[taler-marketing] 01/02: comments; minor fixes

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martin-schanzenbach pushed a commit to branch master
in repository marketing.

commit f0177005a9f03eda2baa6e7c2e628186af284dd3
Author: Martin Schanzenbach <schanzen@gnunet.org>
AuthorDate: Sun Jan 23 23:46:03 2022 +0100

    comments; minor fixes
---
 2022-privacy/privacy.tex | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/2022-privacy/privacy.tex b/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
index 3252298..c0873c4 100644
--- a/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
+++ b/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ system. Our paper attempts to set the record straight.
 }
 
 \section{The ECB cannot be the Guardian of Privacy}
+\label{sec:guardians}
 
 The ECB's report starts with a public interest-oriented self-image of central
 banks. For example, the authors claim that ``central banks operate in the
@@ -86,10 +87,18 @@ ignore this danger and must reestablish the principles of 
personal
 responsibility, personal independence and subsidiarity in the design processes
 for critical infrastructure created by European institutions.
 
+% FIXME:
+% Changed scientifically to demonstrably.
+% It is still unclear here what "the system" is and if it would be
+% mandatory because of technical or regulatory reasons.
+% The monero reference is missing/wrong and I could not find ad hoc references.
 Here the wording of the French report is confusing, as it suggests that
 monitoring would be a mandatory component of the system, which is
-scientifically false: There are many digital currencies that do not allow such
-surveillance, such as Monero~\cite{monero} or Taler~\cite{dold2019}.  Thus, it 
is dangerous for the authors
+demonstrably false: There are many digital currencies that do not allow such
+surveillance, such as Monero~\cite{monero} or Taler~\cite{dold2019}.
+%FIXME dangerous for the authors? What exactly is dangerous?
+% Maybe just say it is false? An incorrect conclusion?
+Thus, it is dangerous for the authors
 of the French report take a possible design choice of an account-based system
 as fact, for example when they write that ``the centralization and data
 tracking of central bank digital currency projects leads to a loss of privacy
@@ -150,17 +159,16 @@ exists, and develop new protocols for this world, this is 
by no means a
 prerequisite to any work on a Digital Euro.  Waiting for the creation of a new
 trusted digital identity at the European level before creating a CBDC may be
 equivalent to postponing the decision indefinitely, and the necessity of first
-deploying a new electronic identity scheme is far from being proven by the
-French report.
+deploying a new electronic identity scheme is not shown by the authors.
 
 What neither report appreciates is that combining payments with such a digital
 identity system would create a serious liability.  Even if central banks were
-neutral custodians of citizens' privacy (see above), the problem is the data
+neutral custodians of citizens' privacy (see Section~\ref{sec:guardians}), the 
problem is the data
 itself.  As Bruce Schneier has concisely argued already in 2016: ``Data is a
 toxic asset.  We need to start thinking about it as such, and treat it as we
 would any other source of toxicity. To do anything else is to risk our
-security and privacy.''~\cite{schneier2016toxic} Despit this well-established
-insight, the ECB report is insunuating to link identities with payments which
+security and privacy.''~\cite{schneier2016toxic} Despite this well-established
+insight, the ECB report is insinuating to link identities with payments which
 consequently and inevitably produces highly sensitive\footnote{Or to stick
 with Schneier's analogy, ``super-toxic''} metadata.  Referring to the toxicity
 of this metadata, Edward Snowden famously said at IETF 93 in 2019
@@ -172,18 +180,21 @@ that \begin{quote} ``(...) we need to get away from 
true-name payments on the
 If the European Union wants to avoid a dystopia of the transparent citizen
 and catastrophic cases of personal data theft, it must enable citizens to put a
 firewall between their identity and their payments.
-Tightly coupling them is thus probably the worst idea so far
-proposed in the design space for CBDCs.
+Tightly coupling them is thus probably the worst idea to entertain in the 
design
+space for CBDCs but is exactly what is proposed.
 
+Citizens themselves are well aware of this aspect and it consequently would
+have a significant impact on acceptance of a CDBC:
 The Swiss population recently rejected a proposal for a national
 E-ID~\cite{eid2021}, and the newly elected German government is promising a
 reversal of ubiquitous data retention (without cause) in
 Germany~\cite{koalitionsvertrag2021}.  The European Parliament has members
 proposing to ban the use of facial recognition in public
-spaces~\cite{euai2021}.  The ECB's proposal ignores the popular rejection of
-treating every citizen as a criminal suspect.  Payment data is typically
-retained for 6 or more years. The missing link in the ECB proposal that would
-show the dystopic reality they would invoke would be a statement that facial
+spaces~\cite{euai2021}.  The ECB's proposal seemingly ignores the popular
+rejection of treating every citizen as a criminal suspect by doubling down.
+Payment data is typically retained for 6 or more years. % FIXME: What is this 
referring to? Is it already retained 6 or more years? Is that proposed?
+The missing link in the ECB proposal that would
+reveal the dystopic reality they would invoke would be a statement that facial
 recognition could be used to conveniently establish the payer's identity --- or
 ``pay with your smile'', as contemporary account-based digital payment
 offerings already put it.  If CBDC payment data is strongly coupled with our
@@ -234,6 +245,10 @@ children as they see fit, instead of taking control.
 
 \section{Addressing Balance Sheet Disintermediation via Self-Custody}
 
+% FIXME: This is probably true in above statements as well but
+% whenever the report is referenced, a more specific pointer would be
+% helpful (e.g. section, paragraph etc).
+% I think the more accessible term (to me) here is "bank run".
 The ECB report describes the risk of (commercial) bank balance sheet
 disintermediation as one of the major risks to consider from the introduction
 of a CBDC.  Basically, the risk is that consumers loosing faith in a
@@ -306,7 +321,7 @@ computational resources, primarily limited by the much 
slower transaction rate
 of the underlying DLT for inbound and outbound on-chain transacitons. The
 resulting system would also provide durable transactions within milliseconds,
 making cryptocurrency payments significantly more practical. However, like
-with e-gold it would do nothing to migitage the environmental cost of
+with e-gold it would do nothing to mitigate the environmental cost of
 (cryptocurrency) mining, so fiat currency remains an environmentally
 preferable choice.
 
@@ -355,6 +370,9 @@ government).
 
 Confidence in fiat currencies is much more complex than what is described in
 the French report, and one must at least include the following elements:
+% FIXME: The first item is a bit odd in combination with the statement below
+% that the properties are fulfilled for Eurp. currencies as a bit further 
above a lot of space was given to
+% the argument that the tokens are not risk free because of the possiblity of 
hyperinflation.
 \begin{itemize}
 \item confidence in the non-inflationary nature of the currency (it can be 
hoarded without significant risk)
 \item confidence in the stability of the exchange rate (it is safe to trade 
with other assets)

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