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Re: Sawmill's dataspaces and the Hurd's physmem

From: Neal H. Walfield
Subject: Re: Sawmill's dataspaces and the Hurd's physmem
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2005 10:42:09 +0100
User-agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) SEMI/1.14.6 (Maruoka) FLIM/1.14.6 (Marutamachi) APEL/10.6 Emacs/21.4 (i386-pc-linux-gnu) MULE/5.0 (SAKAKI)

> It appears to me that a file system server providing a file to a client
> always belongs to that client's trusted computing base. The FS server
> has to belong to the client's TCB, because it will provide the client
> with the content of a file. It may alter that content in any possible
> way before handing it to the client.
> Given that trust relationship, the revocation of pages may or may not be
> part of the protocol the client and the server agreed upon. If no pages
> shall be revoked, the client *knows* that the server will not revoke
> pages, because the client trusts the server.
> Therefore, the FS server can be the DM for the file, the client
> requested: No need to drop that approach.

Data integrity is an orthogonal issue from providing data
(i.e. transferring it) and holding data (e.g. mapping).  Data
integrity can be guaranteed using cryptographic means.  (Indeed,
confidentiality, another separate issue, can as well.)

Consider "Reducing TCB size by using untrusted components---small
kernels versus virtual-machine monitors" by Hohmuth et al: untrusted
L4Linux servers are securely used to fulfill operation dependencies.
In this model, I think having the trusted components depend on the
untrusted L4Linux servers to provide mappings of data may violate
these security requirements.


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