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Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 12/34] hmp: hmp_cont(): don't rely on QERR_DEVIC


From: Markus Armbruster
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 12/34] hmp: hmp_cont(): don't rely on QERR_DEVICE_ENCRYPTED
Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2012 10:42:23 +0200
User-agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux)

Luiz Capitulino <address@hidden> writes:

> On Thu, 02 Aug 2012 13:53:08 +0200
> Markus Armbruster <address@hidden> wrote:
>
>> Luiz Capitulino <address@hidden> writes:
>> 
>> > This commit changes hmp_cont() to loop through all block devices
>> > and proactively set an encryption key for any encrypted device
>> > without a valid one.
>> >
>> > This change is needed because QERR_DEVICE_ENCRYPTED is going to be
>> > dropped by a future commit.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <address@hidden>
>> > ---
>> >  hmp.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
>> >  1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/hmp.c b/hmp.c
>> > index 6b72a64..1ebeb63 100644
>> > --- a/hmp.c
>> > +++ b/hmp.c
>> > @@ -610,34 +610,41 @@ void hmp_pmemsave(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
>> >  
>> >  static void hmp_cont_cb(void *opaque, int err)
>> >  {
>> > -    Monitor *mon = opaque;
>> > -
>> >      if (!err) {
>> > -        hmp_cont(mon, NULL);
>> > +        qmp_cont(NULL);
>> >      }
>> >  }
>> >  
>> > -void hmp_cont(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
>> > +static bool blockinfo_is_encrypted(const BlockInfo *bdev)
>> >  {
>> > -    Error *errp = NULL;
>> > -
>> > -    qmp_cont(&errp);
>> > -    if (error_is_set(&errp)) {
>> > -        if (error_is_type(errp, QERR_DEVICE_ENCRYPTED)) {
>> > -            const char *device;
>> > +    return (bdev->inserted && bdev->inserted->encrypted);
>> > +}
>> >  
>> > -            /* The device is encrypted. Ask the user for the password
>> > -               and retry */
>> > +static bool blockinfo_key_is_set(const BlockInfo *bdev)
>> > +{
>> > +    return (bdev->inserted && bdev->inserted->valid_encryption_key);
>> > +}
>> >  
>> > -            device = error_get_field(errp, "device");
>> > -            assert(device != NULL);
>> > +void hmp_cont(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
>> > +{
>> > +    BlockInfoList *bdev_list, *bdev;
>> > +    Error *errp = NULL;
>> >  
>> > -            monitor_read_block_device_key(mon, device, hmp_cont_cb, mon);
>> > -            error_free(errp);
>> > -            return;
>> > +    bdev_list = qmp_query_block(NULL);
>> > +    for (bdev = bdev_list; bdev; bdev = bdev->next) {
>> > +        if (blockinfo_is_encrypted(bdev->value) &&
>> > +            !blockinfo_key_is_set(bdev->value)) {
>> > +                monitor_read_block_device_key(mon, bdev->value->device,
>> > +                                              hmp_cont_cb, NULL);
>> > +                goto out;
>> >          }
>> > -        hmp_handle_error(mon, &errp);
>> >      }
>> > +
>> > +    qmp_cont(&errp);
>> > +    hmp_handle_error(mon, &errp);
>> > +
>> > +out:
>> > +    qapi_free_BlockInfoList(bdev_list);
>> >  }
>> >  
>> >  void hmp_system_wakeup(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
>> 
>> Quote my previous analysis:
>> 
>> Diff makes this change look worse than it is.  Odd: M-x ediff gets it
>> right.  Anyway, here's how I think it works:
>> 
>> Unchanged qmp_cont(): search the bdrv_states for the first encrypted one
>> without a key.  If found, set err argument to QERR_DEVICE_ENCRYPTED.
>> Other errors unrelated to encrypted devices are also possible.
>> 
>> hmp_cont() before: try qmp_cont().  If we get QERR_DEVICE_ENCRYPTED,
>> extract the device from the error object, and prompt for its key, with a
>> callback that retries hmp_cont() if the key was provided.
>> 
>> After: search the bdrv_states for an encrypted one without a key.  If
>> there is none, qmp_cont(), no special error handling.  If there is one,
>> prompt for its key, with a callback that runs qmp_cont() if the key was
>> provided.
>> 
>> End quote.
>> 
>> Two observations:
>> 
>> 1. I don't understand how this works for multiple encrypted BDSs without
>> keys.  If there are any, hmp_cont() starts reading the first one's key,
>> then returns.  But the callback doesn't start reading the next one's
>> key.  Please explain.
>
> The callback calls qmp_cont(), which will fail. Then the user will enter
> cont again, and the loop on BlockInfos will run again and the user will
> be asked for the password of the next image.
>
> IOW, each time cont is issued by the user it will ask for the password
> of a different device.
>
> That's the current behavior, and I believe it was also the behavior before
> I converted cont to the qapi.

Ugh.  Clunky even for QEMU standards.

cont gives no indication that the run state change didn't happen.

>> 2. qmp_cont() uses bdrv_key_required() to test whether a BDS lacks a
>> key.  Your new hmp_cont() uses blockinfo_is_encrypted() &&
>> !blockinfo_key_is_set().  Not obvious that the two are equivalent.
>> 
>> I'm afraid they are not.  bdrv_key_required() checks the backing image
>> first:
>> 
>>     int bdrv_key_required(BlockDriverState *bs)
>>     {
>>         BlockDriverState *backing_hd = bs->backing_hd;
>> 
>>         if (backing_hd && backing_hd->encrypted && !backing_hd->valid_key)
>>             return 1;
>>         return (bs->encrypted && !bs->valid_key);
>>     }
>> 
>> Your code doesn't:
>> 
>>     static bool blockinfo_is_encrypted(const BlockInfo *bdev)
>>     {
>>         return (bdev->inserted && bdev->inserted->encrypted);
>>     }
>> 
>>     static bool blockinfo_key_is_set(const BlockInfo *bdev)
>>     {
>>         return (bdev->inserted && bdev->inserted->valid_encryption_key);
>>     }
>> 
>>     BlockInfoList *qmp_query_block(Error **errp)
>>     {
>>         BlockInfoList *head = NULL, *cur_item = NULL;
>>         BlockDriverState *bs;
>> 
>>         QTAILQ_FOREACH(bs, &bdrv_states, list) {
>>             BlockInfoList *info = g_malloc0(sizeof(*info));
>> [...]
>>             if (bs->drv) {
>>                 info->value->has_inserted = true;
>>                 info->value->inserted = 
>> g_malloc0(sizeof(*info->value->inserted));
>> [...]
>>                 info->value->inserted->encrypted = bs->encrypted;
>>                 info->value->inserted->valid_encryption_key = bs->valid_key;
>> [...]
>> 
>> Are you sure this is correct?
>
> Is it actually possible for backing_hd to be false and valid_key to be true?

Yes.  Let's create an encrypted QCOW2 image without backing_file:

    $ qemu-img create -f qcow2 -o encryption,size=1G foo.qcow2
    Formatting 'foo.qcow2', fmt=qcow2 size=1073741824 encryption=on 
cluster_size=65536 lazy_refcounts=off 
    $ qemu-img info foo.qcow2
    Disk image 'foo.qcow2' is encrypted.
    password: 
    image: foo.qcow2
    file format: qcow2
    virtual size: 1.0G (1073741824 bytes)
    disk size: 136K
    encrypted: yes
    cluster_size: 65536
    $ qemu-system-x86_64 -nodefaults --enable-kvm -S -m 512 -vnc :0 -usb 
-monitor stdio -drive if=ide,file=foo.qcow2,id=foo
    QEMU 1.1.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
    (qemu) info block
    foo: removable=0 io-status=ok file=foo.qcow2 ro=0 drv=qcow2 encrypted=1 
bps=0 bps_rd=0 bps_wr=0 iops=0 iops_rd=0 iops_wr=0
    (qemu) c
    foo (foo.qcow2) is encrypted.
    Password: 

Now wrap an unencrypted one around it:

    $ qemu-img create -f qcow2 -o size=1G,backing_file=foo.qcow2 bar.qcow2
    Formatting 'bar.qcow2', fmt=qcow2 size=1073741824 backing_file='foo.qcow2' 
encryption=off cluster_size=65536 lazy_refcounts=off 
    $ qemu-img info bar.qcow2
    image: bar.qcow2
    file format: qcow2
    virtual size: 1.0G (1073741824 bytes)
    disk size: 196K
    cluster_size: 65536
    backing file: foo.qcow2
    $ qemu-system-x86_64 -nodefaults --enable-kvm -S -m 512 -vnc :0 -usb 
-monitor stdio -drive if=ide,file=bar.qcow2,id=foo
    QEMU 1.1.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
    (qemu) c
    'foo' (foo.qcow2) is encrypted
    (qemu) 

Regression :)

>> I understand we require HMP code to go via QMP for everything, to keep
>> HMP honest.  This case shows a drawback: duplicated code, leading to
>> inconsistencies.
>
> Keeping DeviceEncrypted would solve this.

Another way is to replace valid-encryption-key by the predicate that's
actually wanted: key-required.



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