Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

[Tom at FlowCrypt]

> Is it possible without facing a user revolt?  No.

SKS does do key parsing though, and we could surely figure out just how big the photo-id is in bytes. I suggest to impose a limit. Does it really need to be any bigger than 10kB? My suggestion:

- impose a 10kB image size limit

- max one image per key

- max 20 uids per key

- max 1kb length per uid

On Sat, Jul 14, 2018 at 3:37 AM, Robert J. Hansen <address@hidden> wrote:

> IMHO Photo-ID should be dropped entirely, I see no point and its just
> ripe for abuse like this..

Unfortunately, we really can't.  They've been part of OpenPGP
certificates for just about twenty years now.  They are an expected part
of the certificate.  Users already scream bloody murder about GnuPG and
Enigmail dropping support for SE packets and those have been deprecated
since 2003.  The idea of just waving a wand and getting rid of a
non-deprecated part of a public key is just ... no.

Is it technically possible?  Yes.  But it would require a significant
amount of redesign: we'd have to parse out the key, recognize images,
drop them, etc.  Right now SKS does *zero* cryptographic verification of
the key data; we'd need to change SKS to introduce at least some crypto
support.

Is it possible without facing a user revolt?  No.

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