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[taler-exchange] branch master updated: add cmd line option to restrict
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From: |
gnunet |
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Subject: |
[taler-exchange] branch master updated: add cmd line option to restrict timetravel, minor code cleanup of keystate logic |
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Date: |
Tue, 17 Mar 2020 17:33:36 +0100 |
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
grothoff pushed a commit to branch master
in repository exchange.
The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/master by this push:
new c17909d8 add cmd line option to restrict timetravel, minor code
cleanup of keystate logic
c17909d8 is described below
commit c17909d8209e18829102c7de2789909722e1af3b
Author: Christian Grothoff <address@hidden>
AuthorDate: Tue Mar 17 17:33:30 2020 +0100
add cmd line option to restrict timetravel, minor code cleanup of keystate
logic
---
src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd.c | 12 ++
src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd.h | 8 +
src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_keystate.c | 291 +++++++++++++++++----------
src/include/taler_error_codes.h | 7 +
src/testing/testing_api_helpers_exchange.c | 1 +
5 files changed, 213 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd.c
b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd.c
index 4095d00f..0754163b 100644
--- a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd.c
+++ b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd.c
@@ -82,6 +82,14 @@ char *TEH_exchange_directory;
*/
char *TEH_revocation_directory;
+/**
+ * Are clients allowed to request /keys for times other than the
+ * current time? Allowing this could be abused in a DoS-attack
+ * as building new /keys responses is expensive. Should only be
+ * enabled for testcases, development and test systems.
+ */
+int TEH_allow_keys_timetravel;
+
/**
* The exchange's configuration (global)
*/
@@ -1183,6 +1191,10 @@ main (int argc,
char *logfile = NULL;
int connection_close = GNUNET_NO;
const struct GNUNET_GETOPT_CommandLineOption options[] = {
+ GNUNET_GETOPT_option_flag ('a',
+ "allow-timetravel",
+ "allow clients to request /keys for arbitrary
timestamps (for testing and development only)",
+ &TEH_allow_keys_timetravel),
GNUNET_GETOPT_option_flag ('C',
"connection-close",
"force HTTP connections to be closed after each
request",
diff --git a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd.h
b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd.h
index 137cee72..512fae8f 100644
--- a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd.h
+++ b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd.h
@@ -43,6 +43,14 @@ extern struct GNUNET_CONFIGURATION_Handle *TEH_cfg;
*/
extern char *TEH_exchange_directory;
+/**
+ * Are clients allowed to request /keys for times other than the
+ * current time? Allowing this could be abused in a DoS-attack
+ * as building new /keys responses is expensive. Should only be
+ * enabled for testcases, development and test systems.
+ */
+extern int TEH_allow_keys_timetravel;
+
/**
* Main directory with revocation data.
*/
diff --git a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_keystate.c
b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_keystate.c
index 5bc89324..4117c13a 100644
--- a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_keystate.c
+++ b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_keystate.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ struct KeysResponseData
{
/**
- * Response to return if the client supports (gzip) compression.
+ * Response to return if the client supports (deflate) compression.
*/
struct MHD_Response *response_compressed;
@@ -212,14 +212,14 @@ struct ResponseFactoryContext
struct TEH_KS_StateHandle *key_state;
/**
- * Length of the @e denomkey_array.
+ * Time stamp used as "now".
*/
- unsigned int denomkey_array_length;
+ struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute now;
/**
- * Time stamp used as "now".
+ * Length of the @e denomkey_array.
*/
- struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute now;
+ unsigned int denomkey_array_length;
};
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ struct TEH_KS_StateHandle
struct GNUNET_CONTAINER_MultiHashMap *revoked_map;
/**
- * Sorted array of responses to /keys (sorted by cherry-picking date) of
+ * Sorted array of responses to /keys (MUST be sorted by cherry-picking
date) of
* length @e krd_array_length;
*/
struct KeysResponseData *krd_array;
@@ -309,6 +309,12 @@ static struct TEH_KS_StateHandle *internal_key_state;
*/
static pthread_mutex_t internal_key_state_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+/**
+ * Configuration value LOOKAHEAD_PROVIDE that says for how far in the
+ * future we want to provide exchange key information to clients.
+ */
+static struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative conf_duration_provide;
+
/* ************************** Clean up logic *********************** */
@@ -368,6 +374,11 @@ destroy_response_builder (struct ResponseBuilderContext
*rbc)
json_decref (rbc->auditors_array);
rbc->auditors_array = NULL;
}
+ if (NULL != rbc->hash_context)
+ {
+ GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash_context_abort (rbc->hash_context);
+ rbc->hash_context = NULL;
+ }
}
@@ -447,7 +458,7 @@ ks_free (struct TEH_KS_StateHandle *key_state)
/**
* Pipe used for signaling reloading of our key state.
*/
-static int reload_pipe[2];
+static int reload_pipe[2] = { -1, -1 };
/**
@@ -458,23 +469,15 @@ static int reload_pipe[2];
static void
handle_signal (int signal_number)
{
- ssize_t res;
- char c = signal_number;
-
- res = write (reload_pipe[1],
- &c,
- 1);
- if ( (res < 0) &&
- (EINTR != errno) )
- {
- GNUNET_break (0);
- return;
- }
- if (0 == res)
- {
- GNUNET_break (0);
- return;
- }
+ char c = (char) signal_number; /* never seen a signal_number > 127 on any
platform */
+
+ (void) ! write (reload_pipe[1],
+ &c,
+ 1);
+ /* While one might like to "handle errors" here, even logging via fprintf()
+ isn't safe inside of a signal handler. So there is nothing we safely CAN
+ do. OTOH, also very little that can go wrong in pratice. Calling _exit()
+ on errors might be a possibility, but that might do more harm than good.
*///
}
@@ -482,11 +485,10 @@ handle_signal (int signal_number)
/**
- * Convert the public part of a denomination key issue to a JSON
- * object.
+ * Convert the public part of denomination key data to a JSON object.
*
- * @param pk public key of the denomination key
- * @param dki the denomination key issue
+ * @param pk public key of the denomination
+ * @param dki the denomination key issue information
* @return a JSON object describing the denomination key isue (public part)
*/
static json_t *
@@ -511,7 +513,9 @@ denom_key_issue_to_json (
TALER_amount_ntoh (&fee_refund,
&dki->properties.fee_refund);
return
- json_pack ("{s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o}",
+ json_pack ("{s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o,"
+ " s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o,"
+ " s:o}",
"master_sig",
GNUNET_JSON_from_data_auto (&dki->signature),
"stamp_start",
@@ -526,6 +530,7 @@ denom_key_issue_to_json (
"stamp_expire_legal",
GNUNET_JSON_from_time_abs (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (
dki->properties.expire_legal)),
+ /* 5 entries until here */
"denom_pub",
GNUNET_JSON_from_rsa_public_key (pk->rsa_public_key),
"value",
@@ -536,6 +541,7 @@ denom_key_issue_to_json (
TALER_JSON_from_amount (&fee_deposit),
"fee_refresh",
TALER_JSON_from_amount (&fee_refresh),
+ /* 10 entries until here */
"fee_refund",
TALER_JSON_from_amount (&fee_refund));
}
@@ -553,20 +559,37 @@ static int
store_in_map (struct GNUNET_CONTAINER_MultiHashMap *map,
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_DenominationKey *dki)
{
- struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_DenominationKey *d2;
- int res;
-
+ /* First, we verify that the @a dki is actually well-formed. While it comes
+ from our own hard disk, there is the possibility of missconfiguration
+ (i.e. bogus file in the directory), or that the administrator used the
+ wrong master public key, and we should not accept entries that are not
+ well-formed. *///
{
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_DenominationKeyInformationP *dkip;
struct TALER_DenominationKeyValidityPS denom_key_issue;
dkip = &dki->issue;
denom_key_issue = dkip->properties;
+ /* The above is straight from our disk. We should not trust
+ that it is well-formed, so we setup crucial fields ourselves. */
denom_key_issue.purpose.purpose
= htonl (TALER_SIGNATURE_MASTER_DENOMINATION_KEY_VALIDITY);
denom_key_issue.purpose.size
= htonl (sizeof (struct TALER_DenominationKeyValidityPS));
denom_key_issue.master = TEH_master_public_key;
+
+ /* Check that the data we read matches our expectations */
+ if (0 !=
+ GNUNET_memcmp (&denom_key_issue,
+ &dkip->properties))
+ {
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
+ "Invalid fields in denomination key `%s'\n",
+ GNUNET_h2s (&dkip->properties.denom_hash));
+ return GNUNET_SYSERR;
+ }
+
+ /* Also check the signature by the master public key */
if (GNUNET_SYSERR ==
GNUNET_CRYPTO_eddsa_verify (
TALER_SIGNATURE_MASTER_DENOMINATION_KEY_VALIDITY,
@@ -581,27 +604,36 @@ store_in_map (struct GNUNET_CONTAINER_MultiHashMap *map,
}
}
- d2 = GNUNET_new (struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_DenominationKey);
- d2->issue = dki->issue;
- if (NULL != dki->denom_priv.rsa_private_key)
- d2->denom_priv.rsa_private_key
- = GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_private_key_dup (dki->denom_priv.rsa_private_key);
- d2->denom_pub.rsa_public_key
- = GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_public_key_dup (dki->denom_pub.rsa_public_key);
- res = GNUNET_CONTAINER_multihashmap_put (map,
+ /* We need to make a deep copy of the @a dki, as the original was allocated
+ elsewhere and will be freed by the caller. */
+ {
+ struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_DenominationKey *d2;
+
+ d2 = GNUNET_new (struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_DenominationKey);
+ d2->issue = dki->issue;
+ if (GNUNET_OK !=
+ GNUNET_CONTAINER_multihashmap_put (map,
&d2->issue.properties.denom_hash,
d2,
-
GNUNET_CONTAINER_MULTIHASHMAPOPTION_UNIQUE_ONLY);
- if (GNUNET_OK != res)
- {
- GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
- "Duplicate denomination key `%s'\n",
- GNUNET_h2s (&d2->issue.properties.denom_hash));
- if (NULL != d2->denom_priv.rsa_private_key)
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_private_key_free (d2->denom_priv.rsa_private_key);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_public_key_free (d2->denom_pub.rsa_public_key);
- GNUNET_free (d2);
- return GNUNET_NO;
+
GNUNET_CONTAINER_MULTIHASHMAPOPTION_UNIQUE_ONLY))
+ {
+ GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+ "Duplicate denomination key `%s'\n",
+ GNUNET_h2s (&d2->issue.properties.denom_hash));
+ GNUNET_free (d2);
+ return GNUNET_NO;
+ }
+
+ /* finish *deep* part of deep copy */
+ if (NULL != dki->denom_priv.rsa_private_key)
+ {
+ /* we might be past the withdraw period, so private key could have been
deleted,
+ so only try to (deep) copy if non-NULL. */
+ d2->denom_priv.rsa_private_key
+ = GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_private_key_dup (dki->denom_priv.rsa_private_key);
+ }
+ d2->denom_pub.rsa_public_key
+ = GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_public_key_dup (dki->denom_pub.rsa_public_key);
}
return GNUNET_OK;
}
@@ -624,33 +656,6 @@ struct AddRevocationContext
};
-/**
- * Get the relative time value that describes how
- * far in the future do we want to provide coin keys.
- *
- * @return the provide duration
- */
-static struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative
-TALER_EXCHANGE_conf_duration_provide (void)
-{
- struct GNUNET_TIME_Relative rel;
-
- if (GNUNET_OK !=
- GNUNET_CONFIGURATION_get_value_time (TEH_cfg,
- "exchange",
- "LOOKAHEAD_PROVIDE",
- &rel))
- {
- GNUNET_log_config_invalid (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
- "exchange",
- "LOOKAHEAD_PROVIDE",
- "time value required");
- GNUNET_assert (0);
- }
- return rel;
-}
-
-
/**
* Execute transaction to add revocations.
*
@@ -771,7 +776,7 @@ reload_keys_denom_iter (void *cls,
}
horizon = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_add (rfc->now,
- TALER_EXCHANGE_conf_duration_provide ());
+ conf_duration_provide);
start = GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (dki->issue.properties.start);
if (start.abs_value_us > horizon.abs_value_us)
{
@@ -944,8 +949,7 @@ reload_keys_sign_iter (
struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute now;
struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute horizon;
- horizon = GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute (
- TALER_EXCHANGE_conf_duration_provide ());
+ horizon = GNUNET_TIME_relative_to_absolute (conf_duration_provide);
if (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_ntoh (ski->issue.start).abs_value_us >
horizon.abs_value_us)
{
@@ -1127,7 +1131,9 @@ initialize_denomkey_array (void *cls,
/**
* Comparator used to sort the `struct DenominationKeyEntry` array
- * by the validity period's starting time of the keys.
+ * by the validity period's starting time of the keys. Must match
+ * the expected sorting by cherry_pick_date (which is based on the
+ * issue.properties.start) used in #krd_search_comparator.
*
* @param k1 a `struct DenominationKeyEntry *`
* @param k2 a `struct DenominationKeyEntry *`
@@ -1460,7 +1466,6 @@ build_keys_response (const struct ResponseFactoryContext
*rfc,
&free_auditor_entry,
NULL);
GNUNET_CONTAINER_multihashmap_destroy (auditors);
- GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash_context_abort (rbc.hash_context);
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
}
@@ -1822,6 +1827,8 @@ make_fresh_key_state (struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute now)
if (last.abs_value_us == d.abs_value_us)
continue;
+ /* must be monotonically increasing as per qsort() call above: */
+ GNUNET_assert (last.abs_value_us < d.abs_value_us);
last = d;
off++;
}
@@ -2277,11 +2284,31 @@ static struct GNUNET_SIGNAL_Context *sigchld;
/**
- * Setup initial #internal_key_state.
+ * Setup initial #internal_key_state and our signal handlers.
*/
int
TEH_KS_init (void)
{
+ if (GNUNET_OK !=
+ GNUNET_CONFIGURATION_get_value_time (TEH_cfg,
+ "exchange",
+ "LOOKAHEAD_PROVIDE",
+ &conf_duration_provide))
+ {
+ GNUNET_log_config_invalid (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
+ "exchange",
+ "LOOKAHEAD_PROVIDE",
+ "time value required");
+ return GNUNET_SYSERR;
+ }
+ if (0 == conf_duration_provide.rel_value_us)
+ {
+ GNUNET_log_config_invalid (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
+ "exchange",
+ "LOOKAHEAD_PROVIDE",
+ "value cannot be zero");
+ return GNUNET_SYSERR;
+ }
if (0 != pipe (reload_pipe))
{
GNUNET_log_strerror (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
@@ -2312,7 +2339,7 @@ TEH_KS_init (void)
/**
- * Finally release #internal_key_state.
+ * Finally release #internal_key_state and our signal handlers.
*/
void
TEH_KS_free (void)
@@ -2322,18 +2349,43 @@ TEH_KS_free (void)
/* Note: locking is no longer be required, as we are again
single-threaded. */
ks = internal_key_state;
- if (NULL == ks)
- return;
- GNUNET_assert (1 == ks->refcnt);
- ks->refcnt--;
- ks_free (ks);
- GNUNET_SIGNAL_handler_uninstall (sigusr1);
- GNUNET_SIGNAL_handler_uninstall (sigterm);
- GNUNET_SIGNAL_handler_uninstall (sigint);
- GNUNET_SIGNAL_handler_uninstall (sighup);
- GNUNET_SIGNAL_handler_uninstall (sigchld);
- GNUNET_break (0 == close (reload_pipe[0]));
- GNUNET_break (0 == close (reload_pipe[1]));
+ if (NULL != ks)
+ {
+ GNUNET_assert (1 == ks->refcnt);
+ ks->refcnt--;
+ ks_free (ks);
+ }
+ if (NULL != sigusr1)
+ {
+ GNUNET_SIGNAL_handler_uninstall (sigusr1);
+ sigusr1 = NULL;
+ }
+ if (NULL != sigterm)
+ {
+ GNUNET_SIGNAL_handler_uninstall (sigterm);
+ sigterm = NULL;
+ }
+ if (NULL != sigint)
+ {
+ GNUNET_SIGNAL_handler_uninstall (sigint);
+ sigint = NULL;
+ }
+ if (NULL != sighup)
+ {
+ GNUNET_SIGNAL_handler_uninstall (sighup);
+ sighup = NULL;
+ }
+ if (NULL != sigchld)
+ {
+ GNUNET_SIGNAL_handler_uninstall (sigchld);
+ sigchld = NULL;
+ }
+ if (-1 != reload_pipe[0])
+ {
+ GNUNET_break (0 == close (reload_pipe[0]));
+ GNUNET_break (0 == close (reload_pipe[1]));
+ reload_pipe[0] = reload_pipe[1] = -1;
+ }
}
@@ -2356,10 +2408,11 @@ TEH_KS_sign (const struct
GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose *purpose,
key_state = TEH_KS_acquire (GNUNET_TIME_absolute_get ());
if (NULL == key_state)
{
- /* This *can* happen if the exchange's keys are
- not properly maintained. */
+ /* This *can* happen if the exchange's keys are not properly maintained
+ (i.e. administrator forgets to provision us with non-expired signing
+ keys or to send signal to reload keys after provisioning). */
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
- "Cannot sign request, no valid keys available\n");
+ "Cannot sign request, no valid signing keys available. Were
they properly provisioned and did you signal the exchange to reload the
keys?\n");
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
*pub = key_state->current_sign_key_issue.issue.signkey_pub;
@@ -2374,8 +2427,8 @@ TEH_KS_sign (const struct
GNUNET_CRYPTO_EccSignaturePurpose *purpose,
/**
- * Comparator used for a binary search for @a key in the
- * `struct KeysResponseData` array.
+ * Comparator used for a binary search by cherry_pick_date for @a key in the
+ * `struct KeysResponseData` array. See libc's qsort() and bsearch() functions.
*
* @param key pointer to a `struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute`
* @param value pointer to a `struct KeysResponseData` array entry
@@ -2437,6 +2490,10 @@ TEH_handler_keys (const struct TEH_RequestHandler *rh,
TALER_EC_KEYS_HAVE_NOT_NUMERIC,
"last_issue_date");
}
+ /* The following multiplication may overflow; but this should not really
+ be a problem, as giving back 'older' data than what the client asks for
+ (given that the client asks for data in the distant future) is not
+ problematic */
last_issue_date.abs_value_us = (uint64_t) cherrypickn * 1000000LLU;
}
else
@@ -2458,11 +2515,26 @@ TEH_handler_keys (const struct TEH_RequestHandler *rh,
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return TALER_MHD_reply_with_error (connection,
- MHD_HTTP_BAD_REQUEST,
+ MHD_HTTP_FORBIDDEN,
TALER_EC_KEYS_HAVE_NOT_NUMERIC,
"now");
}
- now.abs_value_us = (uint64_t) fakenown * 1000000LLU;
+ if (TEH_allow_keys_timetravel)
+ {
+ /* The following multiplication may overflow; but this should not really
+ be a problem, as giving back 'older' data than what the client asks
for
+ (given that the client asks for data in the distant future) is not
+ problematic */
+ now.abs_value_us = (uint64_t) fakenown * 1000000LLU;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Option not allowed by configuration */
+ return TALER_MHD_reply_with_error (connection,
+ MHD_HTTP_BAD_REQUEST,
+ TALER_EC_KEYS_TIMETRAVEL_FORBIDDEN,
+ "timetravel not allowed by this
exchange");
+ }
}
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO,
"Handling request for /keys (%s/%s)\n",
@@ -2474,11 +2546,14 @@ TEH_handler_keys (const struct TEH_RequestHandler *rh,
key_state = TEH_KS_acquire (now);
if (NULL == key_state)
{
- TALER_LOG_ERROR ("Lacking keys to operate\n");
+ /* Maybe client picked time stamp too far in the future? In that case,
+ #MHD_HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR might be missleading, could be more
like a
+ NOT_FOUND situation. But, OTOH, for 'sane' clients it is more likely
+ to be our fault, so let's speculatively assume we are to blame ;-) */
return TALER_MHD_reply_with_error (connection,
MHD_HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
TALER_EC_EXCHANGE_BAD_CONFIGURATION,
- "no keys");
+ "no keys for requested time");
}
krd = bsearch (&last_issue_date,
key_state->krd_array,
@@ -2501,6 +2576,10 @@ TEH_handler_keys (const struct TEH_RequestHandler *rh,
}
if (NULL == krd)
{
+ /* Maybe client picked time stamp too far in the future? In that case,
+ "INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR" might be missleading, could be more like a
+ NOT_FOUND situation. But, OTOH, for 'sane' clients it is more likely
+ to be our fault, so let's speculatively assume we are to blame ;-)
*///
GNUNET_break (0);
TEH_KS_release (key_state);
return TALER_MHD_reply_with_error (connection,
diff --git a/src/include/taler_error_codes.h b/src/include/taler_error_codes.h
index 9a7c544b..0969261a 100644
--- a/src/include/taler_error_codes.h
+++ b/src/include/taler_error_codes.h
@@ -1051,6 +1051,13 @@ enum TALER_ErrorCode
*/
TALER_EC_KEYS_MISSING = 1901,
+ /**
+ * This exchange does not allow clients to request /keys for times
+ * other than the current (exchange) time. This reponse is provied
+ * with an HTTP status code of MHD_HTTP_FORBIDDEN.
+ */
+ TALER_EC_KEYS_TIMETRAVEL_FORBIDDEN = 1902,
+
/**
* The backend could not find the merchant instance specified in the
* request. This response is provided with HTTP status code
diff --git a/src/testing/testing_api_helpers_exchange.c
b/src/testing/testing_api_helpers_exchange.c
index 967a4efb..9f571684 100644
--- a/src/testing/testing_api_helpers_exchange.c
+++ b/src/testing/testing_api_helpers_exchange.c
@@ -762,6 +762,7 @@ TALER_TESTING_setup_with_exchange_cfg (void *cls,
NULL, NULL, NULL,
"taler-exchange-httpd",
"taler-exchange-httpd",
+ "-a", /* some tests may need timetravel
*/
"-c", setup_ctx->config_filename,
NULL);
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- [taler-exchange] branch master updated: add cmd line option to restrict timetravel, minor code cleanup of keystate logic,
gnunet <=