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Re: [Qemu-block] [PATCH v2 2/4] block/qcow2: refactor qcow2_co_preadv_pa
Re: [Qemu-block] [PATCH v2 2/4] block/qcow2: refactor qcow2_co_preadv_part
Wed, 14 Aug 2019 17:58:53 +0200
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On 14.08.19 17:15, Eric Blake wrote:
> On 8/14/19 4:11 AM, Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy wrote:
>> 14.08.2019 0:31, Max Reitz wrote:
>>> On 30.07.19 16:18, Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy wrote:
>>>> Further patch will run partial requests of iterations of
>>>> qcow2_co_preadv in parallel for performance reasons. To prepare for
>>>> this, separate part which may be parallelized into separate function
>>>> While being here, also separate encrypted clusters reading to own
>>>> function, like it is done for compressed reading.
>>>> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <address@hidden>
>>>> + * but we must not do decryption in guest buffers for security
>>>> + * reasons.
>>> "for security reasons" is a bit handwave-y, no?
>> Hmm, let's think of it a bit.
>> 1. We can't do any operations on write buffers, as guest may use them for
>> something else and not prepared for their change. [thx to Den, pointed to
>> this fact]
>> Hmm, here otherwise, guest should not expect something meaningful in buffers
>> until the
>> end of read operation, so theoretically we may decrypt directly in guest
>> buffer.. What is
>> bad with it?
> The badness is that the guest can theoretically reverse-engineer the
> encryption keys if they are savvy enough to grab the contents of the
> buffer before and after. The guest must NEVER be able to see the
> encrypted bits, which means decryption requires a bounce buffer.
Our encryption does not protect against a known-plaintext attack?
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