Bug#839278: oathtool: has no secure way to provide a key

[Ian Jackson]

Hi.  Thanks for the review.

David Woodhouse writes ("Re: Bug#839278: oathtool: has no secure way to provide 
a key"):
> If you're going to load keys from files, surely you want to use PSKC
> files?

That would be a possible further improvement, surely.

> And we need to be able to write back to them in the case of HOTP
> keys too, to increase the counter.

You seem to be saying that the pre-existing command line API is wrong
for HOTP - since it takes the key as an argument and has no way of
writing anything back.  (I don't know HOTP so I will take your word
for it...)

My change works for TOTP, at least.  Having the key in an encrypted
file, or a desktop keyring, or whatever, would be a good improvement,
but I don't think my patch stands in the way of that.

Indeed, right now, with my patch it is possible to put the TOTP key in
a PGP-encrypted file and pipe the key into oathtool.  Before my patch
this is not safe because one has to pass the key exposed on oathtool's
command line.

Thanks,
Ian.

-- 
Ian Jackson <ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk>   These opinions are my own.  

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