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bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability
From: |
Stefan Kangas |
Subject: |
bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability |
Date: |
Thu, 24 Nov 2022 23:53:46 -0800 |
"lux" <lx@shellcodes.org> writes:
> I rewrote this code, not use system(1).
Thanks.
> From d6bc71f8640efe7caa2657a75c5aa4d8b4f0532c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: lu4nx <lx@shellcodes.org>
> Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2022 14:38:29 +0800
> Subject: [PATCH] * Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability
>
> ---
> lib-src/etags.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib-src/etags.c b/lib-src/etags.c
> index f665f35fa6..1bb352f565 100644
> --- a/lib-src/etags.c
> +++ b/lib-src/etags.c
> @@ -1387,9 +1387,11 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
> /* From here on, we are in (CTAGS && !cxref_style) */
> if (update)
> {
> - char *cmd =
> - xmalloc (strlen (tagfile) + whatlen_max +
> - sizeof "mv..OTAGS;grep -Fv '\t\t' OTAGS >;rm OTAGS");
> + FILE *otags_f, *tag_f;
> + int buf_len;
> + char *buf;
> + char line[512];
Hmm, I'm not sure about the hard-coded 512 character line limit here.
ISTR that some people use much longer lines than that.
Could we do without it?
(As a matter of style, I would just declare the types at first use,
which limits their scope and makes the code easier to read. But it's up
to you.)
> +
> for (i = 0; i < current_arg; ++i)
> {
> switch (argbuffer[i].arg_type)
> @@ -1400,17 +1402,33 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
> default:
> continue; /* the for loop */
> }
> - char *z = stpcpy (cmd, "mv ");
> - z = stpcpy (z, tagfile);
> - z = stpcpy (z, " OTAGS;grep -Fv '\t");
> - z = stpcpy (z, argbuffer[i].what);
> - z = stpcpy (z, "\t' OTAGS >");
> - z = stpcpy (z, tagfile);
> - strcpy (z, ";rm OTAGS");
> - if (system (cmd) != EXIT_SUCCESS)
> - fatal ("failed to execute shell command");
> +
> + otags_f = fopen ("OTAGS", "w");
> + tag_f = fopen (tagfile, "r");
> +
> + if (otags_f == NULL)
> + pfatal ("OTAGS");
> +
> + if (tag_f == NULL)
> + pfatal (tagfile);
> +
> + buf_len = strlen (argbuffer[i].what) + sizeof ("\t\t ") + 1;
> + buf = xmalloc (buf_len);
> + snprintf (buf, buf_len, "\t%s\t", argbuffer[i].what);
> +
> + while (fgets (line, sizeof (line), tag_f) != NULL)
We should check ferror(tag_f), too and croak if there is a problem.
> + {
> + if (strstr (line, buf) == NULL)
> + fputs (line, otags_f);
Missing error handling for fputs.
> + }
> +
> + fclose (otags_f);
> + fclose (tag_f);
Should be:
if (fclose (otags_f) == EOF)
pfatal (otags_f);
if (fclose (tag_f) == EOF)
pfatal (tag_f);
> +
> + rename ("OTAGS", tagfile);
> + unlink ("OTAGS");
Please add error handling for both of these.
> }
> - free (cmd);
> +
Nit: I don't think the empty line helps here?
> append_to_tagfile = true;
> }
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, lux, 2022/11/24
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, Eli Zaretskii, 2022/11/24
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, Stefan Kangas, 2022/11/24
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, Eli Zaretskii, 2022/11/24
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, lux, 2022/11/24
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, lux, 2022/11/25
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability,
Stefan Kangas <=
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, lux, 2022/11/25
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, Stefan Kangas, 2022/11/25
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, Eli Zaretskii, 2022/11/25
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, Eli Zaretskii, 2022/11/25
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, lux, 2022/11/25
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, Stefan Kangas, 2022/11/25
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, lux, 2022/11/25
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, lux, 2022/11/25
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, Stefan Kangas, 2022/11/26
- bug#59544: [PATCH] Fixed lib-src/etags.c command execute vulnerability, Eli Zaretskii, 2022/11/26