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bug#34632: [PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-KRB5.

From: Marius Bakke
Subject: bug#34632: [PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-KRB5.
Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 20:15:36 +0200
User-agent: Notmuch/0.28.3 ( Emacs/26.2 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)

Hi Maxim,

Maxim Cournoyer <address@hidden> writes:

> Hello,
> Leo Famulari <address@hidden> writes:
>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 11:43:26PM -0400, Maxim Cournoyer wrote:
>>> Unmaintained on what ground? The website doesn't list fresh news,
>>> but the latest release was made in 2014 [1], and the maintainer has made
>>> changes to the Debian package last time in 2017 [2]. I wouldn't say it's
>>> unmaintained until the maintainer says so or CVEs pile up unfixed (which
>>> there aren't).
>> Considering the rate of vulnerability discovery in MIT Kerberos [0] I
>> think that, if GSS was being examined to the same degree, we would learn
>> of many serious bugs. Any significant C codebase of this age will have
>> such bugs. But unfortunately GSS hasn't received as much scrutiny.
>> [0]
> Just FYI,
> I had ping'd the GSS mailing list with this message:
>, but
> there haven't been a reply (yet).
> So it looks like it was a wise decision to make the switch! Sorry for
> doubting, eh!

Thank you very much for checking with upstream :-)

I was on the fence about this switch myself, and submitted this patch
hoping for feedback along these lines.

It would be great to get Shishi and GSS into Googles OSS-Fuzz and
similar so that we can be more confident in the implementation.

For now I've pushed these patches in 996186b..828d376.

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