Re: Hey Terekhov: Wallace lost. Who'd guess.... ;)

[Alexander Terekhov]

David Kastrup wrote:
[...]
> > And once again you attempt to misinterpret Wallace's case.
> 
> Well, he _has_ no case, remember?  That's what the court finally rules

Both courts ruled (and erred) on the issue of injury (standing). It's 
the same legal situation as with a case asserting patent infringement 
(for example) filed by someone not owning enforceable rights.

Try reading

http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/FEDERAL/judicial/fed/opinions/02opinions/02-1555.html

might help.

-----
The district court determined that Telepresence held no enforceable 
rights in the ’501 patent at the time it filed suit because the 
assignment of the ’501 patent from Gluck to LNCJ, Ltd., licensor 
of the ’501 patent to Telepresence, was ineffective.  Therefore it 
lacked the cognizable injury necessary to assert standing under 
Article III of the Constitution.  Accordingly, the court dismissed 
Telepresence’s infringement action

[...]

To be given preclusive effect, a judgment must be a final 
adjudication of the rights of the parties and must dispose of the 
litigation on the merits.  See 18A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 4427, at 4-5 (2d ed. 2002).  The 
Ninth Circuit, in common with other federal courts, recognizes that 
standing is a threshold question that must be resolved before 
proceeding to the merits of a case.  L. A. County Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 
979 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) ( “The rules of standing, . . . are 
threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”). 
The doctrine of standing limits federal judicial power and has both 
constitutional and prudential components.  See United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 
544, 551 (1996).  Article III standing, like other bases of 
jurisdiction, must be present at the inception of the lawsuit.  
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570 n.5 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (“[S]tanding is to be determined as of the 
commencement of suit.”); see also Arizonans for Official English 
v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64, 67 (1997) (holding that standing is an 
aspect of the case or controversy requirement, which must be 
satisfied “at all stages of review”); Keene Corp. v. United States, 
508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993)  (“[T]he jurisdiction of the Court depends 
upon the state of things at the time of the action brought.”).  
Pursuant to Article III, “standing . . . is jurisdictional and not 
subject to waiver.”  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1 (1996).

Because standing is jurisdictional, lack of standing precludes a 
ruling on the merits.  Thus, the district court erred in giving 
preclusive effect to the Telepresence judgment because its 
dismissal of Telepresence’s complaint for lack of standing was 
not a final adjudication of the merits.  Scott v. Pasadena 
Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 653-54 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating 
that “[w]e must establish jurisdiction before proceeding to the 
merits of the case”); Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 
1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that before reaching the merits 
of the case, the court must determine the threshold issue of 
standing); accord H.R. Techs. v. Astechnologies, Inc., 275 F.3d 
1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Because lack of standing is not an 
issue that goes to the merits of the underlying patent issues, a 
dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing would not normally 
be expected to be made with prejudice.”).
-----

[...]
> But licenses are bound to particular physical copies.  This is the

The GPL license is "bound" to intangible WORK, not "particular 
physical copies". Stupid.

regards,
alexander.