[taler-marketing] branch master updated: update

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grothoff pushed a commit to branch master
in repository marketing.

The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/master by this push:
     new c8597a9  update
c8597a9 is described below

commit c8597a95ea27a1f3dd1cfdc50a74f8114ac40f60
Author: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
AuthorDate: Wed Feb 22 22:35:24 2023 +0100

    update
---
 presentations/comprehensive/sic.tex | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)

diff --git a/presentations/comprehensive/sic.tex 
b/presentations/comprehensive/sic.tex
index 1208c8e..73d3aca 100644
--- a/presentations/comprehensive/sic.tex
+++ b/presentations/comprehensive/sic.tex
@@ -214,11 +214,11 @@
 
 \begin{frame}
   \begin{center}
-    \LARGE {\bf GNU}
-
-    \vfill
+    \LARGE {\bf GNU} \\
+    \vspace{0.3cm}
 %    \includegraphics[width=0.66\textwidth]{logo-2017-fr.pdf}
     \includegraphics[width=0.66\textwidth]{taler-logo-2021-inkscape.pdf}
+    \vfill
   \end{center}
 \begin{textblock*}{6cm}(.5cm,7.7cm) % {block width} (coords)
     {\Large {\bf \href{https://taler.net/}{taler.net}} \\
@@ -227,15 +227,16 @@
 \end{textblock*}
 
 % Substitute based on who is giving the talk!
- \begin{textblock*}{6cm}(6.7cm,7.7cm) % {block width} (coords)
-   {\hfill {\Large {\bf Florian Dold \&} \\
-    \hfill {\bf Christian Grothoff}} \\
-    \hfill \{dold,grothoff\}@taler.net }
+ \begin{textblock*}{8cm}(4.7cm,6.7cm) % {block width} (coords)
+   {\hfill {{\bf Dr. Emmanuel Benoist} \\
+    \hfill {\bf Dr. Florian Dold} \\
+    \hfill {\bf Dr. Andreas Habegger} \\
+    \hfill {\bf Dr. Christian Grothoff} \\ }
+    \hfill \{benoist,dold,habegger,grothoff\}@taler.net }
 \end{textblock*}
 
 \end{frame}
 
-
 \begin{frame}{GNU Taler}
   \vfill
   \begin{center}
@@ -831,8 +832,8 @@ But of course we use modern instantiations.
   \begin{center}
   \begin{tikzpicture}
    \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1em and 1em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
-    \node (origin) at (0,0) {\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{shop.pdf}};
-    \node (cart) [draw=none, below=of 
m]{\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{cart.pdf}};
+    \node (origin) at (0,0) {\includegraphics[width=0.18\textwidth]{shop.pdf}};
+    \node (cart) [draw=none, below=of 
m]{\includegraphics[width=0.18\textwidth]{cart.pdf}};
     \node (merchant) [node distance=4em and 0.5em, draw, below =of 
cart]{Merchant};
     \tikzstyle{C} = [color=black, line width=1pt];
     \draw [<-, C] (cart) -- (origin) node [midway, above, sloped] (TextNode) 
{};
@@ -1020,7 +1021,7 @@ But of course we use modern instantiations.
    \end{minipage}
   \begin{minipage}{4cm}
   \begin{tikzpicture}
-   \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1.5em and 0.5em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
+   \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1.5em and 0.45em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
     \node (blinded) [def, 
draw=none]{\includegraphics[width=0.15\textwidth]{blinded.pdf}};
     \node (planchet) [def, draw=none, above left= of blinded]  
{\includegraphics[width=0.15\textwidth]{planchet.pdf}};
     \node (cnew) [def, draw=none, above= of planchet]  {$c_{new}$};
@@ -1061,7 +1062,7 @@ But of course we use modern instantiations.
    \end{minipage}
   \begin{minipage}{4cm}
   \begin{tikzpicture}
-   \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1.5em and 0.5em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
+   \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1.4em and 0.45em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
     \node (t) [def, draw=none] at (0,0) {$t$};
     \node (dice) [def, draw=none, above = of 
t]{\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{dice.pdf}};
     \node (dh) [def, draw=none, below left=of 
b]{\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{ct.pdf}};
@@ -1089,7 +1090,7 @@ But of course we use modern instantiations.
 \begin{frame}{Cut-and-Choose}
   \begin{minipage}{4cm}
   \begin{tikzpicture}
-   \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1.5em and 0.5em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
+   \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1.4em and 0.45em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
     \node (t) [def, draw=none] at (0,0) {$t_1$};
     \node (dice) [def, draw=none, above = of 
t]{\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{dice.pdf}};
     \node (dh) [def, draw=none, below left=of 
b]{\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{ct.pdf}};
@@ -1113,7 +1114,7 @@ But of course we use modern instantiations.
   \end{minipage}
   \begin{minipage}{4cm}
   \begin{tikzpicture}
-   \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1.5em and 0.5em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
+   \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1.4em and 0.45em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
     \node (t) [def, draw=none] at (0,0) {$t_2$};
     \node (dice) [def, draw=none, above = of 
t]{\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{dice.pdf}};
     \node (dh) [def, draw=none, below left=of 
b]{\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{ct.pdf}};
@@ -1137,7 +1138,7 @@ But of course we use modern instantiations.
   \end{minipage}
   \begin{minipage}{4cm}
   \begin{tikzpicture}
-   \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1.5em and 0.5em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
+   \tikzstyle{def} = [node distance= 1.4em and 0.45em, inner sep=0em, outer 
sep=.3em];
     \node (t) [def, draw=none] at (0,0) {$t_3$};
     \node (dice) [def, draw=none, above = of 
t]{\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{dice.pdf}};
     \node (dh) [def, draw=none, below left=of 
b]{\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{ct.pdf}};
@@ -2118,6 +2119,22 @@ Searching for functions \uncover<2->{with the following 
signatures}
 \end{frame}
 
 
+\begin{frame}{Warranting deposit safety}
+  Exchange has online signing key $W = wG$:
+  \begin{center}
+    Sends $EdDSA_w(M,H(D),FDH(C))$ to the merchant.
+  \end{center}
+  This signature means that $M$ was the {\em first} to deposit
+  $C$ and that the exchange thus must pay $M$.
+  \vfill
+  \begin{center}
+     Without this, an evil exchange could renege on the deposit
+     confirmation and claim double-spending if a coin were
+     deposited twice, and then not pay either merchant!
+  \end{center}
+\end{frame}
+
+
 \begin{frame}{Key management}
 Taler has many types of keys:
 \begin{itemize}
@@ -2135,24 +2152,6 @@ Taler has many types of keys:
 \end{frame}
 
 
-\begin{frame}{Protecting online keys}
-The exchange needs RSA and EdDSA keys to be available for online signing.
-\begin{itemize}
-\item {\tt taler-exchange-secmod-rsa} and {\tt taler-exchange-secmod-eddsa}
-      are the only processes that must have access to the private keys.
-\item The secmod processes should run under a different UID, but share
-      the same GID with the exchange.
-\item The secmods generate the keys, allow {\tt taler-exchange-httpd} to sign 
with
-      them, and eventually delete the private keys.
-\item Communication between secmods and {\tt taler-exchange-httpd} is via
-      a UNIX domain socket.
-\item Online private keys are stored on disk (not in database!) and should
-      NOT be backed up (RAID should suffice). If disk is lost, we can always
-      create fresh replacement keys!
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-
 \begin{frame}{Offline keys}
 Both exchange and auditor use offline keys.
 \begin{itemize}
@@ -2170,13 +2169,31 @@ Both exchange and auditor use offline keys.
 \end{frame}
 
 
+\begin{frame}{Protecting online keys}
+The exchange needs keys to be available for online signing.
+\begin{itemize}
+\item {\tt taler-exchange-secmod-\{cs,eddsa,rsa\}}
+      are the only processes that must have access to the private keys.
+\item The secmod processes should run under a different UID, but share
+      the same GID with the exchange.
+\item The secmods generate the keys, allow {\tt taler-exchange-httpd} to sign 
with
+      them, and eventually delete the private keys.
+\item Communication between secmods and {\tt taler-exchange-httpd} is via
+      a UNIX domain socket.
+\item Online private keys are stored on disk (not in database!) and should
+      NOT be backed up (RAID should suffice). If disk is lost, we can always
+      create fresh replacement keys!
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+
 \begin{frame}{Online keys}
-The exchange needs RSA and EdDSA keys to be available for online signing.
+The exchange needs keys to be available for online signing:
 \begin{itemize}
 \item Knowledge of these private keys will allow an adversary to
-      mint digital cash, possibly resulting in huge financial losses
-      (eventually, this will be detected by the auditor, but only
-       after some financial losses have been irrevocably incurred).
+      mint digital cash, possibly resulting in financial losses
+%      (eventually, this will be detected by the auditor, but only
+%       after some financial losses have been irrevocably incurred).
 \item The corresponding public keys are certified using
       Taler's public key infrastructure (which uses offline-only keys).
 \end{itemize}
@@ -2190,31 +2207,12 @@ online signing keys, if we find they have been 
compromised.
 \end{frame}
 
 
-\begin{frame}{Warranting deposit safety}
-  Exchange has {\em another} online signing key $W = wG$:
-  \begin{center}
-    Sends $EdDSA_w(M,H(D),FDH(C))$ to the merchant.
-  \end{center}
-  This signature means that $M$ was the {\em first} to deposit
-  $C$ and that the exchange thus must pay $M$.
-  \vfill
-  \begin{center}
-     Without this, an evil exchange could renege on the deposit
-     confirmation and claim double-spending if a coin were
-     deposited twice, and then not pay either merchant!
-  \end{center}
-\end{frame}
-
-
 \begin{frame}{Online keys}
 \begin{itemize}
 \item The exchange needs $d$ and $w$ to be available for online signing.
 \item The corresponding public keys $W$ and $(e,n)$ are certified using
       Taler's public key infrastructure (which uses offline-only keys).
 \end{itemize}
-\begin{center}
-\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{taler-diagram-signatures.png}
-\end{center}
 \vfill
 \begin{center}
 {\bf What happens if those private keys are compromised?}
@@ -2285,9 +2283,9 @@ The exchange needs the database to detect double spending.
       significant financial losses.
 \item The database contains total amounts customers withdrew and
       merchants received, so sensitive private banking data. It
-      must also not become public.
+      must thus not become public.
 \item The auditor must have a (current) copy. Asynchronous replication
-      is considered sufficient.  This copy could also be used as an
+      should be sufficient.  This copy can also serve as an
       additional (off-site?) backup.
 \end{itemize}
 \end{frame}
@@ -2491,12 +2489,17 @@ The exchange needs the database to detect double 
spending.
     \item[$\Rightarrow$] Permanent offline features weaken a digital payment 
solution (privacy, security)
     \item[$\Rightarrow$] Introduces unwarranted competition for physical cash 
(endangers emergency-preparedness).
 \end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Offline Payments with GNU Taler}
 We have filed for a patent to address situations where only the merchant is 
offline:
 \begin{enumerate}
   \item Customer pays by scanning static QR code and entering amount on mobile 
phone.
   \item Merchant confirms payment by checking simple unique numeric 
confirmation code.
 \end{enumerate}
-Merchant needs only $\approx$ \EUR{10} COSTS hardware.
+\begin{center}
+{\bf Point-of-sale needs only $\approx$ \EUR{10} COSTS hardware.}
+\end{center}
 \end{frame}
 
 
@@ -2906,9 +2909,9 @@ Merchant needs only $\approx$ \EUR{10} COSTS hardware.
             \draw[confl,thick,dotted](I) -- (Ip);
         \end{tikzpicture}
     \end{center}
-    If we experience a reorganization once, its dangerously likely for another
-    one of a similar scope to happen again. Depolymerizer learns from 
reorganizations
-    by increasing its confirmation delay.
+    If we experience a reorganization once, its likely for another
+    reorganization of a similar scope to happen again.
+    Depolymerizer learns from reorganizations by increasing its confirmation 
delay.
 \end{frame}
 
 
@@ -2980,7 +2983,7 @@ Merchant needs only $\approx$ \EUR{10} COSTS hardware.
     \begin{itemize}
         \item [$-$] Trust exchange operator or auditors
         \item [$+$] Fast and cheap
-        \item [$+$] Realtime, ms latency
+        \item [$+$] Realtime: transactions with milliseconds of latency
         \item [$+$] Linear scalability
         \item [$+$] Ecological
         \item [$+$] Privacy when it can, transparency when it must (avoid tax 
evasion and money laundering)
@@ -3037,8 +3040,8 @@ Future work:
   \begin{center} \small
     \begin{tabular}{l||c|c|c|c|c}
                 & Cash & Bitcoin & Zerocoin & Creditcard & GNU Taler \\ \hline 
\hline
-   Online      &$-$$-$$-$  &   ++    &    ++    &     +      &   +++  \\ \hline
-    Offline     & +++  &   $-$$-$    &    $-$$-$    &     +      &   $-$$-$  
\\ \hline
+    Online      &$-$$-$$-$  &   ++    &    ++    &     +      &   +++  \\ 
\hline
+    Offline     & +++  &   $-$$-$    &    $-$$-$    &     +      &   ++  \\ 
\hline
     Trans. cost & +    & $-$$-$$-$   & $-$$-$$-$  &     $-$      &   ++  \\ 
\hline
     Speed       & +    & $-$$-$$-$   & $-$$-$$-$  &     o      &   ++  \\ 
\hline
     Taxation    & $-$    &   $-$$-$    &  $-$$-$$-$   &    +++     &  +++  \\ 
\hline
@@ -3085,6 +3088,7 @@ References:
 \end{center}
 \end{frame}
 
+\section*{Appendix: Business aspects}
 
 \begin{frame}{Development Infrastructure}
   \begin{itemize}
@@ -3135,6 +3139,20 @@ References:
 \end{frame}
 
 
+\begin{frame}{Rights}
+  \begin{itemize}
+    \item GNUnet e.V. shared copyrights of their AGPLv3+ licensed code with 
Taler Systems SA
+    \item Taler Systems SA holds copyrights to entire GNU Taler code base 
(AGPLv3+, GPLv3+,
+      dual-licensing exclusive domain of Taler Systems SA)
+    \item Taler Systems SA applied for patent on offline payment approach
+    \item Taler Systems SA holds trademark on ``Taler''.
+    \item FSF holds trademark on ``GNU'', we are authorized to use ``GNU 
Taler''.
+    \item Taler Systems SA owns {\tt taler.net} and {\tt taler-systems.com}.
+  \end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+
+
 \end{document}
 
 

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