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Re: [Qemu-block] [PATCH v3 4/6] nbd/client: Support qemu-img convert fro
From: |
Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy |
Subject: |
Re: [Qemu-block] [PATCH v3 4/6] nbd/client: Support qemu-img convert from unaligned size |
Date: |
Fri, 29 Mar 2019 15:26:31 +0000 |
29.03.2019 7:27, Eric Blake wrote:
> If an NBD server advertises a size that is not a multiple of a sector,
> the block layer rounds up that size, even though we set info.size to
> the exact byte value sent by the server. The block layer then proceeds
> to let us read or query block status on the hole that it added past
> EOF, which the NBD server is unlikely to be happy with. Fortunately,
> qemu as a server never advertizes an unaligned size, so we generally
> don't run into this problem; but the nbdkit server makes it easy to
> test:
>
> $ printf %1000d 1 > f1
> $ ~/nbdkit/nbdkit -fv file f1 & pid=$!
> $ qemu-img convert -f raw nbd://localhost:10809 f2
> $ kill $pid
> $ qemu-img compare f1 f2
>
> Pre-patch, the server attempts a 1024-byte read, which nbdkit
> rightfully rejects as going beyond its advertised 1000 byte size; the
> conversion fails and the output files differ (not even the first
> sector is copied, because qemu-img does not follow ddrescue's habit of
> trying smaller reads to get as much information as possible in spite
> of errors). Post-patch, the client's attempts to read (and query block
> status, for new enough nbdkit) are properly truncated to the server's
> length, with sane handling of the hole the block layer forced on
> us. Although f2 ends up as a larger file (1024 bytes instead of 1000),
> qemu-img compare shows the two images to have identical contents for
> display to the guest.
>
> I didn't add iotests coverage since I didn't want to add a dependency
> on nbdkit in iotests. I also did NOT patch write, trim, or write
> zeroes - these commands continue to fail (usually with ENOSPC, but
> whatever the server chose), because we really can't write to the end
> of the file, and because 'qemu-img convert' is the most common case
> where we care about being tolerant (which is read-only). Perhaps we
> could truncate the request if the client is writing zeros to the tail,
> but that seems like more work, especially if the block layer is fixed
> in 4.1 to track byte-accurate sizing (in which case this patch would
> be reverted as unnecessary).
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <address@hidden>
> ---
> block/nbd-client.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/block/nbd-client.c b/block/nbd-client.c
> index 3edb508f668..409c2171bc3 100644
> --- a/block/nbd-client.c
> +++ b/block/nbd-client.c
> @@ -848,6 +848,25 @@ int nbd_client_co_preadv(BlockDriverState *bs, uint64_t
> offset,
> if (!bytes) {
> return 0;
> }
> + /*
> + * Work around the fact that the block layer doesn't do
> + * byte-accurate sizing yet - if the read exceeds the server's
> + * advertised size because the block layer rounded size up, then
> + * truncate the request to the server and tail-pad with zero.
> + */
> + if (offset >= client->info.size) {
> + assert(bytes < BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
> + qemu_iovec_memset(qiov, 0, 0, bytes);
> + return 0;
> + }
> + if (offset + bytes > client->info.size) {
> + uint64_t slop = offset + bytes - client->info.size;
> +
> + assert(slop < BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
> + qemu_iovec_memset(qiov, bytes - slop, 0, slop);
> + request.len -= slop;
> + }
> +
> ret = nbd_co_send_request(bs, &request, NULL);
> if (ret < 0) {
> return ret;
> @@ -966,7 +985,8 @@ int coroutine_fn
> nbd_client_co_block_status(BlockDriverState *bs,
> .from = offset,
> .len = MIN(MIN_NON_ZERO(QEMU_ALIGN_DOWN(INT_MAX,
> bs->bl.request_alignment),
> - client->info.max_block), bytes),
> + client->info.max_block),
> + MIN(bytes, client->info.size - offset)),
> .flags = NBD_CMD_FLAG_REQ_ONE,
> };
>
> @@ -977,6 +997,23 @@ int coroutine_fn
> nbd_client_co_block_status(BlockDriverState *bs,
> return BDRV_BLOCK_DATA | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID;
> }
>
> + /*
> + * Work around the fact that the block layer doesn't do
> + * byte-accurate sizing yet - if the status request exceeds the
> + * server's advertised size because the block layer rounded size
> + * up, we truncated the request to the server (above), or are
> + * called on just the hole.
> + */
> + if (offset >= client->info.size) {
> + *pnum = bytes;
> + assert(bytes < BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
> + /* Intentionally don't report offset_valid for the hole */
> + return BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO;
> + }
> +
> + if (client->info.min_block) {
> + assert(QEMU_IS_ALIGNED(request.len, client->info.min_block));
it will crash if info.size is unaligned..
" If a server advertises a minimum block size, the advertised export size
SHOULD be an integer multiple of that block size"
violation "SHOULD" by server, should it lead to client crash?
> + }
> ret = nbd_co_send_request(bs, &request, NULL);
> if (ret < 0) {
> return ret;
>
--
Best regards,
Vladimir