[taler-marketing] branch master updated: add references

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     new 6984c0b  add references
6984c0b is described below

commit 6984c0bbf72e690a8c15f23340c575287a4803dd
Author: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
AuthorDate: Fri Mar 26 14:38:17 2021 +0100

    add references
---
 2021-offline/literature.bib | 186 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2021-offline/offline.tex    |  44 +++++++----
 presentations/bank/bank.tex |  39 +---------
 3 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

diff --git a/2021-offline/literature.bib b/2021-offline/literature.bib
index a92fc43..9453c3c 100644
--- a/2021-offline/literature.bib
+++ b/2021-offline/literature.bib
@@ -1,3 +1,48 @@
+@article{cap,
+author = {Gilbert, Seth and Lynch, Nancy},
+title = {Brewer's Conjecture and the Feasibility of Consistent, Available, 
Partition-Tolerant Web Services},
+year = {2002},
+issue_date = {June 2002},
+publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
+address = {New York, NY, USA},
+volume = {33},
+number = {2},
+issn = {0163-5700},
+url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/564585.564601},
+doi = {10.1145/564585.564601},
+abstract = {When designing distributed web services, there are three 
properties that are commonly desired: consistency, availability, and partition 
tolerance. It is impossible to achieve all three. In this note, we prove this 
conjecture in the asynchronous network model, and then discuss solutions to 
this dilemma in the partially synchronous model.},
+journal = {SIGACT News},
+month = jun,
+pages = {51–59},
+numpages = {9}
+}
+
+@misc{christodorescu2020twotier,
+      title={Towards a Two-Tier Hierarchical Infrastructure: An Offline 
Payment System for Central Bank Digital Currencies},
+      author={Mihai Christodorescu and Wanyun Catherine Gu and Ranjit 
Kumaresan and Mohsen Minaei and Mustafa Ozdayi and Benjamin Price and 
Srinivasan Raghuraman and Muhammad Saad and Cuy Sheffield and Minghua Xu and 
Mahdi Zamani},
+      year={2020},
+      eprint={2012.08003},
+      archivePrefix={arXiv},
+      primaryClass={cs.CR}
+}
+
+@InProceedings{chaum1988offine,
+author="Chaum, David
+and Fiat, Amos
+and Naor, Moni",
+editor="Goldwasser, Shafi",
+title="Untraceable Electronic Cash",
+booktitle="Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO' 88",
+year="1990",
+publisher="Springer New York",
+address="New York, NY",
+pages="319--327",
+abstract="The use of credit cards today is an act of faith on the p a t of all 
concerned. Each party is vulnerable to fraud by the others, and the cardholder 
in particular has no protection against surveillance.",
+isbn="978-0-387-34799-8"
+}
+
+
+
 @Article{calhoun2019puf,
   AUTHOR = {Calhoun, Jeff and Minwalla, Cyrus and Helmich, Charles and Saqib, 
Fareena and Che, Wenjie and Plusquellic, Jim},
   TITLE = {Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-Based e-Cash Transaction 
Protocol (PUF-Cash)},
@@ -35,3 +80,144 @@
   year={1988},
   organization={Springer}
 }
+
+@INPROCEEDINGS{samsung2017knox,
+  author={M. {Dorjmyagmar} and M. {Kim} and H. {Kim}},
+  booktitle={2017 19th International Conference on Advanced Communication 
Technology (ICACT)},
+  title={Security analysis of Samsung Knox},
+  year={2017},
+  volume={},
+  number={},
+  pages={550-553},
+  doi={10.23919/ICACT.2017.7890150}}
+
+@INPROCEEDINGS{arm2016alias,
+  author={R. {Guanciale} and H. {Nemati} and C. {Baumann} and M. {Dam}},
+  booktitle={2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)},
+  title={Cache Storage Channels: Alias-Driven Attacks and Verified 
Countermeasures},
+  year={2016},
+  volume={},
+  number={},
+  pages={38-55},
+  abstract={Caches pose a significant challenge to formal proofs of security
+                  for code executing on application processors, as the cache
+                  access pattern of security-critical services may leak secret
+                  information. This paper reveals a novel attack vector,
+                  exposing a low-noise cache storage channel that can be
+                  exploited by adapting well-known timing channel analysis
+                  techniques. The vector can also be used to attack various
+                  types of security-critical software such as hypervisors and
+                  application security monitors. The attack vector uses
+                  virtual aliases with mismatched memory attributes and
+                  self-modifying code to misconfigure the memory system,
+                  allowing an attacker to place incoherent copies of the same
+                  physical address into the caches and observe which addresses
+                  are stored in different levels of cache. We design and
+                  implement three different attacks using the new vector on
+                  trusted services and report on the discovery of an 128-bit
+                  key from an AES encryption service running in TrustZone on
+                  Raspberry Pi 2. Moreover, we subvert the integrity
+                  properties of an ARMv7 hypervisor that was formally verified
+                  against a cache-less model. We evaluate well-known
+                  countermeasures against the new attack vector and propose a
+                  verification methodology that allows to formally prove the
+                  effectiveness of defence mechanisms on the binary code of
+                  the trusted software.},
+    keywords={Security;Cache storage;Timing;Monitoring;Program 
processors;Virtual machine monitors;side channels;hypervisor;cache storage 
channels;verification},
+    doi={10.1109/SP.2016.11},
+    ISSN={2375-1207},
+   month={May},}
+
+@inproceedings{arm2017boomerang,
+  title={BOOMERANG: Exploiting the Semantic Gap in Trusted Execution 
Environments.},
+  author={Machiry, Aravind and Gustafson, Eric and Spensky, Chad and Salls, 
Christopher and Stephens, Nick and Wang, Ruoyu and Bianchi, Antonio and Choe, 
Yung Ryn and Kruegel, Christopher and Vigna, Giovanni},
+  booktitle={NDSS},
+  year={2017}
+}
+@article{zhang2016truspy,
+  title={TruSpy: Cache Side-Channel Information Leakage from the Secure World 
on ARM Devices.},
+  author={Zhang, Ning and Sun, Kun and Shands, Deborah and Lou, Wenjing and 
Hou, Y Thomas},
+  journal={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
+  volume={2016},
+  pages={980},
+  year={2016}
+}
+
+
+
+@Misc{sim2019,
+  author =       {Security Research Labs},
+  title =        {New SIM attacks de-mystified, protection tools now available 
},
+  howpublished =  {\url{https://srlabs.de/bites/sim_attacks_demystified/}},
+  year =         {2019},
+}
+
+@TechReport{intel2020sgx,
+  author =       {Dan Goodin},
+  title =        {Intel SGX is vulnerable to an unfixable flaw that can steal 
crypto keys and more},
+  institution =  {ARS Technica},
+  year =         {2020},
+}
+
+
+
+
+@InProceedings{amd2019,
+  author =       {Mengyuan Li and Yinqian Zhang and Zhiqiang Lin and Yan 
Solihin},
+  title =        {Exploiting Unprotected I/O Operations inAMD’s Secure 
Encrypted Virtualization},
+  booktitle = {USENIX Security Symposium},
+  year =      {2019},
+}
+
+@Misc{sim2020,
+  author =    {Peter Buttler},
+  title =     {WIB Vulnerability: Sim-Card that Allows Hackers to Takeover 
Phones},
+  howpublished = 
{\url{https://readwrite.com/2020/01/06/wib-vulnerability-sim-card-that-allows-hackers-to-takeover-phones/}},
+  month =     {January},
+  year =      {2020},
+}
+
+@Misc{intel2020sgaxe,
+  author =    {Ravie Lakshmanan},
+  title =     {Intel CPUs Vulnerable to New 'SGAxe' and 'CrossTalk' 
Side-Channel Attacks},
+  howpublished = 
{\url{https://thehackernews.com/2020/06/intel-sgaxe-crosstalk-attacks.html}},
+  month =     {June},
+  year =      {2020},
+}
+
+@Misc{intel2006survey,
+  author =    {Alexander Nilsson and Pegah Nikbakht Bideh and Joakim Brorsson},
+  title =     {A Survey of Published Attacks on Intel SGX},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.13598v1.pdf}},
+  year =      {2006},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{arm2017clkscrew,
+author = {Tang, Adrian and Sethumadhavan, Simha and Stolfo, Salvatore},
+title = {CLKSCREW: Exposing the Perils of Security-Oblivious Energy 
Management},
+year = {2017},
+isbn = {9781931971409},
+publisher = {USENIX Association},
+address = {USA},
+abstract = {The need for power- and energy-efficient computing has resulted in 
aggressive cooperative hardware-software energy management mechanisms on modern 
commodity devices. Most systems today, for example, allow software to control 
the frequency and voltage of the underlying hardware at a very fine granularity 
to extend battery life. Despite their benefits, these software-exposed energy 
management mechanisms pose grave security implications that have not been 
studied before.In this  [...]
+booktitle = {Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium},
+pages = {1057–1074},
+numpages = {18},
+location = {Vancouver, BC, Canada},
+series = {SEC'17}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{arm2016cache,
+author = {Lipp, Moritz and Gruss, Daniel and Spreitzer, Raphael and Maurice, 
Cl\'{e}mentine and Mangard, Stefan},
+title = {ARMageddon: Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices},
+year = {2016},
+isbn = {9781931971324},
+publisher = {USENIX Association},
+address = {USA},
+abstract = {In the last 10 years, cache attacks on Intel x86 CPUs have gained 
increasing attention among the scientific community and powerful techniques to 
exploit cache side channels have been developed. However, modern smartphones 
use one or more multi-core ARM CPUs that have a different cache organization 
and instruction set than Intel x86 CPUs. So far, no cross-core cache attacks 
have been demonstrated on non-rooted Android smartphones. In this work, we 
demonstrate how to solve key  [...]
+booktitle = {Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium},
+pages = {549–564},
+numpages = {16},
+location = {Austin, TX, USA},
+series = {SEC'16}
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/2021-offline/offline.tex b/2021-offline/offline.tex
index 65989cd..218b903 100644
--- a/2021-offline/offline.tex
+++ b/2021-offline/offline.tex
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 % * Offline payments should be a fallback, not regular (migitate risks!)
 % * Payments with anonymity should not be "second class" citizens
 
-\title{Why a Digital Euro should be Online-first and Bearer-based}
+\title{Why a Digital Euro should be \\ Online-first and Bearer-based}
 \author{Christian Grothoff \and Florian Dold}
 \date{\today}
 \begin{document}
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ are desirable for distributed systems:
   parts of the distributed system temporarily impossible.
 \end{itemize}
 
-The well-known CAP theorem proves that it is impossible to design a
+The well-known CAP theorem~\cite{cap} proves that it is impossible to design a
 network protocol that simultaneously achieves all three properties.
 For electronic payment systems, this means it is impossible to
 simultaeneously protect against double-spending (Consistency) while
@@ -91,13 +91,15 @@ choices:
 \item Protect against double-spending by taking away
   control over computing from the user, typically using
   hardware security elements that prevent the user from
-  accessing certain functions of the device.
+  accessing certain functions of the device.\footnote{
+    A good example for such a design is~\cite{christodorescu2020twotier}.}
 \item
   % FIXME: this is a bit too technical
   Retroactively identifying the user after network
   connectivity is restored, in privay-preserving systems
   using conditional deanonymization, and attempting to recoup
-  the losses from the double-spending party afterwards.
+  the losses from the double-spending party afterwards.\footnote{
+    A classical example for such a design is~\cite{chaum1988offine}.}
 \end{itemize}
 
 There is no third choice. While there are minor variations how one
@@ -110,10 +112,24 @@ exhaustive.
 If breaking the restrictive computing element's security properties
 gives users the ability to access virtually unlimited funds, they
 will.  Hardware protections typically fall against well-equipped
-adversaries with plenty of time and expertise. Nation-state attackers
-and organized crime may even find it advantageous to force large-scale
-network outages to bring the payment system into a stage where they
-can multi-spend.
+adversaries with plenty of time and expertise.\footnote{Examples of 
vulnerabilities in such
+  hardware security systems 
include~\cite{samsung2017knox,arm2016alias,arm2016cache,arm2017boomerang,arm2017clkscrew,zhang2016truspy,intel2020sgx,intel2006survey,intel2020sgaxe,sim2019,sim2020,amd2019},
 affecting all major hardware security architectures (Intel, Samsung, ARM, AMD, 
and SIM cards).}  When Google published
+an attack on ARMs TrustZone, a key observation of the report (that is not 
uncommon
+for these types attacks) is:
+\begin{quote}
+  ``Unfortunately, the design issue outlined in this blog post is difficult to
+  address, and at times cannot be fixed without introducing additional
+  dedicated hardware or performing operations that risk rendering devices
+  unusable.''
+  -- 
\url{https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/07/trust-issues-exploiting-trustzone-tees.html}
+\end{quote}
+So hardware security is hardly in a better shape than software security,
+and issues can be significantly more expensive to fix.
+
+Given a known vulnerability in an offline payment system, nation-state
+attackers and organized crime may even find it advantageous to force
+large-scale network outages to bring the payment system into a stage where
+they can multi-spend.
 
 Deanonymization is similarly problematic, as the identified individual
 may actually be the victim of a computer crime. Furthermore, even if
@@ -129,12 +145,12 @@ informational self-determination. Forcing users to use 
hardware that
 they do not control is limiting their ability to control and customize
 their digital lives.
 
-In privacy-friendly systems (like those based on Chaum) where citizens
-can use digital cash to make purchases anonymously, adding the ability
-to retroactively deanonymize double-spending users implies that
-accidentally double-spending (say after restoring from backup) voids
-the privacy assurances of the system. A key security property of the
-systems would thus be weakened and becomes brittle.
+In privacy-friendly systems (like those based on
+Chaum~\cite{chaum1988untraceable}) where citizens can use digital cash to
+make purchases anonymously, adding the ability to retroactively deanonymize
+double-spending users implies that accidentally double-spending (say after
+restoring from backup) voids the privacy assurances of the system. A key
+security property of the systems would thus be weakened and becomes brittle.
 
 
 \subsection{Hurting availability}
diff --git a/presentations/bank/bank.tex b/presentations/bank/bank.tex
index f8c47ff..e8cf667 100644
--- a/presentations/bank/bank.tex
+++ b/presentations/bank/bank.tex
@@ -731,52 +731,21 @@ Once everyone is happy with Beta, move to production.
 \end{frame}
 
 
-\begin{frame}[fragile]{Debian Installation Overview (1/3)}
-Recommended {\tt /etc/apt/preferences}:
-
-{\tiny
-\begin{verbatim}
-Package: *
-Pin: release a=stable
-Pin-Priority: 700
-
-Package: *
-Pin: release a=testing
-Pin-Priority: 650
-
-Package: *
-Pin: release a=unstable
-Pin-Priority: 600
-
-Package: *
-Pin: release l=Debian-Security
-Pin-Priority: 1000
-\end{verbatim}
-}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}[fragile]{Debian Installation Overview (2/3)}
+\begin{frame}[fragile]{Ubuntu 20.04 LTS Installation Overview}
 \noindent
-Recommended {\tt /etc/apt/sources.list}:
+Extend your {\tt /etc/apt/sources.list} with:
 
 {\tiny
 \begin{verbatim}
-deb http://ftp.ch.debian.org/debian/ buster main
-deb http://security.debian.org/debian-security buster/updates main
-deb http://ftp.ch.debian.org/debian/ testing main
-deb http://ftp.ch.debian.org/debian/ unstable main
-deb https://deb.taler.net/apt/debian sid main
+deb https://deb.taler.net/apt/ubuntu focal-fossa main
 \end{verbatim}
 }
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}[fragile]{Debian Installation Overview (3/3)}
 \noindent
 Key import and installation:
 
 {\tiny
 \begin{verbatim}
-# wget -O - https://taler.net/static/taler-systems.gpg.key | apt-key add -
+# wget -O - https://taler.net/static/taler-systems.gpg.key | apt-sign add -
 # apt update
 # apt install taler-exchange
 \end{verbatim}

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