bug#45198: 28.0.50; Sandbox mode

[Philipp Stephani]

Am Sa., 17. Apr. 2021 um 18:33 Uhr schrieb Eli Zaretskii <eliz@gnu.org>:
>
> > From: Philipp Stephani <p.stephani2@gmail.com>
> > Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2021 18:20:15 +0200
> > Cc: Mattias Engdegård <mattiase@acm.org>,
> >       João Távora <joaotavora@gmail.com>,
> >       45198@debbugs.gnu.org, Stefan Kangas <stefankangas@gmail.com>,
> >       Stefan Monnier <monnier@iro.umontreal.ca>, Alan Third 
> > <alan@idiocy.org>
> >
> > That's a fair statement, and I'll try to answer here (and hopefully
> > later in the other thread as well). The sandbox should be able to
> > perform operations that are in some sense not security-relevant:
> > mostly performing computations, reading some necessary files, and
> > writing some diagnostics to standard output. The initial use case can
> > be running byte compilation in a Flymake backend. This would allow us
> > to enable Flymake byte compilation support by default, even on
> > untrusted code, because due to the sandbox that code could never
> > perform harmful operations. The Flymake backend would then use the
> > high-level sandbox functions to asynchronously start byte compilation
> > in a sandbox. The start-sandbox function in turn would launch an Emacs
> > subprocess using bwrap or similar to set up appropriate mount
> > namespaces and apply a Seccomp filter (in the GNU/Linux case).
>
> Thanks.  I think I understand the general idea, but not how to
> translate that into real life.
>
> "Performing computations" in Emacs corresponds to invoking gobs of
> system interfaces, and if we are going to filter most of them, I fear
> we will get a dysfunctional Emacs.  E.g., cursor blinking requires
> accessing the system time, displaying a busy cursor requires interval
> timers, profiling requires signals, and you cannot do anything in
> Emacs without being able to allocate memory.  If we leave Emacs only
> with capabilities to read and write to a couple of descriptors, how
> will the result be useful?

We would definitely allow more stuff (e.g. some other syscalls are
required for Emacs to even start up). For example, Emacs needs to
allocate memory and thus needs mmap/sbrk. Timing functions are not
security-sensitive (timing attacks exist, but should be prevented in
this case by blocking any relevant use of the data such obtained), and
signals only affect the sandboxed Emacs process. The two big things we
need to prevent is writing arbitrary files and creating sockets.
At least initially we should only care about batch mode, though -
nothing prevents interactive mode in a sandbox in principle, but batch
mode is much easier to deal with, and suffices for the Flymake use
case.

>  Even if Flymake byte compilation can live
> in such a sandbox (and I'm not yet certain it can), is that the most
> important situation where untrusted code could be run by Emacs?

It's at least the situation described here, and I think it's pretty
important. Another potential use case would be to allow some
buffer-local evaluation.