[taler-marketing] branch master updated: draft

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grothoff pushed a commit to branch master
in repository marketing.

The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/master by this push:
     new efbed82  draft
efbed82 is described below

commit efbed82e19fd0e693bbea9ba24424b252370b12e
Author: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
AuthorDate: Mon Dec 27 14:41:57 2021 +0100

    draft
---
 2022-privacy/privacy.tex | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/2022-privacy/privacy.tex b/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
index 544a3e8..b965f86 100644
--- a/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
+++ b/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
@@ -75,20 +75,50 @@ EZB die eine --- natuerlich am Ende per multi-factor (inkl. 
Biometrie)
 authentifizierte --- Digitale Identitaet zum Bezahlen einfuehren will.
 
 
-\section{Technical Blindspots}
-
-
-2) Einer der Punkte von unserem SNB Paper, dass eine Token-Basierte Loesung 
ein Aufbewahrungsrisko erzeugt, wurde nicht wahrgenommen. So schreiben sie zum 
Thema "excessive hoardings of CBDC" dass "risk-free assets have a negative 
yield (apart from banknotes, which are costly and risky to store in large 
amounts)". Das eine Token-Basierte CBDC genau das gleiche Risiko fuer die 
Besitzer erzeugen wuerde, blenden Sie als Loesungsansatz komplett aus.
+Tokens.
 
-Dafuer wollen Sie "tier one allowances (...) calculated in accordance to
-(...) presumed cash needs". Aus dem CO2-Zertifikatsdisaster haben sie also 
nichts gelernt, wo viele der schlimmsten Firmen sich durch hohe 
Bedarfsmeldungen erst uebertrieben hohe CO2-Quoten zurechtgerechnet haben --- 
und sich dann durch den CO2-Zertifikatsverkauf bereichert haben. Die Idee, man 
koennte solche Bedarfsformeln aufstellen ist aus meiner Sicht naiv, denn da 
wird es wieder Manipulationen geben, wo sich Firmen dann hohe negativzinzfreie 
Quoten ausrechnen lassen. IMO eine ganz s [...]
+Privacy-preserving age-restrictions instead of E-ID.
 
 
-\section{Alternatives}
+\section{Technical Blindspots}
 
-Tokens.
+The ECB report describes the risk of (commercial) bank balance sheet
+disintermediation as one of the major risks to consider from the introduction
+of a CBDC.  Basically, the risk is that consumers loosing faith in a
+commercial bank may shift funds into CBDC, thereby exacerbating the situation.
+The ECB report discusses various strategies, but primarily focuses on limiting
+``hoarding'' of CBDC by imposing a balance limit. They then realize that this
+can be quite difficult, as businesses may have varying needs for CBDC, so a
+fixed low limit would strangle the utility of the CBDC, while a fixed high
+limit may not be effective. They then propose a dynamic limit which they would
+``calculate in accordance to (...) presumed cash needs''.
+
+Here, the ECB fails to learn the hard lessons from the introduction of $CO_2$
+emissions certificates, where initial allocations were calculated based on
+``presumed emission needs'' of certain industries, resulting in windfalls for
+shifty polluters that managed to rig the calculations, giving them excess
+certificates that they could then resell.  If CBDC holdings are limited and
+financially attractive, there will clearly again be businesses profiting from
+organizing their business data to obtain high account limits.  This kind of
+socially unproductive optimization will happen regardless of the specific
+rules that the ECB will design.  Thus, this is a fundamentally flawed design.
+
+The ECB's focus on account-based solutions seems to have caused it to ignore a
+better solution that was proposed in~\cite{snb2021}, even though it was
+clearly on the table: When justifying the need to control hoarding of CBDC,
+the authors write that ``risk-free assets have a negative yield (apart from
+banknotes, which are costly and risky to store in large amounts)''.  Here,
+they presume that hoarding CBDC must be risk-free. However, with Digital Euros
+represented as tokens that citizens hold in self-custody, the CBDC would not
+be risk-free: citizens would have to safeguard their digital devices (both
+physically and against malware). Owners of cryptocurrencies are very familiar
+with the fact that self-custody is risky~\cite{hacks}.  Thus, a CBDC design
+using digital tokens under the control of citizens indirectly provides a good
+solution for hoarding, as self-custody of the digital assets entails a risk,
+quite comparable to the risk of hoarding cash. By analyzing this risk,
+citizens and businesses would themselves determine appropriate individual
+limits for their CBDC holdings based on their actual cash needs.
 
-Privacy-preserving age-restrictions instead of E-ID.
 
 \section{Conclusion}
 

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