01/01: gnu: wpa_supplicant: Fix CVE-2018-14526.

[Leo Famulari]

lfam pushed a commit to branch master
in repository guix.

commit 4e23e8d80913fc2a69e97b29b5640e745b0d550b
Author: Leo Famulari <address@hidden>
Date:   Wed Aug 8 11:35:46 2018 -0400

    gnu: wpa_supplicant: Fix CVE-2018-14526.
    
    * gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch: New file.
    * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
    * gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal)[source]: Use it.
---
 gnu/local.mk                                       |  1 +
 gnu/packages/admin.scm                             |  1 +
 .../patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch    | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+)

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 7b2c7d1..98373aa 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -1213,6 +1213,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA =                                         
\
   %D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-3908-pt1.patch                 \
   %D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-3908-pt2.patch                 \
   %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2017-13082.patch     \
+  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch     \
   %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-fix-key-reuse.patch      \
   %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-fix-zeroed-keys.patch    \
   %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-fix-nonce-reuse.patch    \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
index 7377216..edc1349 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
@@ -1048,6 +1048,7 @@ commands and their arguments.")
                     version
                     ".tar.gz"))
               (patches (search-patches "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2017-13082.patch"
+                                       "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch"
                                        "wpa-supplicant-fix-key-reuse.patch"
                                        "wpa-supplicant-fix-zeroed-keys.patch"
                                        "wpa-supplicant-fix-nonce-reuse.patch"
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch 
b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d3d5cbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+Fix CVE-2018-14526:
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14526
+https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt
+
+Patch downloaded from upstream:
+
+https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
+
+From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <address@hidden>
+Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
+
+Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
+processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
+flag set, but not the MIC flag.
+
+When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
+not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
+the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
+negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
+unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
+could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
+in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
+(CVE-2018-14526)
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <address@hidden>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 
wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+--- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000 
+0300
++++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029 
+0300
+@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c
+ 
+       if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
+           (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
++              /*
++               * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
++               * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
++               * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
++               * which is the case in this code branch.
++               */
++              if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
++                      wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++                              "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but 
unauthenticated data");
++                      goto out;
++              }
+               if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
+                                                   &key_data_len))
+                       goto out;