (continued)
Message not available
Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/22] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD), Michael S. Tsirkin, 2016/09/13