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01/01: gnu: qemu: Update to 2.8.1 [security fixes].
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From: |
Leo Famulari |
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Subject: |
01/01: gnu: qemu: Update to 2.8.1 [security fixes]. |
|
Date: |
Fri, 7 Apr 2017 00:54:47 -0400 (EDT) |
lfam pushed a commit to branch master
in repository guix.
commit fbd6fb1a9d75bd7b5d1df24cb805b7df335b0223
Author: Leo Famulari <address@hidden>
Date: Fri Apr 7 00:16:18 2017 -0400
gnu: qemu: Update to 2.8.1 [security fixes].
Fixes CVE-2016-{9602,9603} and CVE-2017-{2615,2620,2630,5667,5931}.
* gnu/packages/qemu.scm (qemu): Update to 2.8.1.
* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.
---
gnu/local.mk | 5 -
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch | 52 ----------
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch | 134 --------------------------
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch | 47 ---------
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch | 46 ---------
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch | 55 -----------
gnu/packages/qemu.scm | 12 +--
7 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 347 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index f54ab2a..93bafa2 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -890,18 +890,13 @@ dist_patch_DATA =
\
%D%/packages/patches/python-pygpgme-fix-pinentry-tests.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/python2-subprocess32-disable-input-test.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-10155.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5525.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5526.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5552.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5578.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5579.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5856.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5898.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qt4-ldflags.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/quickswitch-fix-dmenu-check.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/rapicorn-isnan.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ede1f8c..0000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64
-this patch is from qemu-git.
-
-
-From 62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2017 09:35:01 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix oob access issue (CVE-2017-2615)
-
-When doing bitblt copy in backward mode, we should minus the
-blt width first just like the adding in the forward mode. This
-can avoid the oob access of the front of vga's vram.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-{ kraxel: with backward blits (negative pitch) addr is the topmost
- address, so check it as-is against vram size ]
-
-Cc: address@hidden
-Cc: P J P <address@hidden>
-Cc: Laszlo Ersek <address@hidden>
-Cc: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
-Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <address@hidden>
-Fixes: d3532a0db02296e687711b8cdc7791924efccea0 (CVE-2014-8106)
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
-Message-id: address@hidden
-Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <address@hidden>
----
- hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 7 +++----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-index 7db6409dc5..16f27e8ac5 100644
---- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-+++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-@@ -274,10 +274,9 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState
*s,
- {
- if (pitch < 0) {
- int64_t min = addr
-- + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
-- int32_t max = addr
-- + s->cirrus_blt_width;
-- if (min < 0 || max > s->vga.vram_size) {
-+ + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
-+ - s->cirrus_blt_width;
-+ if (min < -1 || addr >= s->vga.vram_size) {
- return true;
- }
- } else {
---
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d311182..0000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-2620:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-2620
-https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-02/msg04700.html
-
-Both patches copied from upstream source repository:
-
-Fixes CVE-2017-2620:
-http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=92f2b88cea48c6aeba8de568a45f2ed958f3c298
-
-The CVE-2017-2620 bug-fix depends on this earlier patch:
-http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=913a87885f589d263e682c2eb6637c6e14538061
-
-From 92f2b88cea48c6aeba8de568a45f2ed958f3c298 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
-Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 11:18:36 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: add blit_is_unsafe call to cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo
- (CVE-2017-2620)
-
-CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC blits do NOT check blit destination
-and blit width, at all. Oops. Fix it.
-
-Security impact: high.
-
-The missing blit destination check allows to write to host memory.
-Basically same as CVE-2014-8106 for the other blit variants.
-
-Cc: address@hidden
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
----
- hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-index 1deb52070a..b9e7cb1df1 100644
---- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-+++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-@@ -900,6 +900,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
- {
- int w;
-
-+ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- s->cirrus_blt_mode &= ~CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC;
- s->cirrus_srcptr = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
- s->cirrus_srcptr_end = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
-@@ -925,6 +929,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
- }
- s->cirrus_srccounter = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch * s->cirrus_blt_height;
- }
-+
-+ /* the blit_is_unsafe call above should catch this */
-+ assert(s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch <= CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE);
-+
- s->cirrus_srcptr = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
- s->cirrus_srcptr_end = s->cirrus_bltbuf + s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
- cirrus_update_memory_access(s);
---
-2.12.0
-
-From 913a87885f589d263e682c2eb6637c6e14538061 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Bruce Rogers <address@hidden>
-Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 13:35:20 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] display: cirrus: ignore source pitch value as needed in
- blit_is_unsafe
-
-Commit 4299b90 added a check which is too broad, given that the source
-pitch value is not required to be initialized for solid fill operations.
-This patch refines the blit_is_unsafe() check to ignore source pitch in
-that case. After applying the above commit as a security patch, we
-noticed the SLES 11 SP4 guest gui failed to initialize properly.
-
-Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <address@hidden>
-Message-id: address@hidden
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
----
- hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 11 +++++++----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-index bdb092ee9d..379910db2d 100644
---- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-+++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
- return false;
- }
-
--static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
-+static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
- {
- /* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
- assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
-@@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
- s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
- return true;
- }
-+ if (dst_only) {
-+ return false;
-+ }
- if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
- s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
- return true;
-@@ -673,7 +676,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState
* s,
-
- dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
-
-- if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
-+ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
- return 0;
-
- (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
-@@ -691,7 +694,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int
blt_rop)
- {
- cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
-
-- if (blit_is_unsafe(s)) {
-+ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
- return 0;
- }
- rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth -
1];
-@@ -795,7 +798,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int
src, int w, int h)
-
- static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
- {
-- if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
-+ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
- return 0;
-
- return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
---
-2.12.0
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b154d17..0000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-2630:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-2630
-https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-02/msg01246.html
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=2563c9c6b8670400c48e562034b321a7cf3d9a85
-
-From 2563c9c6b8670400c48e562034b321a7cf3d9a85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <address@hidden>
-Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 09:16:27 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH] nbd/client: fix drop_sync [CVE-2017-2630]
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Comparison symbol is misused. It may lead to memory corruption.
-Introduced in commit 7d3123e.
-
-Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <address@hidden>
-Message-Id: <address@hidden>
-[eblake: add CVE details, update conditional]
-Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <address@hidden>
-Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <address@hidden>
-Message-Id: <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
----
- nbd/client.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/nbd/client.c b/nbd/client.c
-index 5c9dee37fa..3dc2564cd0 100644
---- a/nbd/client.c
-+++ b/nbd/client.c
-@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static ssize_t drop_sync(QIOChannel *ioc, size_t size)
- char small[1024];
- char *buffer;
-
-- buffer = sizeof(small) < size ? small : g_malloc(MIN(65536, size));
-+ buffer = sizeof(small) >= size ? small : g_malloc(MIN(65536, size));
- while (size > 0) {
- ssize_t count = read_sync(ioc, buffer, MIN(65536, size));
-
---
-2.12.0
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5adea0d..0000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-5667 (sdhci OOB access during multi block SDMA transfer):
-
-http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/243
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5667
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9
-
-From 42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 18:29:59 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] sd: sdhci: check data length during dma_memory_read
-
-While doing multi block SDMA transfer in routine
-'sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks', the 's->fifo_buffer' starting
-index 'begin' and data length 's->data_count' could end up to be same.
-This could lead to an OOB access issue. Correct transfer data length
-to avoid it.
-
-Cc: address@hidden
-Reported-by: Jiang Xin <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <address@hidden>
-Message-id: address@hidden
-Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <address@hidden>
----
- hw/sd/sdhci.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
-index 01fbf228be..5bd5ab6319 100644
---- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
-+++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
-@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
- boundary_count -= block_size - begin;
- }
- dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, s->sdmasysad,
-- &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count);
-+ &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count - begin);
- s->sdmasysad += s->data_count - begin;
- if (s->data_count == block_size) {
- for (n = 0; n < block_size; n++) {
---
-2.11.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 08910e5..0000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-5931 (integer overflow in handling virtio-crypto requests):
-
-http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/337
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5931
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=a08aaff811fb194950f79711d2afe5a892ae03a4
-
-From a08aaff811fb194950f79711d2afe5a892ae03a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gonglei <address@hidden>
-Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 14:50:03 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] virtio-crypto: fix possible integer and heap overflow
-
-Because the 'size_t' type is 4 bytes in 32-bit platform, which
-is the same with 'int'. It's easy to make 'max_len' to zero when
-integer overflow and then cause heap overflow if 'max_len' is zero.
-
-Using uint_64 instead of size_t to avoid the integer overflow.
-
-Cc: address@hidden
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Gonglei <address@hidden>
-Tested-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
----
- hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
-index 2f2467e859..c23e1ad458 100644
---- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
-+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
-@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
- uint32_t hash_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_hash = 0;
- uint32_t cipher_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_cipher = 0;
-
-- size_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
-+ uint64_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
- size_t s;
-
- /* Plain cipher */
-@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
- return NULL;
- }
-
-- max_len = iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
-+ max_len = (uint64_t)iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len +
hash_result_len;
- if (unlikely(max_len > vcrypto->conf.max_size)) {
- virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-crypto too big length");
- return NULL;
---
-2.11.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/qemu.scm b/gnu/packages/qemu.scm
index aa12b2c..e0b4695 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/qemu.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/qemu.scm
@@ -69,27 +69,23 @@
(define-public qemu
(package
(name "qemu")
- (version "2.8.0")
+ (version "2.8.1")
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
(uri (string-append "http://wiki.qemu-project.org/download/qemu-";
- version ".tar.bz2"))
+ version ".tar.xz"))
(sha256
(base32
- "0qjy3rcrn89n42y5iz60kgr0rrl29hpnj8mq2yvbc1wrcizmvzfs"))
+ "0h342v4n44kh89yyfas4iazvhhsy5m5qk94vsjqpz5zpq1i2ykad"))
(patches (search-patches "qemu-CVE-2016-10155.patch"
- "qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch"
- "qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch"
- "qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5525.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5526.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5552.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5578.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5579.patch"
- "qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5856.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5898.patch"
- "qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch"))))
+ ))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(arguments
'(;; Running tests in parallel can occasionally lead to failures, like: