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[taler-exchange] branch master updated: implement csr max request elemen


From: gnunet
Subject: [taler-exchange] branch master updated: implement csr max request elements
Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2022 22:46:50 +0100

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lucien-heuzeveldt pushed a commit to branch master
in repository exchange.

The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/master by this push:
     new 251f2b59 implement csr max request elements
251f2b59 is described below

commit 251f2b598730b9a5a692a602bcde050d63c2db84
Author: Lucien Heuzeveldt <lucienclaude.heuzeveldt@students.bfh.ch>
AuthorDate: Sat Feb 5 22:46:36 2022 +0100

    implement csr max request elements
---
 src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_csr.c              | 12 ++++++++++--
 src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refreshes_reveal.c | 10 ++--------
 src/include/taler_crypto_lib.h                       |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_csr.c 
b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_csr.c
index b3fa49f3..af621682 100644
--- a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_csr.c
+++ b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_csr.c
@@ -63,7 +63,15 @@ TEH_handler_csr (struct TEH_RequestContext *rc,
       return (GNUNET_SYSERR == res) ? MHD_NO : MHD_YES;
   }
   csr_requests_num = json_array_size (csr_requests);
-  // FIXME: check number of requests against an upper bound
+  if (TALER_MAX_FRESH_COINS <= csr_requests_num)
+  {
+    return TALER_MHD_reply_with_error (
+      rc->connection,
+      MHD_HTTP_BAD_REQUEST,
+      // FIXME: generalize error message
+      TALER_EC_EXCHANGE_REFRESHES_REVEAL_NEW_DENOMS_ARRAY_SIZE_EXCESSIVE,
+      NULL);
+  }
   struct TALER_CsNonce nonces[GNUNET_NZL (csr_requests_num)];
   struct TALER_DenominationHash denom_pub_hashes[GNUNET_NZL 
(csr_requests_num)];
   for (unsigned int i = 0; i < csr_requests_num; i++)
@@ -86,7 +94,6 @@ TEH_handler_csr (struct TEH_RequestContext *rc,
                                       csr_spec,
                                       i,
                                       -1);
-    GNUNET_JSON_parse_free (csr_spec);
     if (GNUNET_OK != res)
       return (GNUNET_NO == res) ? MHD_YES : MHD_NO;
   }
@@ -158,6 +165,7 @@ TEH_handler_csr (struct TEH_RequestContext *rc,
     }
 
     // derive r_pub
+    // FIXME: bundle all requests into one derivation request (TEH_keys_..., 
crypto helper, security module)
     ec = TEH_keys_denomination_cs_r_pub (denom_pub_hash,
                                          nonce,
                                          r_pub);
diff --git a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refreshes_reveal.c 
b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refreshes_reveal.c
index ce1e273b..3e5401a1 100644
--- a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refreshes_reveal.c
+++ b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refreshes_reveal.c
@@ -31,12 +31,6 @@
 #include "taler-exchange-httpd_keys.h"
 
 
-/**
- * Maximum number of fresh coins we allow per refresh operation.
- */
-#define MAX_FRESH_COINS 256
-
-
 /**
  * Send a response for "/refreshes/$RCH/reveal".
  *
@@ -305,7 +299,7 @@ resolve_refreshes_reveal_denominations (struct 
MHD_Connection *connection,
                                         const json_t *coin_evs)
 {
   unsigned int num_fresh_coins = json_array_size (new_denoms_h_json);
-  /* We know num_fresh_coins is bounded by #MAX_FRESH_COINS, so this is safe */
+  /* We know num_fresh_coins is bounded by #TALER_MAX_FRESH_COINS, so this is 
safe */
   const struct TEH_DenominationKey *dks[num_fresh_coins];
   struct TALER_RefreshCoinData rcds[num_fresh_coins];
   struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_RefreshRevealedCoin rrcs[num_fresh_coins];
@@ -610,7 +604,7 @@ handle_refreshes_reveal_json (struct MHD_Connection 
*connection,
   unsigned int num_tprivs = json_array_size (tp_json);
 
   GNUNET_assert (num_tprivs == TALER_CNC_KAPPA - 1); /* checked just earlier */
-  if ( (num_fresh_coins >= MAX_FRESH_COINS) ||
+  if ( (num_fresh_coins >= TALER_MAX_FRESH_COINS) ||
        (0 == num_fresh_coins) )
   {
     GNUNET_break_op (0);
diff --git a/src/include/taler_crypto_lib.h b/src/include/taler_crypto_lib.h
index 0783b1e8..cf8464b3 100644
--- a/src/include/taler_crypto_lib.h
+++ b/src/include/taler_crypto_lib.h
@@ -1557,6 +1557,12 @@ TALER_planchet_to_coin (const struct 
TALER_DenominationPublicKey *dk,
 /* ****************** Refresh crypto primitives ************* */
 
 
+/**
+ * Maximum number of fresh coins we allow per refresh operation.
+ */
+#define TALER_MAX_FRESH_COINS 256
+
+
 /**
  * Given the coin and the transfer private keys, compute the
  * transfer secret.  (Technically, we only need one of the two

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