Re: LYNX-DEV securing Lynx for boxed-in environments.

[Foteos Macrides]

William Yang <address@hidden> wrote:
>The underlying assumption I'm making is that all code outside of Lynx
>and the kernel is potentially broken.  Because Lynx developers are so
>responsive to problems, I'm thinking that Lynx may be a sturdy
>cornerstone of a viable boxed-in environment.

        I'm not sure I follow all the jargon in this thread, but
it sounds as though you want to allow certain programs/scripts
in captive/no-shell accounts via Lynx.  The intent in such cases
it to build it with EXEC_LINKS defined, but set TRUSTED_EXEC to
"none", and leave ALWAYS_TRUSTED_EXEC set to "none", so that
lynxexec and lynxprog URLs are permitted only in jumps files,
which you control via the global lynx.cfg.  The jump shortcuts
can have the security-related switches for those programs/scripts
set, and only programs/scripts you consider safe, or have made
safe via forced inclusion of switches, can be invoked.  Read the
extensive comments about this in lynx.cfg.

                                Fote

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 Foteos Macrides            Worcester Foundation for Biomedical Research
 address@hidden         222 Maple Avenue, Shrewsbury, MA 01545
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