On 05/01/2012 03:53 PM, Anthony Liguori wrote:
I think (correct me if I'm wrong) libvirt should be aware of any file
that qemu
asks it to open. So from a security point of view, libvirt can prevent
opening a
file if it isn't affiliated with the guest.
Right, libvirt can maintain a whitelist of files QEMU is allowed to open
(which is already has because it needs to label these files).
Indeed.
The only
complexity is that it's not a straight strcmp(). The path needs to be
(carefully) broken into components with '.' and '..' handled
appropriately. But this shouldn't be that difficult to do.
Libvirt would probably canonicalize path names, both when sticking them
in the whitelist, and in validating the requests from qemu - agreed that
it's not difficult.
More importantly, libvirt needs to start tracking the backing chain of
any qcow2 or qed file as part of the domain XML; and operations like
'block-stream' would update not only the chain, but also the whitelist.
In the drive-reopen case, this means that libvirt would have to be
careful when to change labeling