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[libmicrohttpd] 09/11: digestauth: removed now unused do-while scope
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gnunet |
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Subject: |
[libmicrohttpd] 09/11: digestauth: removed now unused do-while scope |
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Date: |
Wed, 22 Jun 2022 20:00:15 +0200 |
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
karlson2k pushed a commit to branch master
in repository libmicrohttpd.
commit 348945c3067840f40399f9df1052f643d268ecec
Author: Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k) <k2k@narod.ru>
AuthorDate: Fri Jun 17 20:33:07 2022 +0300
digestauth: removed now unused do-while scope
---
src/microhttpd/digestauth.c | 570 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 283 insertions(+), 287 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/microhttpd/digestauth.c b/src/microhttpd/digestauth.c
index ca66bff0..e6f68222 100644
--- a/src/microhttpd/digestauth.c
+++ b/src/microhttpd/digestauth.c
@@ -1522,324 +1522,320 @@ digest_auth_check_all_inner (struct MHD_Connection
*connection,
tmp2_size = 0;
- do /* Only to avoid "goto" */
- {
-
- params = get_rq_dauth_params (connection);
- if (NULL == params)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
-
- /* Check 'username' */
- if (NULL == params->username.value.str)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
-
- username_len = strlen (username);
- if (! is_param_equal (¶ms->username, username, username_len))
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_USERNAME;
- /* 'username' valid */
-
- /* Check 'realm' */
- if (NULL == params->realm.value.str)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
- realm_len = strlen (realm);
- if (! is_param_equal (¶ms->realm, realm, realm_len))
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_REALM;
- /* 'realm' valid */
-
- /* Check 'nonce' */
- if (NULL == params->nonce.value.str)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
- else if (0 == params->nonce.value.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
- else if (NONCE_STD_LEN (digest_size) * 2 < params->nonce.value.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
+ params = get_rq_dauth_params (connection);
+ if (NULL == params)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
- unq_res = get_unquoted_param (¶ms->nonce, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
- &unquoted);
- if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
- return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
- if (NONCE_STD_LEN (digest_size) != unquoted.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
+ /* Check 'username' */
+ if (NULL == params->username.value.str)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
+
+ username_len = strlen (username);
+ if (! is_param_equal (¶ms->username, username, username_len))
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_USERNAME;
+ /* 'username' valid */
+
+ /* Check 'realm' */
+ if (NULL == params->realm.value.str)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
+ realm_len = strlen (realm);
+ if (! is_param_equal (¶ms->realm, realm, realm_len))
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_REALM;
+ /* 'realm' valid */
+
+ /* Check 'nonce' */
+ if (NULL == params->nonce.value.str)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
+ else if (0 == params->nonce.value.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
+ else if (NONCE_STD_LEN (digest_size) * 2 < params->nonce.value.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
+
+ unq_res = get_unquoted_param (¶ms->nonce, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
+ &unquoted);
+ if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
+ if (NONCE_STD_LEN (digest_size) != unquoted.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
+
+ if (! get_nonce_timestamp (unquoted.str, unquoted.len, &nonce_time))
+ {
+#ifdef HAVE_MESSAGES
+ MHD_DLOG (daemon,
+ _ ("Authentication failed, invalid timestamp format.\n"));
+#endif
+ return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
+ }
+ t = MHD_monotonic_msec_counter ();
+ /*
+ * First level vetting for the nonce validity: if the timestamp
+ * attached to the nonce exceeds `nonce_timeout', then the nonce is
+ * invalid.
+ */
+ if (TRIM_TO_TIMESTAMP (t - nonce_time) > (nonce_timeout * 1000))
+ return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_STALE; /* too old */
- if (! get_nonce_timestamp (unquoted.str, unquoted.len, &nonce_time))
- {
+ calculate_nonce (nonce_time,
+ connection->method,
+ daemon->digest_auth_random,
+ daemon->digest_auth_rand_size,
+ connection->url,
+ realm,
+ realm_len,
+ da,
+ noncehashexp);
+ /*
+ * Second level vetting for the nonce validity
+ * if the timestamp attached to the nonce is valid
+ * and possibly fabricated (in case of an attack)
+ * the attacker must also know the random seed to be
+ * able to generate a "sane" nonce, which if he does
+ * not, the nonce fabrication process going to be
+ * very hard to achieve.
+ */
+ if ((0 != strncmp (noncehashexp, unquoted.str, unquoted.len)) ||
+ (0 != noncehashexp[unquoted.len]))
+ return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
+ /* 'nonce' valid */
+
+ /* Get 'cnonce' */
+ if (NULL == params->cnonce.value.str)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
+ else if (0 == params->cnonce.value.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
+ unq_res = get_unquoted_param (¶ms->cnonce, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
+ &unquoted);
+ if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
+ return (_MHD_UNQ_TOO_LARGE == unq_res) ?
+ MHD_DAUTH_TOO_LARGE : MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
+
+ if (sizeof(cnonce) <= unquoted.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR; /* TODO: handle large client nonces */
+
+ /* TODO: avoid memcpy() */
+ memcpy (cnonce, unquoted.str, unquoted.len);
+ cnonce[unquoted.len] = 0;
+ /* Got 'cnonce' */
+
+ /* Get 'qop' */
+ if (NULL == params->qop.value.str)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
+ else if (0 == params->qop.value.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_QOP;
+ else if (MHD_STATICSTR_LEN_ ("auth-int") * 2 < params->qop.value.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_QOP;
+ unq_res = get_unquoted_param (¶ms->qop, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
+ &unquoted);
+ if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
+
+ if (sizeof(qop) <= unquoted.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR; /* TODO: handle large client qop */
+ /* TODO: avoid memcpy() */
+ memcpy (qop, unquoted.str, unquoted.len);
+ qop[unquoted.len] = 0;
+ /* TODO: Really support empty value, support "auth-int" */
+ if ( ((MHD_STATICSTR_LEN_ ("auth") != unquoted.len) ||
+ (! MHD_str_equal_caseless_bin_n_ (qop, "auth", unquoted.len))) &&
+ (0 != strcmp (qop,"")) )
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_QOP;
+ /* Got 'qop' */
+
+ /* Get 'nc' */
+ if (NULL == params->nc.value.str)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
+ else if (0 == params->nc.value.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
+ else if (4 * 8 < params->nc.value.len) /* Four time more than needed */
+ return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
+ unq_res = get_unquoted_param (¶ms->nc, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
+ &unquoted);
+ if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
+
+ if (sizeof(nc) <= unquoted.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
+ /* TODO: avoid memcpy() */
+ memcpy (nc, unquoted.str, unquoted.len);
+ nc[unquoted.len] = 0;
+ if (unquoted.len != MHD_strx_to_uint64_n_ (nc,
+ unquoted.len,
+ &nci))
+ {
#ifdef HAVE_MESSAGES
- MHD_DLOG (daemon,
- _ ("Authentication failed, invalid timestamp format.\n"));
+ MHD_DLOG (daemon,
+ _ ("Authentication failed, invalid nc format.\n"));
#endif
- return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
- }
- t = MHD_monotonic_msec_counter ();
- /*
- * First level vetting for the nonce validity: if the timestamp
- * attached to the nonce exceeds `nonce_timeout', then the nonce is
- * invalid.
- */
- if (TRIM_TO_TIMESTAMP (t - nonce_time) > (nonce_timeout * 1000))
- return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_STALE; /* too old */
-
- calculate_nonce (nonce_time,
- connection->method,
- daemon->digest_auth_random,
- daemon->digest_auth_rand_size,
- connection->url,
- realm,
- realm_len,
- da,
- noncehashexp);
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER; /* invalid nonce format */
+ }
+ if (0 == nci)
+ {
+#ifdef HAVE_MESSAGES
+ MHD_DLOG (daemon,
+ _ ("Authentication failed, invalid 'nc' value.\n"));
+#endif
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER; /* invalid nc value */
+ }
+ /* Got 'nc' */
+
+ /* Get 'response' */
+ if (NULL == params->response.value.str)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
+ else if (0 == params->response.value.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_RESPONSE_WRONG;
+ else if (digest_size * 4 < params->response.value.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_RESPONSE_WRONG;
+ unq_res = get_unquoted_param (¶ms->response, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
+ &unquoted);
+ if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
+ if (digest_size * 2 != unquoted.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_RESPONSE_WRONG;
+
+ mhd_assert (sizeof(response) > unquoted.len);
+
+ if (sizeof(response) <= unquoted.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
+ /* TODO: avoid memcpy() */
+ memcpy (response, unquoted.str, unquoted.len);
+ response[unquoted.len] = 0;
+ /* Got 'response' */
+
+ if (1)
+ {
+ enum MHD_CheckNonceNC_ nonce_nc_check;
/*
- * Second level vetting for the nonce validity
- * if the timestamp attached to the nonce is valid
- * and possibly fabricated (in case of an attack)
- * the attacker must also know the random seed to be
- * able to generate a "sane" nonce, which if he does
- * not, the nonce fabrication process going to be
- * very hard to achieve.
+ * Checking if that combination of nonce and nc is sound
+ * and not a replay attack attempt. Refuse if nonce was not
+ * generated previously.
*/
- if ((0 != strncmp (noncehashexp, unquoted.str, unquoted.len)) ||
- (0 != noncehashexp[unquoted.len]))
- return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
- /* 'nonce' valid */
-
- /* Get 'cnonce' */
- if (NULL == params->cnonce.value.str)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
- else if (0 == params->cnonce.value.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
- unq_res = get_unquoted_param (¶ms->cnonce, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
- &unquoted);
- if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
- return (_MHD_UNQ_TOO_LARGE == unq_res) ?
- MHD_DAUTH_TOO_LARGE : MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
-
- if (sizeof(cnonce) <= unquoted.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR; /* TODO: handle large client nonces */
-
- /* TODO: avoid memcpy() */
- memcpy (cnonce, unquoted.str, unquoted.len);
- cnonce[unquoted.len] = 0;
- /* Got 'cnonce' */
-
- /* Get 'qop' */
- if (NULL == params->qop.value.str)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
- else if (0 == params->qop.value.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_QOP;
- else if (MHD_STATICSTR_LEN_ ("auth-int") * 2 < params->qop.value.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_QOP;
- unq_res = get_unquoted_param (¶ms->qop, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
- &unquoted);
- if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
- return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
-
- if (sizeof(qop) <= unquoted.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR; /* TODO: handle large client qop */
- /* TODO: avoid memcpy() */
- memcpy (qop, unquoted.str, unquoted.len);
- qop[unquoted.len] = 0;
- /* TODO: Really support empty value, support "auth-int" */
- if ( ((MHD_STATICSTR_LEN_ ("auth") != unquoted.len) ||
- (! MHD_str_equal_caseless_bin_n_ (qop, "auth", unquoted.len))) &&
- (0 != strcmp (qop,"")) )
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_QOP;
- /* Got 'qop' */
-
- /* Get 'nc' */
- if (NULL == params->nc.value.str)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
- else if (0 == params->nc.value.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
- else if (4 * 8 < params->nc.value.len) /* Four time more than needed */
- return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
- unq_res = get_unquoted_param (¶ms->nc, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
- &unquoted);
- if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
- return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
-
- if (sizeof(nc) <= unquoted.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
- /* TODO: avoid memcpy() */
- memcpy (nc, unquoted.str, unquoted.len);
- nc[unquoted.len] = 0;
- if (unquoted.len != MHD_strx_to_uint64_n_ (nc,
- unquoted.len,
- &nci))
+ nonce_nc_check = check_nonce_nc (connection,
+ noncehashexp,
+ NONCE_STD_LEN (digest_size),
+ nonce_time,
+ nci);
+ if (MHD_CHECK_NONCENC_STALE == nonce_nc_check)
{
#ifdef HAVE_MESSAGES
MHD_DLOG (daemon,
- _ ("Authentication failed, invalid nc format.\n"));
+ _ ("Stale nonce received. If this happens a lot, you should "
+ "probably increase the size of the nonce array.\n"));
#endif
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER; /* invalid nonce format */
+ return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_STALE;
}
- if (0 == nci)
+ else if (MHD_CHECK_NONCENC_WRONG == nonce_nc_check)
{
#ifdef HAVE_MESSAGES
MHD_DLOG (daemon,
- _ ("Authentication failed, invalid 'nc' value.\n"));
+ _ ("Received nonce that technically valid, but was not "
+ "generated by MHD. This may indicate an attack
attempt.\n"));
#endif
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER; /* invalid nc value */
+ return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
}
- /* Got 'nc' */
-
- /* Get 'response' */
- if (NULL == params->response.value.str)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
- else if (0 == params->response.value.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_RESPONSE_WRONG;
- else if (digest_size * 4 < params->response.value.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_RESPONSE_WRONG;
- unq_res = get_unquoted_param (¶ms->response, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
- &unquoted);
- if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
- return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
- if (digest_size * 2 != unquoted.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_RESPONSE_WRONG;
-
- mhd_assert (sizeof(response) > unquoted.len);
-
- if (sizeof(response) <= unquoted.len)
- return MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
- /* TODO: avoid memcpy() */
- memcpy (response, unquoted.str, unquoted.len);
- response[unquoted.len] = 0;
- /* Got 'response' */
+ mhd_assert (MHD_CHECK_NONCENC_OK == nonce_nc_check);
+ }
- if (1)
+ /* Get 'uri' */
+ if (NULL == params->uri.value.str)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
+ else if (0 == params->uri.value.len)
+ return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_URI;
+ unq_res = get_unquoted_param_copy (¶ms->uri, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
+ &unq_copy);
+ if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
+ return (_MHD_UNQ_TOO_LARGE == unq_res) ?
+ MHD_DAUTH_TOO_LARGE : MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
+
+ if (NULL != digest)
+ {
+ /* This will initialize da->digest_hex (ha1) */
+ digest_calc_ha1_from_digest (digest_get_algo_name (da),
+ da,
+ digest,
+ noncehashexp,
+ cnonce);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* This will initialize da->digest_hex (ha1) */
+ mhd_assert (NULL != password); /* NULL == digest => password != NULL */
+ digest_calc_ha1_from_user (digest_get_algo_name (da),
+ username,
+ username_len,
+ realm,
+ realm_len,
+ password,
+ noncehashexp,
+ cnonce,
+ da);
+ }
+ memcpy (ha1,
+ digest_get_hex_buffer (da),
+ digest_size * 2 + 1);
+ /* This will initialize da->sessionkey (respexp) */
+ digest_calc_response (ha1,
+ noncehashexp,
+ nc,
+ cnonce,
+ qop,
+ connection->method,
+ unq_copy.str,
+ unq_copy.len,
+ hentity,
+ da);
+ if (1)
+ {
+ char *uri;
+ size_t uri_len;
+ uri = unq_copy.str;
+ uri_len = unq_copy.len;
+
+ uri[uri_len] = 0;
+ qmark = memchr (uri,
+ '?',
+ uri_len);
+ if (NULL != qmark)
+ *qmark = '\0';
+
+ /* Need to unescape URI before comparing with connection->url */
+ uri_len = daemon->unescape_callback (daemon->unescape_callback_cls,
+ connection,
+ uri);
+ if ((uri_len != connection->url_len) ||
+ (0 != memcmp (uri, connection->url, uri_len)))
{
- enum MHD_CheckNonceNC_ nonce_nc_check;
- /*
- * Checking if that combination of nonce and nc is sound
- * and not a replay attack attempt. Refuse if nonce was not
- * generated previously.
- */
- nonce_nc_check = check_nonce_nc (connection,
- noncehashexp,
- NONCE_STD_LEN (digest_size),
- nonce_time,
- nci);
- if (MHD_CHECK_NONCENC_STALE == nonce_nc_check)
- {
#ifdef HAVE_MESSAGES
- MHD_DLOG (daemon,
- _ ("Stale nonce received. If this happens a lot, you should "
- "probably increase the size of the nonce array.\n"));
-#endif
- return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_STALE;
- }
- else if (MHD_CHECK_NONCENC_WRONG == nonce_nc_check)
- {
-#ifdef HAVE_MESSAGES
- MHD_DLOG (daemon,
- _ ("Received nonce that technically valid, but was not "
- "generated by MHD. This may indicate an attack
attempt.\n"));
+ MHD_DLOG (daemon,
+ _ ("Authentication failed, URI does not match.\n"));
#endif
- return MHD_DAUTH_NONCE_WRONG;
- }
- mhd_assert (MHD_CHECK_NONCENC_OK == nonce_nc_check);
- }
-
- /* Get 'uri' */
- if (NULL == params->uri.value.str)
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_HEADER;
- else if (0 == params->uri.value.len)
return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_URI;
- unq_res = get_unquoted_param_copy (¶ms->uri, tmp1, ptmp2, &tmp2_size,
- &unq_copy);
- if (_MHD_UNQ_OK != unq_res)
- return (_MHD_UNQ_TOO_LARGE == unq_res) ?
- MHD_DAUTH_TOO_LARGE : MHD_DAUTH_ERROR;
-
- if (NULL != digest)
- {
- /* This will initialize da->digest_hex (ha1) */
- digest_calc_ha1_from_digest (digest_get_algo_name (da),
- da,
- digest,
- noncehashexp,
- cnonce);
- }
- else
- {
- /* This will initialize da->digest_hex (ha1) */
- mhd_assert (NULL != password); /* NULL == digest => password != NULL */
- digest_calc_ha1_from_user (digest_get_algo_name (da),
- username,
- username_len,
- realm,
- realm_len,
- password,
- noncehashexp,
- cnonce,
- da);
}
- memcpy (ha1,
- digest_get_hex_buffer (da),
- digest_size * 2 + 1);
- /* This will initialize da->sessionkey (respexp) */
- digest_calc_response (ha1,
- noncehashexp,
- nc,
- cnonce,
- qop,
- connection->method,
- unq_copy.str,
- unq_copy.len,
- hentity,
- da);
+
if (1)
{
- char *uri;
- size_t uri_len;
- uri = unq_copy.str;
- uri_len = unq_copy.len;
-
- uri[uri_len] = 0;
- qmark = memchr (uri,
- '?',
- uri_len);
- if (NULL != qmark)
- *qmark = '\0';
-
- /* Need to unescape URI before comparing with connection->url */
- uri_len = daemon->unescape_callback (daemon->unescape_callback_cls,
- connection,
- uri);
- if ((uri_len != connection->url_len) ||
- (0 != memcmp (uri, connection->url, uri_len)))
+ const char *args = qmark;
+
+ if (NULL == args)
+ args = "";
+ else
+ args++;
+ if (MHD_NO ==
+ check_argument_match (connection,
+ args) )
{
#ifdef HAVE_MESSAGES
MHD_DLOG (daemon,
- _ ("Authentication failed, URI does not match.\n"));
+ _ ("Authentication failed, arguments do not match.\n"));
#endif
return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_URI;
}
-
- if (1)
- {
- const char *args = qmark;
-
- if (NULL == args)
- args = "";
- else
- args++;
- if (MHD_NO ==
- check_argument_match (connection,
- args) )
- {
-#ifdef HAVE_MESSAGES
- MHD_DLOG (daemon,
- _ ("Authentication failed, arguments do not match.\n"));
-#endif
- return MHD_DAUTH_WRONG_URI;
- }
- }
-
- ret = (0 == strcmp (response,
- digest_get_hex_buffer (da)))
- ? MHD_DAUTH_OK
- : MHD_DAUTH_RESPONSE_WRONG;
}
- } while (0);
+
+ ret = (0 == strcmp (response,
+ digest_get_hex_buffer (da)))
+ ? MHD_DAUTH_OK
+ : MHD_DAUTH_RESPONSE_WRONG;
+ }
return ret;
}
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- [libmicrohttpd] branch master updated (1c181be2 -> 8b01c152), gnunet, 2022/06/22
- [libmicrohttpd] 04/11: test_digestauth{._with_arguments}: do test really with arguments, gnunet, 2022/06/22
- [libmicrohttpd] 03/11: configure: removed unused variable, gnunet, 2022/06/22
- [libmicrohttpd] 07/11: Added tracking of the request URL length., gnunet, 2022/06/22
- [libmicrohttpd] 10/11: digestauth.h: added some doxy, gnunet, 2022/06/22
- [libmicrohttpd] 01/11: configure: removed unneeded special flags for Darwin, gnunet, 2022/06/22
- [libmicrohttpd] 06/11: digest_auth_check_all(): simplified, improved readability, gnunet, 2022/06/22
- [libmicrohttpd] 05/11: MHD_parse_arguments_(): refactored, allow cls for the callback, gnunet, 2022/06/22
- [libmicrohttpd] 08/11: Fixed check for URL match to handle URLs with binary zero, gnunet, 2022/06/22
- [libmicrohttpd] 02/11: configure: added basic support for AIX XLC flags, gnunet, 2022/06/22
- [libmicrohttpd] 09/11: digestauth: removed now unused do-while scope,
gnunet <=
- [libmicrohttpd] 11/11: mhd_str.h: fixed doxy, gnunet, 2022/06/22