[taler-exchange] branch master updated: add check for sufficiently recent version of libgnunetutil, remove now unnecessary crypto blinding logic

[gnunet]

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grothoff pushed a commit to branch master
in repository exchange.

The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/master by this push:
     new e1e9250f add check for sufficiently recent version of libgnunetutil, 
remove now unnecessary crypto blinding logic
e1e9250f is described below

commit e1e9250ff770625d8a81326e6e5f5011f909cfca
Author: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
AuthorDate: Fri Dec 25 08:44:57 2020 +0100

    add check for sufficiently recent version of libgnunetutil, remove now 
unnecessary crypto blinding logic
---
 configure.ac      |   7 +-
 src/util/crypto.c | 423 ------------------------------------------------------
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 424 deletions(-)

diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 6194f835..bd18a430 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -129,11 +129,16 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gnunet/platform.h 
gnunet/gnunet_util_lib.h],
  [AC_CHECK_LIB([gnunetutil], [GNUNET_SCHEDULER_run], libgnunetutil=1)],
   [], [#ifdef HAVE_GNUNET_PLATFORM_H
         #include <gnunet/platform.h>
+       #endif
+        #include <gnunet/gnunet_common.h>
+       #if GNUNET_UTIL_VERSION < 0x00A0104
+        #fail libgnunetutil is too old
        #endif])
 AS_IF([test $libgnunetutil != 1],
   [AC_MSG_ERROR([[
 ***
-*** You need libgnunetutil to build this program.
+*** You need libgnunetutil > 0.14.0 to build this program.
+*** (Yes, ">", libgnunetutil 0.14.0 is NOT enough.)
 *** This library is part of GNUnet, available at
 ***   https://gnunet.org
 *** ]])])
diff --git a/src/util/crypto.c b/src/util/crypto.c
index 4f084b19..a7ea4f4c 100644
--- a/src/util/crypto.c
+++ b/src/util/crypto.c
@@ -25,18 +25,6 @@
 #include "taler_util.h"
 #include <gcrypt.h>
 
-/**
- * Should we use the RSA blind signing implementation from libgnunetutil?  The
- * blinding only works correctly with a current version of libgnunetutil.
- *
- * Only applies to blinding and unblinding, but
- * not to blind signing.
- *
- * FIXME: Can we define some macro for this in configure.ac
- * to detect the version?
- */
-#define USE_GNUNET_RSA_BLINDING 0
-
 
 /**
  * Function called by libgcrypt on serious errors.
@@ -312,280 +300,6 @@ TALER_refresh_get_commitment (struct 
TALER_RefreshCommitmentP *rc,
 }
 
 
-#if ! USE_GNUNET_RSA_BLINDING
-
-
-/**
- * The private information of an RSA key pair.
- *
- * FIXME: This declaration is evil, as it defines
- * an opaque struct that is "owned" by GNUnet.
- */
-struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaPrivateKey
-{
-  /**
-   * Libgcrypt S-expression for the RSA private key.
-   */
-  gcry_sexp_t sexp;
-};
-
-
-/**
- * The public information of an RSA key pair.
- *
- * FIXME: This declaration is evil, as it defines
- * an opaque struct that is "owned" by GNUnet.
- */
-struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaPublicKey
-{
-  /**
-   * Libgcrypt S-expression for the RSA public key.
-   */
-  gcry_sexp_t sexp;
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief an RSA signature
- *
- * FIXME: This declaration is evil, as it defines
- * an opaque struct that is "owned" by GNUnet.
- */
-struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaSignature
-{
-  /**
-   * Libgcrypt S-expression for the RSA signature.
-   */
-  gcry_sexp_t sexp;
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief RSA blinding key
- */
-struct RsaBlindingKey
-{
-  /**
-   * Random value used for blinding.
-   */
-  gcry_mpi_t r;
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Destroy a blinding key
- *
- * @param bkey the blinding key to destroy
- */
-static void
-rsa_blinding_key_free (struct RsaBlindingKey *bkey)
-{
-  gcry_mpi_release (bkey->r);
-  GNUNET_free (bkey);
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Extract values from an S-expression.
- *
- * @param array where to store the result(s)
- * @param sexp S-expression to parse
- * @param topname top-level name in the S-expression that is of interest
- * @param elems names of the elements to extract
- * @return 0 on success
- */
-static int
-key_from_sexp (gcry_mpi_t *array,
-               gcry_sexp_t sexp,
-               const char *topname,
-               const char *elems)
-{
-  gcry_sexp_t list;
-  gcry_sexp_t l2;
-  const char *s;
-  unsigned int idx;
-
-  if (! (list = gcry_sexp_find_token (sexp, topname, 0)))
-    return 1;
-  l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list);
-  gcry_sexp_release (list);
-  list = l2;
-  if (! list)
-    return 2;
-  idx = 0;
-  for (s = elems; *s; s++, idx++)
-  {
-    if (! (l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, s, 1)))
-    {
-      for (unsigned int i = 0; i < idx; i++)
-      {
-        gcry_free (array[i]);
-        array[i] = NULL;
-      }
-      gcry_sexp_release (list);
-      return 3;                 /* required parameter not found */
-    }
-    array[idx] = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
-    gcry_sexp_release (l2);
-    if (! array[idx])
-    {
-      for (unsigned int i = 0; i < idx; i++)
-      {
-        gcry_free (array[i]);
-        array[i] = NULL;
-      }
-      gcry_sexp_release (list);
-      return 4;                 /* required parameter is invalid */
-    }
-  }
-  gcry_sexp_release (list);
-  return 0;
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Test for malicious RSA key.
- *
- * Assuming n is an RSA modulous and r is generated using a call to
- * GNUNET_CRYPTO_kdf_mod_mpi, if gcd(r,n) != 1 then n must be a
- * malicious RSA key designed to deanomize the user.
- *
- * @param r KDF result
- * @param n RSA modulus
- * @return True if gcd(r,n) = 1, False means RSA key is malicious
- */
-static int
-rsa_gcd_validate (gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t n)
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t g;
-  int t;
-
-  g = gcry_mpi_new (0);
-  t = gcry_mpi_gcd (g, r, n);
-  gcry_mpi_release (g);
-  return t;
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Computes a full domain hash seeded by the given public key.
- * This gives a measure of provable security to the Taler exchange
- * against one-more forgery attacks.  See:
- *   https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/002.pdf
- *   http://www.di.ens.fr/~pointche/Documents/Papers/2001_fcA.pdf
- *
- * @param hash initial hash of the message to sign
- * @param pkey the public key of the signer
- * @return MPI value set to the FDH, NULL if RSA key is malicious
- */
-static gcry_mpi_t
-rsa_full_domain_hash (const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaPublicKey *pkey,
-                      const struct GNUNET_HashCode *hash)
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t r, n;
-  void *xts;
-  size_t xts_len;
-  int ok;
-
-  /* Extract the composite n from the RSA public key */
-  GNUNET_assert (0 == key_from_sexp (&n, pkey->sexp, "rsa", "n"));
-  /* Assert that it at least looks like an RSA key */
-  GNUNET_assert (0 == gcry_mpi_get_flag (n, GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE));
-
-  /* We key with the public denomination key as a homage to RSA-PSS by  *
-  * Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway.  Doing this lowers the degree   *
-  * of the hypothetical polyomial-time attack on RSA-KTI created by a  *
-  * polynomial-time one-more forgary attack.  Yey seeding!             */
-  xts_len = GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_public_key_encode (pkey, &xts);
-
-  GNUNET_CRYPTO_kdf_mod_mpi (&r,
-                             n,
-                             xts, xts_len,
-                             hash, sizeof(*hash),
-                             "RSA-FDA FTpsW!");
-  GNUNET_free (xts);
-
-  ok = rsa_gcd_validate (r, n);
-  gcry_mpi_release (n);
-  if (ok)
-    return r;
-  gcry_mpi_release (r);
-  return NULL;
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Create a blinding key
- *
- * @param pkey the public key to blind for
- * @param bks pre-secret to use to derive the blinding key
- * @return the newly created blinding key, NULL if RSA key is malicious
- */
-static struct RsaBlindingKey *
-rsa_blinding_key_derive (const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaPublicKey *pkey,
-                         const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaBlindingKeySecret *bks)
-{
-  char *xts = "Blinding KDF extractor HMAC key";  /* Trusts bks' randomness 
more */
-  struct RsaBlindingKey *blind;
-  gcry_mpi_t n;
-
-  blind = GNUNET_new (struct RsaBlindingKey);
-  GNUNET_assert (NULL != blind);
-
-  /* Extract the composite n from the RSA public key */
-  GNUNET_assert (0 == key_from_sexp (&n, pkey->sexp, "rsa", "n"));
-  /* Assert that it at least looks like an RSA key */
-  GNUNET_assert (0 == gcry_mpi_get_flag (n, GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE));
-
-  GNUNET_CRYPTO_kdf_mod_mpi (&blind->r,
-                             n,
-                             xts, strlen (xts),
-                             bks, sizeof(*bks),
-                             "Blinding KDF");
-  if (0 == rsa_gcd_validate (blind->r, n))
-  {
-    GNUNET_free (blind);
-    blind = NULL;
-  }
-
-  gcry_mpi_release (n);
-  return blind;
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Print an MPI to a newly created buffer
- *
- * @param v MPI to print.
- * @param[out] buffer newly allocated buffer containing the result
- * @return number of bytes stored in @a buffer
- */
-static size_t
-numeric_mpi_alloc_n_print (gcry_mpi_t v,
-                           char **buffer)
-{
-  size_t n;
-  char *b;
-  size_t rsize;
-
-  gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
-                  NULL,
-                  0,
-                  &n,
-                  v);
-  b = GNUNET_malloc (n);
-  GNUNET_assert (0 ==
-                 gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
-                                 (unsigned char *) b,
-                                 n,
-                                 &rsize,
-                                 v));
-  *buffer = b;
-  return n;
-}
-
-
-#endif /* ! USE_GNUNET_RSA_BLINDING */
-
-
 enum GNUNET_GenericReturnValue
 TALER_rsa_blind (const struct GNUNET_HashCode *hash,
                  const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaBlindingKeySecret *bks,
@@ -593,75 +307,11 @@ TALER_rsa_blind (const struct GNUNET_HashCode *hash,
                  void **buf,
                  size_t *buf_size)
 {
-#if USE_GNUNET_RSA_BLINDING
   return GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_blind (hash,
                                   bks,
                                   pkey,
                                   buf,
                                   buf_size);
-#else
-  struct RsaBlindingKey *bkey;
-  gcry_mpi_t data;
-  gcry_mpi_t ne[2];
-  gcry_mpi_t r_e;
-  gcry_mpi_t data_r_e;
-  int ret;
-
-  GNUNET_assert (buf != NULL);
-  GNUNET_assert (buf_size != NULL);
-  ret = key_from_sexp (ne, pkey->sexp, "public-key", "ne");
-  if (0 != ret)
-    ret = key_from_sexp (ne, pkey->sexp, "rsa", "ne");
-  if (0 != ret)
-  {
-    GNUNET_break (0);
-    *buf = NULL;
-    *buf_size = 0;
-    return GNUNET_NO;
-  }
-
-  data = rsa_full_domain_hash (pkey, hash);
-  if (NULL == data)
-    goto rsa_gcd_validate_failure;
-
-  bkey = rsa_blinding_key_derive (pkey, bks);
-  if (NULL == bkey)
-  {
-    gcry_mpi_release (data);
-    goto rsa_gcd_validate_failure;
-  }
-
-  r_e = gcry_mpi_new (0);
-  gcry_mpi_powm (r_e,
-                 bkey->r,
-                 ne[1],
-                 ne[0]);
-  data_r_e = gcry_mpi_new (0);
-  gcry_mpi_mulm (data_r_e,
-                 data,
-                 r_e,
-                 ne[0]);
-  gcry_mpi_release (data);
-  gcry_mpi_release (ne[0]);
-  gcry_mpi_release (ne[1]);
-  gcry_mpi_release (r_e);
-  rsa_blinding_key_free (bkey);
-
-  *buf_size = numeric_mpi_alloc_n_print (data_r_e,
-                                         (char **) buf);
-  gcry_mpi_release (data_r_e);
-
-  return GNUNET_YES;
-
-rsa_gcd_validate_failure:
-  /* We know the RSA key is malicious here, so warn the wallet. */
-  /* GNUNET_break_op (0); */
-  gcry_mpi_release (ne[0]);
-  gcry_mpi_release (ne[1]);
-  *buf = NULL;
-  *buf_size = 0;
-  return GNUNET_NO;
-#endif
 }
 
 
@@ -670,82 +320,9 @@ TALER_rsa_unblind (const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaSignature 
*sig,
                    const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaBlindingKeySecret *bks,
                    struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaPublicKey *pkey)
 {
-#if USE_GNUNET_RSA_BLINDING
   return GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_unblind (sig,
                                     bks,
                                     pkey);
-#else
-  struct RsaBlindingKey *bkey;
-  gcry_mpi_t n;
-  gcry_mpi_t s;
-  gcry_mpi_t r_inv;
-  gcry_mpi_t ubsig;
-  int ret;
-  struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaSignature *sret;
-
-  ret = key_from_sexp (&n, pkey->sexp, "public-key", "n");
-  if (0 != ret)
-    ret = key_from_sexp (&n, pkey->sexp, "rsa", "n");
-  if (0 != ret)
-  {
-    GNUNET_break_op (0);
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  ret = key_from_sexp (&s, sig->sexp, "sig-val", "s");
-  if (0 != ret)
-    ret = key_from_sexp (&s, sig->sexp, "rsa", "s");
-  if (0 != ret)
-  {
-    gcry_mpi_release (n);
-    GNUNET_break_op (0);
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  bkey = rsa_blinding_key_derive (pkey, bks);
-  if (NULL == bkey)
-  {
-    /* RSA key is malicious since rsa_gcd_validate failed here.
-     * It should have failed during GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_blind too though,
-     * so the exchange is being malicious in an unfamilair way, maybe
-     * just trying to crash us.  */
-    GNUNET_break_op (0);
-    gcry_mpi_release (n);
-    gcry_mpi_release (s);
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  r_inv = gcry_mpi_new (0);
-  if (1 !=
-      gcry_mpi_invm (r_inv,
-                     bkey->r,
-                     n))
-  {
-    /* We cannot find r mod n, so gcd(r,n) != 1, which should get *
-    * caught above, but we handle it the same here.              */
-    GNUNET_break_op (0);
-    gcry_mpi_release (r_inv);
-    rsa_blinding_key_free (bkey);
-    gcry_mpi_release (n);
-    gcry_mpi_release (s);
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  ubsig = gcry_mpi_new (0);
-  gcry_mpi_mulm (ubsig, s, r_inv, n);
-  gcry_mpi_release (n);
-  gcry_mpi_release (r_inv);
-  gcry_mpi_release (s);
-  rsa_blinding_key_free (bkey);
-
-  sret = GNUNET_new (struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_RsaSignature);
-  GNUNET_assert (0 ==
-                 gcry_sexp_build (&sret->sexp,
-                                  NULL,
-                                  "(sig-val (rsa (s %M)))",
-                                  ubsig));
-  gcry_mpi_release (ubsig);
-  return sret;
-#endif
 }
 
 

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