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Re: [Sks-devel] Unde(r)served HKPS [was: Underserved areas?]


From: Alain Wolf
Subject: Re: [Sks-devel] Unde(r)served HKPS [was: Underserved areas?]
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 22:30:54 +0100


On 11.01.2018 18:16, Alain Wolf wrote:
> 
> Opinions, ideas anyone?
> 

Maybe something along the line of ...

1) Server operator puts his PGP fingerprint in the servers contact
information (as we do today but would need to be mandatory HKPS).

2) Server operator creates server private key and CSR.

3) Server operator stores CSR on the server in something like
./well_known/hkps/0x27a69fc9a1744242.csr

3) Server operator signs the CSR with his PGP key and puts the signature
in ./well_known/hkps/0x27a69fc9a1744242.csr.asc

4) Kristian's hourly checking script does the usual tests but
additionally tries to fetch the CSR from its .well-known location.
Checks if the PGP signature of the CSR was done with the key who's
fingerprint is in the servers contact information.

5) The script signs the CSR with the CA key and sends the signed cert to
the server operator in a PGP encrypted mail.

6) Server operator installs the signed cert on his server.

7) The checking script could do some HKPS checks. Valid certificate? Not
expired? Deprecated ciphers? Perfect forward-secrecy? etc.
If everything checks-out server is added to hkps.pool (This might
already be the case today)

Cert expiry could be 3 months, checking script removes any server from
the pool who's cert expires in the next 24 or 48 hours. Cert should not
be valid longer then the operators PGP key.

For certificates renewals, the process could be the same, a new
certificate is issued as soon as the checking script finds a new CSR (or
the same CSR but a new PGP signature along with it).

Server cert revocations could be requested manually by asking the CA
operator or automatically by placing a PGP signed
0x27a69fc9a1744242.revoke.asc file in to the .well-known directory.

Revocation or expiry of the servers operators PGP key, should lead
automatically to the revocation of the server cert and removal of the
server from the pool.

After a while this could be made mandatory. So 100% of the sks-pool
servers are also in the hkps.pool

Creation of server keys, CSR and PGP signing could be automated (or
partly automated because of the PGP signing) by scripts distributed with
the SKS software package.

I don't think I am really qualified for designing new security
protocols, but the idea doesn't go out of my head. Sorry for the long post.

Regards

Alain

-- 
pgpkeys.urown.net 11370 # <address@hidden> 0x27A69FC9A1744242

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